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ABSTRACT
Recycling and Reuse of Radioactive Material

by

Thomas Joseph O’Dou

Dr. Kenneth Czerwinski, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Chemistry
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The Radiochemistry Program at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (UNLV) has a Radiation Protection Program that was designed to
provide students with the ability to safely work with radioactive materials
in quantities that are not available in other academic environments.
Requirements for continuous training and supervision make this unique
program capable of turning out graduates that have an understanding of
contamination and dose control techniques that complement their
knowledge of the elements that they work with. The Program has also
adopted a radionuclide recovery and reuse program that has provided
materials from other universities, government agencies, and private
companies for use in experiments.
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1. CHAPTER 1
RECOVERY OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS FOR REUSE
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
1.0 Radionuclides Used in the UNLV Radiochemistry Program
The radiochemistry program at the University of Nevada Las Vegas
(UNLV)

is

a

comprehensive,

research

intensive

program

that

is

collaboration between the Departments of Health Physics and Chemistry.
The research within the program focuses on the radioelements, primarily
the actinides and technetium (Table 1-1). The isotope

99Tc,

with a half-

life of 2.13x105 years and beta emission energy (Emax) of 293.7 keV is
used in a range of studies. Isotopes of thorium, uranium, neptunium,
plutonium, americium, and curium have been examined in solutions and
solid phases. These research efforts span from basic studies to applied
experiments.

All

this

research

effort

necessitates

the

usage

of

radionuclides. Obtaining these radionuclides, and using them in a safe
manner, is central to the success and capabilities of the program.
This combination of work with actinides and

99Tc

and the provision

of safety make for a unique learning atmosphere within the PhD
radiochemistry program. This combination also provides an opportunity
to develop, evaluate, and document issues associated with radionuclide
usage in an educational setting. The recycling of radionuclides from in
house experiments or outside sources provides a means to preserve a
relatively rare resource. Additionally, the ability of students to work with
these radioelements necessitates the development of a unique radiation
1

safety program. These novel attributes of the UNLV Radiochemistry
program are explored and used as a basis for developing a means of
radionuclide reuse and documenting the necessary radiation safety for
their use in experiments. This combination of radionuclide usage and
applied health physics is exceptional and provides the basis for the
unique contribution contained within this document.
Obtaining

and

using

radioactive

materials

are

cost-driven

activities. Often it is difficult to obtain suitable concentrations of
radioelements. Initially their purchase may be high, if obtainable, and
the analysis of their properties may become expensive. Reuse of
experimental residue by recovering the radionuclide to an identifiable
chemical form provides a route to reduce costs and supply a scarce
resource. A component of this project focuses on the recycling and reuse
of radioactive materials. This reduces procurement and disposal costs,
and minimizes the generation of hazardous waste products that contain
radioactive materials.
Another unique aspect of this work was development of the
radiation safety program for measurable masses of radionuclides in an
academic setting. The vision was a defined program that allowed
research use of technetium and actinide isotopes in experiments. These
experiments require quantities that have contamination control and
serious exposure implications. The program development was facilitated
by

unprecedented

changes

to

the

radioactive

materials

license,

procurement of control equipment, and training. Use of long lived
2

radionuclides by many faculty members, post-doctoral candidates,
visiting scientists and students in many laboratories on campus has
changed UNLV’s image in the research community. The radiation safety
described in this work is a central component to the noted and
acknowledged radiochemistry capabilities at UNLV.
Table 1-1. Common Radionuclides used in Radiochemistry at UNLV

Nuclide

Half-Life

Specific Activity

Annual Limit
on Intake

Emissions

99Tc

2.13x105 a

6.27x108 Bq/g

2.59x107 Bq



232Th

1.41x1010 a

4.04x103 Bq/g

3.7x101 Bq



233U

1.62x105 a

3.5x108 Bq/g

1.48x103 Bq



235U

7.1x108 a

7.9x104 Bq/g

1.48x103 Bq



238U

4.46x109 a

1.25x104 Bq/g

1.48x103 Bq



237Np

2.14x106 a

2.61x107 Bq/g

1.48x102 Bq



239Pu

2.44x104 a

2.27x109 Bq/g

2.22x102 Bq



241Am

4.29x102 a

1.28x1011 Bq/g

2.22x102 Bq



243Am

7.94x103 a

6.86x109 Bq/g

2.22x102 Bq



244Cm

1.76x101 a

3.08x1012 Bq/g

3.7x102 Bq
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1.1 Sources for Procurement of Radionuclides for Experiments
In the laboratory the option of using milligram to kilogram
quantities of these radionuclides enhances the ability to observe the
result of chemical reactions in both the solution and solid phase.
Radionuclides that are used in experiments are usually obtained
commercially from companies that purchase larger quantities and
dispense them in solutions, solids, or plated on materials [1]. The source
of those radionuclides is typically government laboratories, research or
production reactors, or laboratories with the ability to produce
radionuclides using an accelerator [2]. The availability of radionuclides is
typically associated with the demand. If the demand is low, it may only
be available at times when the need is demonstrated and the conditions
are right for production. For the UNLV radiochemistry program,
radionuclide needs are often independent of this demand.
For some radionuclides, costs and availability can hinder or
prevent experiments. There is no standard for determination of the cost
as prices vary widely between vendors. Exploring the availability and
pricing options will provide an extensive array of both (Table 1-2). For
less commonly used radionuclides, such as transuranic elements,
239Pu,

243Am,

237Np,

this expense can increase substantially. Two prime

considerations in the cost of the material are the quality of both the
compound and the quality of the radionuclide analysis. Activity that is
traceable to a standardizing entity [3] such as the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) in the United States or Physikalisch4

Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB) in Europe has a large fee associated
with support of the facility. The cost is typically associated with the need
for calibration of specialty measurement equipment and specially trained
personnel. The compound available for high activity, long lived
radionuclides is typically a chemically stable molecule that may be
suitable for the intended work. In many cases, chemical methods are
applied to change the compound with the intention of making novel
applications of radionuclides, or providing a platform from which to
synthesize other compounds.
Table 1-2. Cost of Radioactive Compounds used at UNLV Since 2006
Compound

Radionuclide

Manufacturer/Date

Cost ($ per MBq)

Uranyl Nitrate
Hexahydrate
UO2(NO3)2∙6H2O

238U

International Bioanalytical Industries, Inc.
2006

$321.00

Ammonium
Pertechnetate
NH4[TcO4]

99Tc

Oak Ridge National
Laboratory
2006

$1.59

Plutonium Nitrate
Pu(NO3)4

239Pu

Ekert & Ziegler Isotope
Products Laboratory
2006

$121.89

Neptunium Nitrate
NpO(NO3)

237Np

Ekert & Ziegler Isotope
Products Laboratory
2006

$70.74

Americium
Chloride AmCl3

241Am

Ekert & Ziegler Isotope
Products Laboratory
2006

$29,054.00

5

In 2007, an in-house price comparison was done to determine the
cost and availability of

244Cm

for experimentation. Estimates were

received from Oak Ridge National Laboratory and Ekert & Ziegler
Laboratories. The cost of 0.5 mg, 1500 MBq, from the national laboratory
was $5682.00. The cost of 1.2 g, 3.7 MBq, of this radionuclide from a
commercial laboratory was $2300.00 for a nominal solution (±15%) and
$2860.00 for a calibrated (±2.5%) solution [4]. While the purchase from
the national laboratory is attractive from a quantity standpoint (400
times as much for 2 times the price), consideration must be given to the
quantity needed for the research and the quality of the product. As a
result of this comparison, the decision was to purchase the calibrated
solution from the commercial laboratory for the experiments. This
solution was provided at a lower cost with a certified analysis. Another
benefit of this purchase was a minimization of total activity, enhancing
contamination control capabilities.
1.2 Disposal of Radioactive Material
In the United States disposal of radioactive material is a controlled
process that provides a high degree of assurance that radioactive wastes
will be transferred from a radioactive material licensee to a licensed
radioactive waste disposal site. The foundation for the process of
controlling waste is in Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations, Title
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Energy [5].

6

Each of the low level radioactive waste disposal sites in the United
States have restrictions on the type of materials that are allowed [6]. For
example, the US Ecology Richland Washington facility may not receive
mixed waste. Mixed wastes are materials that generate toxic gases,
vapors, or fumes, or pyrophoric, hazardous, dangerous, or explosive
items. This exclusion of mixed waste is a necessary measure to protect
the integrity of the site [7] [8]. The impact on the radiochemistry program
is associated with the need to comply with regulation and prevent mixed
waste production, as limited disposal is available.
The costs of disposal at commercial sites may be associated with
the volume, mass, activity, activity concentration, radionuclides present,
and any hazardous chemicals that may require processing before the
waste is accepted for burial [9]. The most recent price for disposal of dry
low level radioactive waste generated at UNLV in 2009, has been
approximately $1000.00 per 55 gallon (208 L) drum [10]. UNLV uses a
‘waste broker’ [11] [12] to facilitate the removal of these wastes from the
campus and their delivery to a licensed low level radioactive waste site. A
waste broker is a commercial service that will collect and combine wastes
from other facilities, minimize waste volume through compaction, and
deliver the waste to a licensed disposal facility. Use of a broker is
important to reduce waste costs, eliminate transportation costs and
provide expert consultation regarding the site to be used for disposal.
The waste collected for disposal in the radiochemistry laboratories
is non-radioactive waste, non-radioactive hazardous waste, or low level
7

radioactive waste. These wastes may be either solid or liquid. There are
currently four listed wastes, F-list (from non-specific sources), K-list
(from specific sources), P-list (acutely hazardous discarded commercial
chemical products), and U-list (discarded commercial chemical products)
[13]. Listed and characteristic hazardous waste require controlled
disposal. Treatments such as neutralization or solidification [14] may be
necessary to allow their proper burial. This is of course also true of the
disposal practices for radioactive wastes that have a hazardous
component in order to prevent damage to the waste site from the
hazardous waste.
Disposal costs for mixed waste are associated with the removal or
neutralization of the hazardous component. If processes are not available
to separate these materials, the waste may be solidified or encapsulated
to allow disposal. Since each of these processes requires special facilities,
resources, and trained personnel, the costs of disposal are high for mixed
waste compared to solely radioactive waste. An exact price for disposal of
mixed wastes requires a detailed analysis of the radioactive and
hazardous components of the waste by a certified laboratory and an
evaluation of the processing and disposal costs of the resulting
components by the commercial disposal facility. It is therefore prudent to
prevent the generation of mixed waste and if it cannot be prevented, its
volume and hazardous nature must be minimized to allow removal of the
hazard or removal of the radionuclide.
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1.3 Use of Radioactive Materials in Experiments
Radioactive materials are used in research to identify the behavior
of radionuclides in chemistry [15], identify properties for commercial
exploitation [16], evaluate their transport in the human body and the
environment [17] [18], and determine safe means for their disposal [19].
Together with the Authorized Radioactive Material User, the researcher
decides to use radioactive materials available in storage or from a
commercial vendor. The decision will provide two benefits if recycled
material is available, the material can be dispensed to the researcher
within a short time and the material has no financial drain on the
research funds. If the decision is made to purchase radioactive materials,
there may be a waiting period while the radio-chemicals are prepared,
usually up to 6 weeks. Additionally there is a cost and time component
associated with commercial radionuclide procurement. The sequence of
obtaining

and

using

radioactive

materials

in

the

radiochemistry

laboratories at UNLV is explained in Figure 1-1.
The User has the overall responsibility for the radioactive material
in their laboratories. The User assigns a laboratory and equipment for
the trained researcher to work. A protocol is devised that provides
technique,

equipment,

safety,

storage

and

waste

considerations

associated with the radionuclide(s) and experiment [20]. Use of the
material is documented in a tracking log [21], and the experiment
proceeds. While the experiment is in progress, the researcher is
responsible to document disposal and the content of residues that may
9

be useful for recovery. Upon completion of the experiment a recovery
analysis may be useful to identify whether recovery of the radionuclides
from any residue is beneficial. The availability of these records provides a
means to reuse radionuclides within the program.
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Figure 1-1. Flow Chart for Use of Radioactive Materials in Radiochemistry
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1.4 Residue Recycling
Recycling of materials from experiment residue eliminates the
concerns for mixed waste generation and provides radionuclides for use
in future experiments [22]. Radionuclides used in experiments can be
expensive; reuse reduces costs associated with replacement and waste
disposal. In Chapter 3, an evaluation method to determine the feasibility
of reuse of materials residues generated from laboratory experiments will
be discussed. If the residues can be broken down and converted to an
identified chemical form with a reasonable procedure, then recovery
should be the desired option. Furthermore, the concept of recycling
residues to obtain valuable radionuclides can be expanded to industrial
application (see Chapter 4). As the Radiochemistry Program grows and
expands its use of radionuclides, it is even more desirable to recover
material upon completion of their experiments due to increased scarcity
of even common uranium compounds. Since the researchers are the
most familiar with their experiments, they would be the best suited to
propose

the

appropriate

techniques

for

recovery

and

provide

a

description of the final residue.
The products of experiments in radiochemistry laboratories are
typically a prepared, well-defined compound plus liquid and solid wastes.
The intended product has a known structure and has been characterized
by analysis from a host of techniques. The low level solid radioactive
waste products, primarily laboratory gloves and other consumables are
disposed in the laboratories. The liquid residues contain products of the
12

experiments that have hazardous and radioactive components (See
Chapter 3). These residues often contain reaction byproducts of
radionuclides

in

both

liquid

and

solid

forms.

Recovery

of

the

radionuclides to an identified chemical form represents a means to reuse
these isotopes in experiments.
The decision to recover radioactive materials from experimental
products should be based on the value of the radionuclides and ease of
separation. Labeling residues based on their expected chemistry provides
a starting point for recovery. In planning any recovery, the researcher
who produced the material should be consulted. Since recovery often
deals with the seldom investigated part of an experiment, the desirability
of recovery is not always an easy decision to make. In order to recover
radioactive materials from liquid or solid residues of radiochemistry
experiments, there must be a series of evaluations to answer the
questions that follow:


Is the radionuclide worthwhile to recover?



Is the recovery cost efficient?



Does the material present a hazard?

In many cases, the decision to recover the material can be made with a
simple evaluation regarding radionuclide quantity. For example, if the
total radionuclide stock is large (kg) compared to the amount in the
experimental product (mg or g), then recovery may not be desirable. A
more difficult decision will be required when there is valuable material to
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recover but separation will be difficult. In this case leveraging established
laboratory procedures can facilitate recovery.
Figure 1-2 provides some important considerations in determining
recycling feasibility. Costs of recovery are radionuclide and residue
specific. Consider the following example for recovery of

239Pu

from a

residue. An experiment has created a product that can be broken down
with minimal effort and the cost for materials and labor is less than
$500.00. The radioactive compound used in creation of the product cost
$8,000.00. The cost for disposal of the product, a mixed waste, is
$2000.00. Considering a 90% recovery, the value of the material
recovered is $7,200.00. In this example, the financial decision may be
either the primary or sole consideration. Therefore, the gains (avoided
cost of disposal and value of material recovered = $2000.00 + $7200.00)
compared to losses (cost of recovery = $500.00) would indicate that
recovery is a reasonable decision. If the solution that was created is not
well documented then the decision to recover may not be justifiable.
Once the administrative evaluation is complete and the residue is
determined to be valuable, the ability to define a recovery method is then
made. The recovery effort should put the radionuclides in a condition
that allows their reuse.
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Figure 1-2. Recovery Flowchart for Radioactive Material Used in Research

Products that have been recovered must have an identified
chemical form of known purity to be usable in further experiments.
Ideally the level of purity should be similar to commercially available
material. The material can be characterized with a range of techniques
designed to identify chemical concentrations. Within the UNLV program
these include atomic emission spectroscopy, mass spectroscopy, UVVisible spectroscopy, and radiochemical methods [23] [24]. If the
experiments will simply involve use of the activity of the radionuclide and
the chemical compound is not important, then characterization may only
involve simple activity determination. When the product of recovery is
available for reuse, the properties of the material must be made
available. These properties include chemical form, isotopes, and any
15

impurities. If the final form is a solution then the matrix composition and
radionuclide concentration needs to be reported.
1.5 Recovery Methods
There are a number of simple techniques that can be used to
separate radionuclides from a mixture of chemicals. These include
filtration [25], precipitation [26], evaporation [27], ion exchange [28], and
extraction [29]. This section will describe some methods that might be
used for recovery of a material of interest. In order to use one of these
processes, it is important that the mixture conform to the needs of the
method. This may require a pretreatment such as precipitation or
solution neutralization. For example, solutions that are known to be
destructive to filters may require pH neutralization as a pre-treatment.
The recovery method is intended to remove what has been determined to
be a valuable quantity of radioactive material based on analysis of a
sample aliquot or prior knowledge of the solution.
An example of evaporation as a removal method is described. The
rotary evaporator provides a means to enclose the evaporation process to
reduce emissions and losses. With evaporation, it is usually the intent to
remove a volatile liquid that is the solvent matrix for the radionuclide.
Where many solvents or liquids with a low flash point are combined, it
may be reasonable to use multiple collection temperatures on a rotovap,
Figure 1-3, to allow extraction of reasonably clean solvents. In order to
use this method, the residue must have one or more volatile liquids and
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the material of interest must be in a chemical form that is less volatile. If
the above condition is met, the volatile liquid(s) will be evaporated from
the remainder of the solution using a rotary evaporator or similar device.

Figure 1-3 Typical Rotovap Evaporation Apparatus

In cases where the residue matrix is well known, the final
evaporative state may be a suitable final product. As an example, for a
radionuclide in an acid, the resulting radioelement salt can be a suitable
final product. For an organic residue, the final product may require
further treatment. As an example, technetium in a hydrocarbon organic
residue can be treated by steam reforming to produce the metal [30]. An
important consideration for some materials is their volatility in different
compounds; enclosed apparatus such as the rotovap will help to prevent
loss. Many other techniques for removal of radionuclides from solutions,
17

this is the subject of many chemistry courses too extensive to add to this
document. The separation techniques to be used should be researched
so that the most appropriate technique for recovery of the materials of
concern is used.
1.6 Donated Material
Many organizations have donated radionuclides to the UNLV
Radiochemistry Program in the past several years (Table 1-3). Materials
obtained were planned for disposal by other radioactive material
licensees but were instead transferred to UNLV. These donations have
resulted in procurement of many materials useful to the university for
very low cost. The methods to receive, license and control these materials
are inherent in the UNLV Radiation Safety Program. The savings by the
donating licensee was sufficient incentive for a donation. Confirmation of
the chemical and radiological purity of the donated samples is necessary
prior to finalization of the transaction. The material received in donations
has been adequate for reuse. A list of some of the materials in a typical
donation received is shown in Table 1-4. The items received were labeled
and assigned a number from the radiochemistry stock tracking system.
As the materials were received, the quantity and inventory was controlled
by continuous communication with the UNLV Radiation Safety Office.
Over the years 2006 to 2010 the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)
understood that the UNLV Radiochemistry Program was not taking the
‘waste’ products from other facilities; it was taking the facility’s excess
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materials for reuse rather than having them dispose of useful
radionuclides.
The

suitability

of

a

donation

to

provide

benefit

to

the

Radiochemistry program must be thoroughly evaluated to prevent receipt
of materials that will require costly disposal or cause an unsafe situation.
Considerations appropriate for a useful donation are; radionuclide(s),
quantity, age and stability of the compound(s), and purity. The
documented radionuclides and their activity must provide assurance that
the material will be usable. The age should be considered so that there is
confidence that there has not been ingrowth of radionuclides that provide
an undesirable radiological hazard; the stability of the compound should
be such that it remains usable, and the purity should be adequate to
provide for reuse. Some complications that interfere with the ability to
know the purity are related to the radio-sensitivity of the compound. If
there

is

sufficient

activity

in

the

compound,

there

should

be

consideration given to radiolytic degradation.
Plutonium was received in the form of two NIST standards that had
documentation indicating isotope composition. Each standard contained
250 mg of solid plutonium sulfate. The value of this material to the
program is very high as the costs of plutonium for experiments in 2007
had been as much as $10,000 for 5 ml of liquid containing 1 mg of

239Pu.

Many different uranium compounds were received such as oxide, acetate,
formate, nitrate, oxalate, sulfate, and chloride, commonly as the
hexavalent oxidation state.
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Table 1-3. Radioactive Compounds Donated to UNLV
Compound

Radionuclide(s)

Manufacturer

Cost

Plutonium Sulfate
Tetrahydrate
Pu(SO4)2∙4H2O

238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu,

National Institute of
Standards &
Technology

Approximately
$1500.00, the cost
of shipping.

Uranyl Nitrate
235UO (NO ) *6H O
2
3 2
2

235U

Argonne National
Laboratory

No cost

Uranyl Nitrate
238UO (NO ) *6H O
2
3 2
2

238U

Many

No cost

Uranyl Acetate

238U

Many

No cost

Uranyl Sulfate

238U

Many

No cost

Thorium Nitrate

232Th

Many

No cost

241Pu
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Table 1-4. A Transfer of Radioactive Compounds from the University of

Massachusetts at Amherst in 2009
Manufacturer

Net Uranyl
Acetate Mass
(g)

Mallinckrodt

297.15

Fisher Lot 772508

55.75

Fisher Lot 745119

16.75

Fisher Lot 731493

13.45

Fisher Lot 770672

24.19

Fisher Lot 745119

21.49

Fisher Lot 725175

15.66

Fisher Lot 772764

105.85

Fisher Lot 741569

112.53

Fisher Lot 725175

112.17

Total Net Mass of Uranyl Acetate (grams):

774.99

Total Uranium (238U grams):

441.21

Total

238Uranium

Activity (Bq):

5.49x106

Specific donations sought from other radioactive material licensees
across the United States have helped to build a stockpile of uranium,
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thorium, and plutonium sufficient to provide for research with these
actinides for years into the future (Table 1-5). This clearly indicates that
there were many facilities that took advantage of the offer for UNLV to
utilize their excess. For small facilities, radiological control agencies,
universities, and even high schools, it was advantageous for the UNLV
Radiochemistry Program to provide this service. There were other
facilities that had materials they wanted to donate; however, the inability
to ship the material or the lack of a method to ship the material provided
a barrier that could not be overcome. In other cases, some recognized a
liability that their management considered unacceptable. While the
majority of the donors were eager to provide the materials that were
needed without stipulation, some of the more stringently regulated
agencies were concerned with our ability to provide them with closure to
their obligation for the subject materials.
Materials recovered that were typically planned for disposal by
other radioactive material licensees may not have a purity that would be
expected when purchased from a chemical manufacturer. It is prudent to
inspect any donated radioactive compounds to verify that the purity is
adequate for the intended experiment. Initially, this may be completed by
obtaining and evaluating documentation of any work performed on the
subject material by the original licensee. Table 1-5 lists the donations
that have been received since donations were first received in 2006.
Another risk taken when accepting a donation is the possibility that the
material has already been used in experiments and what is received is
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actually a residue that may or may not be acceptable for further
research. In this situation, the extra evaluative step to provide prevention
from receiving a waste product can be important.
Table 1-5. Summary of Radioactive Material Donations Received

Donor
U Mass at Amherst
U Mass at Amherst
U Mass at Amherst
Brown University
Brown University
Brown University
Brown University
Brown University
VA E. Colorado
U Texas at Austin
U Texas at Austin
Cal State Fresno
Cal State Fresno
Cal State Fresno
Cal State Fresno
U Nevada Reno
U Nevada Reno
U Nevada Reno
U Nevada Reno
U Nevada Reno
New York Med Col
Penn State U
Florida Dept. of
Radiation Control
Rensselaer
Polytech Institute
Battle Mountain
High School

Radionuclide
238U

Compound
Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Nitrate
Mg-Na-Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Oxalate
Mg-Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Oxide
Uranyl Formate
Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Nitrate

238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu,

Mass
(g)
1138
503
229
305
10
25
50
5
265
600

Plutonium Sulfate

0.5

238U

Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Nitrate
Uranyl Sulfate
Zn-Uranyl Acetate
Uranyl Acetate
Uranium Oxide
Uranyl Nitrate
Thorium Nitrate
Thorium Chloride
Uranyl Nitrate
Uranyl Nitrate

900
860
160
50
1260
2800
50
1350
100
172.5
168

238U

Uranyl Nitrate

454

238U

Uranyl Acetate

500

238U

Uranyl Nitrate

50

241Pu
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
238U
232Th
232Th
238U

After the receipt of donations of uranium compounds at UNLV, a
company in Florida, International Bio-Analytical Industries, Inc. was
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found to be accepting uranium compounds for reuse. This practice
continues today [31]. While the reason for the recycling effort on the part
of this company may or may not have been as a result of the success of
the UNLV recovery, it was not in place before recycling uranyl
compounds was found to be useful at UNLV. The donations that have
been received were as a result of general inquiries regarding the
materials that are considered surplus by radioactive material licensees.
The current stockpile of radioactive materials is reasonable to keep
uranium research projects well provided for until 2015. In seeking future
donations, requests made should be more specific regarding nuclide and
available quantities to avoid having material become waste because of
non-use and to

avoid having surplus material at the time of

decommissioning of the program.
1.7 Thesis Preview
In the following chapters novel aspects of material reuse and
control inherent to a unique academic program utilizing high levels of
radioelement will be described. Chapter 2 is concerned with development
of radiation safety for a radiochemistry program. As the levels of activity
used in the university program are unique, the radiation safety in the
laboratory, training of personnel, surveys, monitoring, and management
represent a novel contribution to academic research. Recycling Tc
recovered from decontamination of a chemical fume hood is presented in
Chapter 3. This effort used a commercial gel based radionuclide removal
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agent. The investigation into the utilization of this material has
implications for its application to nuclear forensics [32]. A unique
application of the gel in the sampling and recovery of materials is shown
to be feasible. The use of the gel in collection of samples from
contaminated sites for health physics or nuclear forensics applications
[33] can be an outcome of this initial research. Methods to break down
the gel are discussed; other reactions are identified but not pursued. In
Chapter 4 recovery of Tc from experiment waste products is discussed.
This required working closely with researchers to identify methods that
would not result in unexpected reactions and unsafe conditions. The
resulting solutions are useful for moderate activity experiments and free
of gross organic impurities. The techniques used, monitoring methods,
development of rapid analysis of the waste for activity, and recovery
yields are discussed. In chapter 5, analysis of coal ash is completed to
determine the feasibility of recovering natural uranium from the ash.
This represents an application of the reuse and recovery concepts
developed in the laboratory to an industrial setting. The results indicate
the same concepts can be applied to residue reuse evaluation.
Chapter 6 provides recommendations for the future of the recovery
and reuse of radioactive materials and radiation safety in the UNLV
Radiochemistry Program.
Unique contributions are as follows:


The recovery of radioactive materials from hazardous waste in
anticipation of reuse is a novel approach to resolution of two
25

problems associated with the UNLV Radiochemistry Program;
disposal of mixed waste and availability of radionuclides for an
academic radiochemistry program.


The use of a decontamination gel created by a commercial firm as
a means for recovering spilled radionuclides or sampling high
activity dispersions of radioactive materials is a new use of this
material.



Implementation of a plan for upcoming radiochemistry experiments
by each researcher was a precursor to the vision of a complete
laboratory experiment tracking system.



Development of a radiation safety program for use of measurable
masses of radionuclides provided an opportunity for development
of a program for novel radiochemistry research in an academic
setting.
The

last

section

of

each

chapter

is

provided

with

an

implementation document. This could be converted to a publishable
paper or note in a professional journal. This is provided to accentuate
the value of the thesis in programs where the concepts presented are
useful.
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2. CHAPTER 2
RADIATION SAFETY FOR A RADIOCHEMISTRY PROGRAM
2.0 Introduction – Design Considerations for Radiochemistry
Radiation safety for the UNLV Radiochemistry Program [34] was
developed with the key features used by any academic facility using
licensed radioactive materials in the United States and innovative
methods to maintain control. Academic programs in the United States
are designed with the basic requirements prescribed by regulatory
authorities [35] [36] [37]. Prior to the existence of radiochemistry as a
degree at UNLV, the license and radiation safety program supported low
activity use of short lived radionuclides for biology experiments and long
lived radionuclides in low activity solutions, powders, and sealed or
encapsulated sources for instrument calibration or environmental
analysis. The requirements of the new license would require a
combination of the regulatory guidance for academic programs, use of
special nuclear materials, a license of broad scope, and a service provider
license. Table 2-1 provides a review of controls before and after
establishment of the Radiochemistry Program.
The radionuclides and associated activity limits applied for were
devised by the Authorized User, the Director of the UNLV Radiochemistry
Program. The controls established for these radionuclides were described
in the license amendment application.
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The development of the radiation safety aspects of the program
were completed as needed to support research goals for radiochemistry
and meet all appropriate regulatory guidance. There are many unique
aspects of this type of program compared to other radiation safety
programs [38] for research in the United States [39]. This chapter will
discuss some of those differences, the details of work control and the
successes and failures observed since the program started using
radioactive material.
The fundamental needs of a radiation safety program must
consider

the

goals

of

licensed

entity.

The

goal

of

the

UNLV

Radiochemistry Program is to prepare students for a career at facilities
where large quantities of radioactive material may undergo processes
that could create a hazardous work environment. The preparation for
such a career requires that the student understand the controls required
for protecting themselves and others around them while they do their
work. Students work with low and moderate activity radioactive material
to develop contamination control skills while researching the properties
of the materials that they create. Consider the regulatory agencies as
shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1 Major Regulatory Agencies Involved with UNLV Licensing

Enhancement of the UNLV Radiation Safety Program to allow work
with quantities of radioactive material with the potential to cause harm
was done at a time when the public image of radiological and nuclear
facilities was poor. By public opinion polling in 18 countries in 2005, the
IAEA identified that 54% of those asked, were concerned that the risk of
nuclear terrorist acts was high because of inadequate protection [40].
The case presented to the State of Nevada regulators to allow use of gram
quantities of alpha emitting radionuclides in any form was strong;
contamination

control,

dose

control,
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and

public

protection

were

addressed to resolve concerns. Before radioactive material use at UNLV
changed to accommodate the Radiochemistry program, contamination
control was a minimal aspect. It has now become the most important
aspect. The following factors were considered for development of
radiation safety for the UNLV Radiochemistry Program:
•

control of individual internal and external dose;

•

researcher awareness of radiological conditions and controls;

•

training to provide researchers with protection techniques;

•

management oversight of routine and non-routine experiments;

•

protection of members of the campus and the public;

•

control and security of radioactive materials;

•

appropriate support of area and personnel monitoring programs;

•

completeness and retrievability of records;

•

radiological control performance indicators;

•

special controls for unusual situations or work;

•

compliance with regulatory standards.
The preparation for high activity work required license and office

operation changes in the UNLV Radiation Safety Office to recognize that this
work would be done on campus and controls must be in place when it is.
This would be a significant change from the control of short lived
radionuclides used in nuclear medicine, or biology research and the use of
x-ray machines for imaging with which the UNLV Radiation Safety Office
was already familiar.

An amendment to the UNLV radioactive material license was
submitted in 2004 that provided significant capability for a new program
at a facility that had no demonstrated User experience with high activity
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dispersible sources of actinides [41]. The license change allowed up to
200 grams of the following radionuclides in any form:
243Am, 244Cm,

237Np, 241Am,

and 248Cm in addition to the previous limits in the license.

The approval of this license amendment provided evidence that the State
of Nevada had confidence that the UNLV program was capable of
controlling the radionuclides listed in addition to the radionuclide
inventory that was currently maintained on campus. Nevada is an NRC
Agreement State with radiation protection regulations and license
specifications in the Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) [42].
The radiochemistry laboratories were initially only housed at
UNLV’s Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies (HRC). As the
program grew, the laboratories expanded to UNLV’s Bigelow Health
Science (BHS) building and the Science and Engineering Building (SEB).
Original

facilities

for

chemistry

laboratories

were

adequate

for

radiochemistry program operations.
2.1 Radiation Laboratory Design Hypothesis
Through

proper

laboratory

design,

several

aspects

radiochemistry program are enhanced.


personnel access control;



isolation of work with different radionuclides;



isolation of low activity and high activity work;



multiple levels of contamination control;



location of instrumentation outside of contaminated areas;
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of

the



low background areas for radionuclide analysis.
Laboratories where radioactive materials are used have desired

features to allow personnel to control radioactive materials and protect
themselves from hazardous materials. In order to ensure personnel who
enter the laboratories are prepared for work with hazardous materials,
they must be trained to understand methods of control and be provided
with security access. Changes were required in laboratories to prevent
access to radioactive materials by untrained personnel and to provide
radiation detection equipment for contamination control. The most
substantial change was to the laboratory layout and the security controls
for each laboratory.
2.1.1 Challenges in Laboratory Use and Design


Two groups inhabited the laboratory areas, one worked with low
activity (Bq) of

99Tc, 237Np

quantities (MBq to GBq) of

and
99Tc

129I;

the other worked with gram

and MBq of actinides. Both groups

ingressed and egressed their laboratories in the same hallway.



Contamination controls were not of interest to the low activity
group because their activity was always in solution and their
solutions did not cause contamination control concerns.



Equipment for contamination control did not provide adequate
sensitivity to minimize the probability of activity release from the
laboratories.
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The laboratories had many exit points and access and egress from
the laboratories did not require security in some cases.



Equipment was moved from areas of high activity use to areas of
low or no activity use without concern for contamination control.



Fume hoods designed for work with radioactive materials were
insufficient in number to allow for the number of projects with
radioactive materials.



Many fume hoods in the program laboratories did not have High
Efficiency

Particulate

Air

(HEPA)

filtration

of

exhaust

air,

minimizing the number of simultaneous experiments.


Security

of

radioactive

materials

in

the

laboratories

was

continuously in question because doors to laboratories were left
propped open or unlocked to facilitate ease of access.


Security of radioactive materials was minimal and was controlled
by a single user.



Chemicals were commonly stored in many locations without regard
to potential incompatibility hazards.



There was no organized accountability of personnel access to the
laboratories.



There was no organization of personal protective supplies.

2.1.2 Actions Taken to Improve Facility Use and Design
The issue of one group using activity of a radionuclide used in
quantities 1x106 to 1x109 times higher than the group across the hall
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was resolved by ensuring that these groups did not have access to each
other’s laboratories. A proximity card access system was implemented
and personnel were informed of their access limitations and the reasons
for them. This type of restriction will only have the desired effect for a
limited time. The low activity group left UNLV and the issue was resolved.
Contamination controls were required to be implemented at the
work site in accordance with the UNLV Radiation Safety Program. To
implement this, all laboratories were required to purchase contamination
control instrumentation and conduct surveys of work areas. In addition,
all personnel have been instructed in how to take smear surveys and
how to analyze smears. It is emphasized in training that the primary
contamination control measures must be taken at the work area.
Contamination control equipment was provided at the exit from the
laboratories to ensure that the hands and feet of workers were
sufficiently free of activity to allow release from the area. A revision to
this that further enhanced control was a donation from the USEPA of a
personnel contamination monitor (PCM-1B). The PCM is not designed to
be a primary instrument for release of personnel from the laboratories. It
is the final action that is taken to ensure that the primary contamination
control actions were effective. When a researcher leaves one of the
laboratories, it is necessary that they are radiologically clean and the
work area that they just left is not contaminated. In this way, the PCM
will not get contaminated and will provide the level of comfort for the
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Authorized Users and the radiation safety officer that it was designed to
provide.
As more research with higher activity was conducted, the layout of
the laboratory bay was changed to provide for one entry point, one
controlled exit point, and several emergency exit points from the area
that previously had been individual laboratories. Some individual
laboratories had their own security and some did not. Figure 2-2 shows
the combined layout which became the original laboratories of the UNLV
Radiochemistry Program. Proximity card access was decided as the most
desirable method of security. With keys, a door could be left unlocked,
they also provide a physical vector for contamination transfer to a hand,
pocket, or to another person. Marlock cards provide the security but
have the same difficulty for contamination transfer in that they require
handling. Proximity cards can operate a lock without a person touching
them and without touching a surface.
The new layout provided better security, a location for common
entry and exit from the area, a contamination control point, a protective
clothing storage location, a monitoring station, and an exit to another
enclosed location in the building that could serve as a secondary control
point should there be an event which caused either loss of control or a
requirement for evacuation. Sufficient room and monitoring capability at
the exit location provided for the ability to ensure adequate monitoring of
equipment before it was moved out of the laboratory bay to other areas
where contamination control was not necessary.
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The use of filtered ventilation on fume hood exhaust was rare in
the laboratories, as that was only a feature on two the laboratories.
Filtration of exhaust on laboratory fume hoods is provided to minimize
release of activity from the hood that might result from vaporization of
radioactive solutions or unexpected changes in the physical state of
radioactive liquids or solids. The filtration is a safety measure not
provided to routinely collect activity that is discharged but to minimize
the probability of accidental release of radioactive material from the
facility. As the number of experiments requiring controlled ventilation
has increased, more chemical fume hoods were provided with high
efficiency (HEPA) filters.
In 2010, the new UNLV RSO supervised testing of the HEPA filter
systems in use to verify that they indeed met the specifications for HEPA
filter systems. A form of testing using dispersed oil particulate (DOP) was
used to evaluate the filtration capability of the system. In this testing a
known concentration of the DOP is introduced to the exhaust flow
upstream of the filter and the measured concentration downstream is
compared with the introduced concentration to determine the filtration
efficiency. All systems passed the testing.
The number of fume hoods with HEPA filtration systems on their
exhaust was significantly increased with the installation of filters on five
remaining unfiltered hoods in the older laboratories in June of 2012. Of
the significant events that relate to the potential for discharge of
radioactive materials to the campus, one event in MSM-165 had potential
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for release of an actinide mixture to the campus through an unfiltered
fume hood. In this incident, a researcher was heating and stirring a
solution in a fume hood that did not have filtered exhaust. The liquid
boiled away and activity entrained in the vapor was carried to the back of
the hood where it attached to the cooler hood surfaces. Surveys of the
spread of contamination in the hood did not reveal evidence that activity
was released. This event once again caused a discussion of the use of
radioactive materials in fume hoods that did not have filtered ventilation.
It was decided at this time that all hoods would be labeled to prevent use
for experiments where there was the possibility of release of radioactive
material from the experiment. All researchers were made aware of the
new labeling and the new policy regarding hood use at the weekly group
meeting and through the distribution of Newsletter 29 in Appendix B.
The entry to the radiochemistry facility was provided with
proximity card security [43] that enabled direct control of access to the
laboratories and would allow exclusion of people who were not qualified
or disqualification of person’s whose training had gone beyond a year
without receiving requalification training. The experience of the initial
development of the program indicates that a Radiochemistry Program in
an academic setting needs to be independent from non-complementary
research and security protocols need to be in place and understood by all
researchers who enter the radiochemistry laboratories.
Because of the large quantities of radionuclides held for research
by the radiochemistry program, and the way that radionuclides are used,
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security of the areas where there is a contamination control concern is
very important. UNLV is in the center of a city whose most important
industry is tourism [44]. There must never be a fear developed in the
local population that would cause people to have second thoughts of
coming to Las Vegas because of poor security of radioactive materials.
The only way to prevent this is to have tight security of all radiochemistry
laboratories and important quantities of radioactive materials. It is not
acceptable to lose sight of the fact that the Radiochemistry Program is
not important to the local population and there must always be focus on
the need for detailed documentation that proves the ability of personnel
in the program to control radioactive materials. Security for control of
radioactive materials has been good and has not changed since the use
of a gun safe, for radioactive material storage, procured in 2006.
While security in the program is good, there must continue to be
improvement in this area because it is imperative. In the past, events
have

occurred

where

someone

was

allowed

to

enter

controlled

laboratories without proper training and without an escort. Until
everyone associated with security of any part of the program recognizes
the need for control, the program will be at risk. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission issued an order for increased controls for certain radioactive
materials licensees in 2005 [45]. This order established controls for
radioactive materials based on quantities that are much higher than the
levels held by the Radiochemistry Program. At the current time the
security of the laboratories is established as the responsibility of
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everyone in the program. There are no requirements for increased
security based on government regulations or UNLV procedures.

Figure 2-2. Layout of the HRC Laboratories for Radiochemistry
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Chemical storage in the laboratories was a concern because the
quantity of chemicals tracked by the Risk Management Group was close
to limits for some chemicals and many containers of the same chemical
were spread throughout the laboratories. A common storage location was
decided on, storage cabinets procured and a labeling mechanism devised
to allow easy access to the chemical desired. This system minimized time
looking for the chemical in all areas of laboratories where dose rates were
higher than the chemical storage area. This change was a boost to
chemical control and to ensuring personnel dose was ALARA.
When first established, the access to the laboratories was based on
the access granted by administration of the Harry Reid Center. Access
was granted by need to enter and not on evaluation of the individual’s
qualification to work in the laboratories with hazardous and radioactive
materials. A change specified that all personnel would apply for access
and criteria established for required training and permission from the
Authorized User for the laboratories. Access requires a magnetic
proximity card be programmed to allow access to the bay and to any
rooms where the trained researcher required access. Control of access
remains related to training and permission.
Redesign of the laboratory layout and control of the hallways
allowed a reorganization of the protective clothing, dosimetry, eye-ware,
and an employee ‘In/Out’ status board that are located at the entrance to
the laboratories. This establishes a means whereby a researcher can
store their personal belongings, collect all of their safety equipment and
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ensure that they are ready to do their work before they enter a
radioactive materials work area. The entry hallway must be maintained
radiologically clean to allow for survey of equipment and personnel before
leaving the area. This location also serves as a decontamination area
should activity be identified in the release survey.
2.2 Development of the Radiation Safety Culture Hypothesis
The most important aspect of any radiation safety program is a
well-founded respect for radioactive materials and radiation producing
devices. Training in the fundamental aspects of radionuclide properties
and radiation protection principles is the beginning of establishing a
safety culture. The Radiation Safety Officer provides for the control of
radioactive materials and the radiation safety of the campus by
authorizing personnel as Users with the responsibility to supervise the
use

of

radioactive

materials.

Users

must

have

respect

for

the

requirements of the radioactive material license and work together to
keep students, staff, and the public safe.
The safety culture at the Radiochemistry Laboratories is good
within the program. As long as the Authorized Users communicate well
with each other and with the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer, the
programs that are set up will succeed and the research will be
unaffected. Two important aspects of the program are attention to detail
in contamination control and minimization of waste products that are
both hazardous and radioactive. The first, contamination control, will
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keep the program in operation by preventing the release of radioactive
materials from the confines of the radiochemistry laboratories. The other
feature, hazardous waste minimization, is the basis for the work
presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation. Creation of mixed
waste is costly and is unnecessary in a radiochemistry program.
It is essential that researchers in a Radiochemistry Program
respect

the

authority

of

a

Radiation

Laboratory

Administrator

(Authorized User or Laboratory Staff) and the University Radiation Safety
Officer and staff. In addition, other members of the organization need to
recognize that it would be highly unproductive in the laboratories unless
there was respect for radiological controls. Personal dose must be As Low
As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and the understanding of this concept
can be achieved with continuous training through weekly group meetings
that emphasize a need for dose and contamination control.
2.2.1 Challenges in Safety Culture Development - Incidents
The safety culture in a program develops based on influences from
management, senior researchers, professors, and associate researchers.
Whether

the

program

has

positive

influences

depends

on

the

observations that a researcher experiences when working with wellrespected researchers in a group. Constant positive influences of good
work practices, contamination control, and license requirements are
needed to keep everyone on the right track. The following items
challenged the program’s method of compliance with license conditions.

42

On 17 January, 2008, there was a minor spill of

99Tc

in laboratory

MSM-173. This spill caused low level contamination of a small area of
the laboratory and the clothing of two researchers. The clothing was
collected and disposed, the floor was cleaned and work resumed. The
activity spilled caused no additional dose to the researchers but provided
indication that contamination in the area was becoming a concern to the
UNLV RSO.
On 18 January, 2008, another loss of control, this time associated
with handling particles of plutonium from soil in laboratory MSM-165.
The particles were found to travel from the work bench to the floor
without recognition by the researchers until their post work survey. After
the particles were found; the area was isolated, cleaned, and work was
allowed to resume in a more controlled manner. It was again recognized
that the event was not important from a dose standpoint but indicated
an increasing trend of conditions adverse to good contamination control.
On 30 April 2008 a third event occurred in a different laboratory,
this time involving a spread of

233U

from an experiment in a fume hood in

MSM-164. This event was also not important from a dose standpoint but
was an important event regarding an undetected loss of contamination
control. Although surveys were done by the researcher, they were not
sufficiently extensive to recognize the contamination outside of the hood.
The timeliness and detail of RSO surveys and laboratory staff surveys
identified the contamination, the radionuclide, and the source of the
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contamination within 48 hours, the area was isolated and the
contamination cleaned up in the next 12 hours.
2.2.2 Actions Taken In Response to Incidents
When there is an event that has caused a deviation from the
normal conditions of radiological control, it is necessary that the event is
evaluated with input from all of the people that were involved and the
people with the authority to make changes based on the results of the
evaluation. In many industries this evaluation is termed a root cause
analysis, the idea to find the underlying event(s) that contributed to the
occurrence. In each of the occurrences that contributed to changes in the
control of radioactive material, a meeting was held with each of the
participants, written statements were obtained by those involved and
action taken was reported to the UNLV when it was decided on by the
Authorized Users for the area.
A review of all of the events together provides the following set of
similarities and differences:


each event was related to contamination control,



each event caused contamination spread on the floor,



there were different personnel involved in each event,



each event involved different radionuclides,



each event occurred in different laboratories,



everyone had different research goals,



one event was discovered immediately,
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99Tc, 239Pu, 233U,



one event was identified when the end of the day survey was done,



one event was not identified for two days after its occurrence,



in the

99Tc

event the material was being moved in an open

container,


in the

239Pu

event, the material was being physically sorted on a

bench-top,


in the

233U

event, a solution was being bubbled with gas in a fume

hood.
In any evaluation to determine the cause, once the facts about the
event are collected, a set of questions is generated to identify the most
reasonable actions to take for recovery from the event this is the
analysis phase which allows the event to be seen from a larger
viewpoint than the individual experiences of the participants. With
sufficient information about what happened conclusions might be
reached that establish the cause and contributing factors. From the
analysis of possible causes a determination of actions to prevent
recurrence of the event can be made.
The three events discussed in section 2.2.1, changed the course of
the program. The changes included:


training regarding the details of these three occurrences,



requirements for more detailed contamination control surveys,



recognition that methods for movement of material requires closed
containers,
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work with potential for contamination spread should be done in
enclosures such as glove boxes or fume hoods,



procedures for research involving radioactive materials and
requirements for contamination control need to be specified, and



closer evaluation of work areas where work with solutions,
powders or particles was to be done.
As a result of the attention provided to these events in

requirements

for

training,

detailed

contamination

surveys,

better

material control, and plans for work involving high amounts of activity,
the number of events that could be termed incidents was reduced. There
were no events with similar magnitude as those identified here.
All researchers need a structured program for controls no matter
how much experience they have or how comfortable they are working
with radioactive materials. For example, contamination controls are
established to prevent the spread of activity from work surfaces. Yet, in
the first two years of the program, most researchers did not analyze
smears of their work area as they were trained to do. Periodically a point
was made at group meetings or training bulletins were issued, yet the
spread

of

contamination

continued

until

there

were

individual

repercussions when it was found that surveys were not done.
It is best to determine a method for dose and contamination
control that has minimal effect on a researcher’s work and maximum
control for the effort that he or she would apply. If a researcher has to
spend time associated with contamination control for survey or cleanup,
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it is more likely if the time required for this action is minimized and
demonstrated to be important.
Since the occurrence of these events, there have been other minor
losses of contamination control, but they have been recognized by the
more frequent and detailed surveys. Laboratory management also has
increased the detail of their surveys and ensures immediate cleanup
when contamination is found. Even with simple solutions, proper
equipment, and continuous reminders, work could be done with
radioactive

materials

in

powder

and

liquid

form

without

doing

contamination control surveys.
In March 2010, the number of smears taken in the weekly surveys
that were identified in excess of the contamination control limit
continued to increase. This was again indicative that researchers were
not complying with the requirement to survey their work area each time
they used radioactive material. Although surveys were required,
documentation of those surveys was not. At this time a change was made
in the contamination control program to require documentation of all
surveys done by researchers.

The surveys were easy to do and

document, this provided more assurance that contamination was
controlled at the worksite. The efforts since that time have focused on
each individual working in the facility, what they are working with, and
when they are present in the laboratory. This has increased the number
of surveys done, and prevented spread of contamination from the
laboratories.
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2.3 Training the Participants Hypothesis
A safety culture is evolved in time through recognition that noncompliance with radiation safety rules is detrimental to one’s research.
The following statements are the hypothesis for this section:


There must be continuous identification of what the rules are so
that everyone has a similar belief in what is needed.



Understanding the goals of the researchers will provide them with
the information they need to be successful.

2.3.1 Initial Development and Evolution of the Training Program
The initial training for radiation safety in the UNLV Radiochemistry
Program was established as two hours of radiation fundamentals and
regulation.

In

familiarization

time,
and

this

general

training

developed

laboratory

safety

into

a

laboratory

training. Continuing

training was first established with the general distribution of a radiation
safety newsletter that provided a simple coverage of several topics to
enable a basis for compliance with laboratory rules.
Early in the development of a program for radiation safety in
radiochemistry, the characteristics of the radionuclides used will lead to
conclusions about the balance for internal and external radiation
protection. In this program, the radionuclides used require more focus
on protection from intake of radionuclides as external dose rates are
typically low throughout the laboratories. Contamination control was the
primary concern at the start of the program and continues to be the most
significant concern for radiation protection.
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With initial training for radiation safety and annual refresher
training providing the fundamentals of radiation protection in two hours,
there was no time provided for other aspects of radiation safety such as
the fine points of contamination control, instrument use, radioactive
waste collection, responsibilities, security, fume hoods, etc. It was
decided to establish a method of expanding the periodic training to
include those details. This also provided a way of establishing
documented training in many aspects of radiation safety that cannot be
covered due to time constraints.
In January of 2007 the first HRC Radiation Laboratory Newsletter
was published and distributed to the program participants [46]. The first
newsletter was entitled ‘Contamination Surveys’ and was written in a
question and answer format. The introduction provided a reason for the
newsletter. “Whenever you work with radioactive materials, there is the
possibility that some of the radioactive material evaded your control
mechanism and may be spread to other parts of your laboratory or even
outside of the facility. While the contamination spread is not likely to be
hazardous to anyone, it may be in excess of our license conditions. In
order to prevent this type of situation from developing, we take
measurements of our work areas with portable instruments or in some
cases we take smears for laboratory analysis to identify the level of
surface contamination (or absence of it) in our work areas.”
This newsletter then asked the question “When are surveys
required?” The answer was provided as follows: “Contamination surveys
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are desired in each laboratory where radioactive material is used, weekly,
or immediately after unsealed radioactive materials are used in an area,
whichever is more frequent. If you are using high-energy beta emitters,
you should also evaluate your body and clothes for the presence of
contamination after each procedure.”
That newsletter went on to identify what instruments to use for
evaluation of surfaces when using different radionuclides, what a smear
is and how to evaluate a surface for loose surface activity, how to know
when a surface is contaminated, how to convert from instrument
response to activity, how to survey your body, what to do if you identify
contamination on the body, and how to prevent spills of radioactive
material. The newsletter concept was demonstrated to be a good way to
get a lot of information out to the continuously growing group in a
reasonable amount of time while allowing the information to be digested
on their time. Table 2-2 provides a list of the newsletter topics that were
published from January of 2007 to December of 2010. The newsletters
were brief and covered a single topic. The intent was to provide a
constant reminder of the need for vigilance in the control of the
radioactive materials that were the mainstay of the Radiochemistry
Program. In June of 2007, a newsletter on contamination control was
again published, aimed at assigning responsibility so that all researchers
would know who they are responsible to when it came to: who must
answer for a loss of contamination control. This newsletter also took a
different

approach

with

things

to
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do

to

maintain

control

of

contamination. in your work area. Some of these items are provided in
Figure 2-3. In some cases, the topic of the monthly newsletter was
dictated based on the events that had occurred to put the control of the
laboratories in jeopardy. For example, before the publication of HRC-9
“Laboratory Access” in September of 2007, there were a number of times
that people without training were found to be in the laboratories without
an escort. Publication of the rules on that topic was a way to make it
clear what was expected so that future events such as that did not recur.
1. Delineate a work area in your laboratory. Ensure that the area is not subject to
high personnel traffic that may cause items to be touched or knocked off of the
laboratory bench.
2. Wear protective clothing (gloves and laboratory coat) to prevent the spread of
contamination.
3. Complete surveys each time that you use radioactive materials to ensure that no
material is spread to other parts of your laboratory. Surveys may be done by direct
monitoring for some radionuclides but must be done using smears and liquid
scintillation counting for others.
4. Ensure that you monitor any items that are taken out of the contaminated area.
Remember, anything in that area is suspected of being contaminated until proven
not to be.
5. There must be no food, drink or cosmetics stored or used in any laboratory
where there exists a potential for intake of radioactive or hazardous materials.

Figure 2-3. June 2007 Radiation Safety Newsletter Excerpt
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Table 2-1. A Listing of Radiation Laboratory Newsletter Topics

Number
HRC-1
HRC-2
HRC-3
HRC-4
HRC-5
HRC-6
HRC-7
HRC-8
HRC-9
HRC-10
HRC-11
HRC-12
HRC-13
HRC-14
HRC-15
HRC-16
HRC-17
HRC-18
HRC-19
HRC-20
HRC-21
HRC-22
HRC-23
HRC-24
HRC-25
HRC-26
HRC-27
HRC-28
HRC-29
HRC-30
HRC-31
HRC-32
HRC-33
HRC-34
HRC-35
HRC-37

Date Published
January, 2007
February, 2007
March, 2007
April, 2007
May, 2007
June, 2007
July, 2007
August, 2007
September, 2007
October, 2007
November, 2007
December, 2007
January, 2008
February, 2008
March, 2008
April, 2008
May, 2008
June, 2008
July, 2008
August, 2008
September, 2008
October, 2008
November, 2008
December, 2008
January, 2009
March, 2009
April, 2009
May, 2009
June, 2009
July, 2009
August, 2009
September, 2009
October, 2009
November, 2009
December, 2009
May, 2010

Newsletter Topic
pp
Contamination Control
4
Dosimetry
3
Training
2
Radioactive Waste
4
Security of Radioactive Materials
2
Contamination Responsibility
2
Transporting Radioactive Materials
2
Using Radiation Detectors
4
Laboratory Access
4
Personnel Contamination
4
Protective Clothing
2
Fume Hoods
2
Postings for Radiation Safety
3
Radioactive Materials Regulations
4
X-Ray Producing Devices
3
Instrument Checks and Calibration
2
Background Radiation
4
Liquid Scintillation Counters
4
Transportation of Rad. Material
5
Emergency Equipment in Laboratory 4
Access to the Radiochemistry Facility 3
New Laboratories in HRC Completed
4
Emergency Preparedness
3
Instruments – Ludlum 3/44-9
5
Instruments – Ludlum 2360/43-93
5
Laboratory Inspections
3
Radioactive Material Inventory
3
Survey Documentation
4
Radiochemistry Fume Hoods
7
Risk and Radiation Exposure
3
Labeling Radioactive Material
3
Safety and in the HRC Laboratories
3
X-Ray Machines
4
Good Work Practices
5
Wearing Dosimetry
2
Authorized User Responsibility
8
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Over the years there were events that the whole group learned from
even though only a few participated in the laboratory situation. Each
occurrence was discussed at the weekly radiochemistry group meeting
and in some cases presented to the group by the researcher in charge of
the experiment. The events were primarily minor losses of contamination
control and chemistry research with undesirable consequences. However,
in each of the events, there was no measurable intake of radioactive
material, there was no measurable dose to personnel, and there was no
release of radioactive material from the radiochemistry laboratories.
Then there were the events that were the result of inattention to
detail and lack of basic common sense. These events continue to occur,
one such item is the disposal of food containers or food wrappers in the
waste containers within the radiological control area. This one item has
been continuously brought to the attention of everyone in the
Radiochemistry Program for all of the years that there has been
organized radiochemistry at UNLV and the only way to minimize its
recurrence is continuous reminder.
Those who have poor safety practices and put the health and
safety of other people in the laboratories with them at risk must have a
life changing experience to enable them to recognize the need for
changing their ways [47]. As humans, we change our behavior based on
perception and availability of a desire to change to satisfy ourselves or
others. For example, if someone recognizes that they did something that
upset another deeply and caused them to express emotion, this may
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cause a change in behavior. Over the years there were many times that
evidence of deviation from good safety practice which occurred in the
laboratories was brought to the attention of faculty, staff, and students
in a radiochemistry group meeting, there was usually recognition that
behavior must be changed. Restriction of access to the laboratories may
be useful as a means to help a researcher recognize that change is
needed for them to be able to complete their work. Another way of
ensuring compliance may simply be related to the amount of activity that
a researcher is allowed to work with.
In another example, consider a researcher who is using high
activity of a radionuclide with a low Annual Limit on Intake in a
laboratory where other people are using much less hazardous materials
in quantities that are lower in health significance. If the researcher using
the more hazardous material fails to conduct detailed surveys of their
work area, he or she will put others working in that laboratory at risk for
a potentially serious intake. That researcher might also cause a concern
in the cohabitants of the laboratory that their research could be affected
by a loss of control on the part of the high activity worker.
The discovery of poor controls is not easy, but once identified and
reported to a researcher, the realization that their controls may have cost
shut down of the laboratory and affected the ability for anyone working
there to accomplish their experiments is a significant emotional
experience that may enable them to recognize the need for more diligence
in control of radioactive materials in their possession. There are also
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times when an arrogance associated with someone’s feeling that their
research is much more important than anyone else’s and that they will
control their activity any way that they want. This type of attitude can be
devastating to a radiochemistry program where all researchers must
work together to accomplish their projects. The way to accomplish large
projects is to get all personnel involved; the way to minimize nonbeneficial interaction is to ensure that all personnel know what it is.
Over the years there have been many changes in the management
of the radiation safety program, the research facility, the Department of
Chemistry, and the College of Sciences, but there have been no true
changes to the Authorized Users in the radiochemistry program. This
consistency in the program and the working relationship between the
radiochemistry professors has been the force that has kept the program
intact. Control of undesirable behavior in the laboratories is the
responsibility of the faculty and staff. It must be recognized and dealt
with quickly and forcefully. A solution should be presented to
management that will resolve any situation that is detrimental to the
work of researchers in the program and allow completion of the work of
all researchers, even if they need to be separated. Researchers need a
management member capable of resolving conflict, to prevent issues that
may cause a loss of control.
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2.4 Communication of Program Ideals Hypothesis
In training personnel to work with radiation and other hazards in
the radiochemistry laboratories safely, there must be expression that
security of the materials is essential, dose must be As Low as Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA), and contamination control must prevent radioactive
materials from becoming airborne and from leaving the confines of the
laboratory. These are not goals of a radiochemistry program; they are
essential aspects of the radiation safety program. These simple controls
prevent violation of the conditions of the UNLV State of Nevada
radioactive materials license so that radiochemistry research may
continue at UNLV.
The goals of the program must be less lofty and present a
quantifiable level below which is ALARA, above which is unacceptable
and requires adverse interaction with a laboratory authority if exceeded.
Original contamination control goals were to maintain contamination
levels less than 10,000 dpm/100 cm2 for beta emitters and 100
dpm/100 cm2 for alpha emitters in the continually contaminated areas of
laboratories, and maintain contamination levels less than 1000 dpm/100
cm2 for beta emitters and 20 dpm/100 cm2 for alpha emitters in all other
areas of the laboratory. These later goals have since become the
contamination control limits for the radiochemistry laboratories. There
does not appear to be an allowance of contaminated areas at the current
time, even when experiments are in progress. The rationale for these
limits is associated with the desire to minimize the occurrence of
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contamination in unrestricted areas. If higher levels of contamination
were allowed to exist in work areas, then the frequency of observing
activity outside of the work area would increase. This would also be the
result of lowering the contamination control limit to allow for some
increased margin of safety. The basis for these limits is the UNLV
Radiation Safety Manual, the foundation for these particular values is an
obsolete Nuclear Regulatory Commission document on decommissioning
from June 1974, Regulatory Guide 1.86.
For airborne activity, a safety factor of 20 is applied to the Derived
Air Concentration (DAC) value for the radionuclide being used. This
ensures that airborne activity is below the requirements for use of
respiratory protection and any potential exposure will be below the 1.25
mSv per quarter year limit for areas where respiratory protection is not
required. Ideally, airborne radioactive materials should never be present
in the air space of researchers, but realistically this cannot be prevented.
For personnel, goals should minimize the probability that the
annual dose will exceed 10% of the federal and state limits for total
effective dose equivalent [48], less than 0.005 Sv per year. The fractions
are the same fractions used by regulators to provide a limit for
unmonitored workers or workers under the age of 18. The standard of
care for control of dose in the Radiochemistry Program is the regulatory
limit of 0.05 Sv/year. The goal is to establish a level of dose which fits
with

the

excellence

of

the

radiochemistry

program.

This

level

demonstrates that the control of higher amounts of activity is
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accomplished in the program without harm to program participants. The
essential elements of the program are easily communicated to members
of the radiochemistry program and they are recognized as non-deviation
requirements by the UNLV Radiation Safety Staff.
2.4.1 Key Indicators and Tracking Performance
As the Radiochemistry Program has grown, incidents have been
experienced that put the program in need of actions to minimize the
occurrence of events adverse to radiation safety and ensure that control
of the laboratories was not at risk. Three incidents in 2008, discussed in
section 2.2, demonstrated that the program needed changes and
researchers were not as good at control of radioactive material as was
considered before the events occurred.
Each of these incidents was the result of inattention to detail
associated with the work that was being done. None of these events was
found to have caused a release of radioactive materials from the
laboratories and there was no intake of radioactive materials by any of
students, faculty or staff that occupied the laboratories where these
events occurred. Since then, there have been several changes that have
resulted in a much more closely guarded program and much better
controls. Each event was an experience that changed the behavior of
personnel in the program, the potential consequence was the loss of the
Radiochemistry

Program,

the

response

to

each

experience

was,

laboratory closure, area cleanup, verification that there was recovery
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from the event, documentation of the event, discussion of ways to
prevent such an occurrence in the future and a change to the training
program to include discussion of each loss of control.
Several measures of the status of a radiation protection program
should be used to ensure that the program is performing in a manner to
ensure conditions of the radioactive material license are satisfied. A
reasonable example for a radiochemistry program is listed in Table 2-3.
The focus for this program is contamination control, prevention of
internal exposure, and waste minimization.
Table 2-2. Proposed Performance Indicators for Radiation Safety Programs

Key Indicator
The number of skin contamination events.
The number of personal clothing contamination events.
The number of air samples that indicate an airborne concentration
greater than the DAC value for the radionuclides used.
The personnel dose equivalent in excess of 1 mSv in a badging period.
More than 10 cubic feet of waste generated in a month.
The number of spills that required greater than 1 hour to clean.
The number of times a laboratory was closed for contamination control
problems.
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An increase in the number of events for each category must cause
a re-evaluation of the control measures and not the key indicator. For
example, if the number of skin contamination events in a month is five,
and no events have ever been recorded, then there is an indication of
poor contamination control. The action taken is resolution of the bad
practice. Performance should show continuous improvement. If an
indicator shows a trend toward less control, action should be taken to
put the indicator back on the right path.
Each event caused a re-evaluation of control methods and the
needed changes for the program to continue into the future. One change
that has helped substantially by the contamination events was increased
awareness of the need for assistance by the UNLV Radiation Safety
Office. Immediately after the first important loss of contamination
control, the RSO was asked to change the frequency of the surveys that
they completed from quarterly to monthly. Surveys completed by the
Laboratory Support Group were done weekly and the number of smears
taken in high risk laboratories was increased. This increased surveillance
would provide a more timely evaluation by the Radiation Safety Office
and a more timely alert should something be missed by the research staff
surveys.
In large radiological facilities with an abundance of manpower
there is a tracking of key indicators to ensure that everyone is aware of
situations that are adverse to a quality radiation safety program. The
quality of any program should be a concern to the management of that
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program and items that are preventable and may cause unnecessary
harm (or dose) to participants are tracked so that preventative methods
may be tested. Such indicators as identified in Table 2-3 should be
tracked at these facilities. The UNLV radiochemistry program has done
well without these types of encouragers because there has always been
an influence from the faculty that unacceptable behavior will be strongly
discouraged and the students in the program have always had a high
level of maturity. As the program changes and other influences manifest
themselves, the desire to implement such a program of tracking
performance of the program may become important to improve the
program and demonstrate regulatory compliance.
2.5 Radioactive and Hazardous Waste in Radiochemistry
In the United States radioactive waste is considered an undesirable
aspect of nuclear power and any industry where radioactive materials are
used. Disposal of unneeded residue or contaminated equipment is
required. Early in the history of radioactive waste generation there was
not a concern for the volume of waste generated and waste sites were
filled to capacity. Poor management practices also caused inappropriate
disposal of caustic materials and deterioration of waste containers at
licensed disposal sites. Recovery from these practices led to increases in
the cost of waste disposal and a need to reduce waste volume generated
to reduce cost.
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Radiochemists make hazardous wastes that are radioactive. This is
normally accepted as the nature of the program. These materials together
are known as mixed waste when they are no longer a part of research.
The new mantra for radiochemistry students and researchers should be:
“If you create a hazardous radioactive product, you will return that
product to a non-hazardous, reusable, radioactive product or radioactive
waste.” There will be times when such an accomplishment is not
attainable, but with encouragement of faculty and staff, this can be an
advantageous philosophy.
2.5.1 Challenges in the Creation of Mixed Waste
The last three chapters of this dissertation identify the most
important control problem that lingers in the program today. Waste is
the Achilles heel of nuclear power in the United States and it could be
the demise of a radiochemistry program if allowed. If new compounds
and new techniques for chemical synthesis and separations that enhance
our world can be developed, participants in the program can remove the
hazardous components of residues created in the laboratories.
Early in the program (2004-2006) there were issues of personnel
throwing potentially radioactive and sometimes radioactive waste in the
non-radioactive trash. This problem was mostly eliminated within the
main radiochemistry population. However, this issue reappears with new
people to the laboratories. A constant reinforcement of this rule prevents
lapses of compliance.
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Since the start of the radiochemistry program, liquid waste has
been created at a slow rate. The volume created is relatively small but the
degree of associated hazard is high. Waste is put into plastic containers
and stored in satellite accumulation areas. The labeling of the waste is
not consistent and the originator of the waste and its chemical
constituents are not identified.
One major issue in reuse of waste materials that have been
recovered is the purity of the final product. Actions should be taken to
purify the material of concern to a specific documented endpoint. The
recovery should be complete when the radionuclide is in a final
identifiable form. Chemical separation of the radioelements may be
beneficial to enhance the desirability of reuse.
2.5.2 Actions Needed to Control Mixed Waste
In

order

to

facilitate

reuse

of

recovered

materials,

it

is

recommended that a Recovered Material Registry documenting the
process to be developed (Figure 2-4). The registry should contain;


Chemical components and concentrations



Mass



Radionuclide and mass or activity



Researcher who produced residue material



Experimental methods used to produce material (can
reference publication(s), report(s), or theses).
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The usefulness of any recovered material will be based on the need
and desire of researchers to modify the chemical compound containing
the radionuclide. Other information should be provided for the
radionuclide to allow an informed decision to be made. Indication of
impurities or any known features of the compound(s) may also be useful.

UNLV Radiochemistry Program Recovered Material
Stock Material Identification Number ____________
Inventory Number _________
Date of recovery __________
Material recovered by ________________________________
Volume of solution _________ ml

Solution pH ______

Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;
Activity(1)_____Bq
Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;
Activity(1)_____Bq
Radionuclide(1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______;
Activity(1)_____Bq
Chemical compound(s):_________________________________________
Known Impurities: __________________________________________
Notes:_________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________
Figure 2-4. Recovered Material Documentation
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2.6 Administrative Controls Hypothesis
User interactions, work planning, policies, transportation, surveys
and monitoring, evaluation of the program and laboratory management
are the main personnel functions that make the radiation safety program
in the UNLV Radiochemistry Program functional. Administrative controls
are the exercise of authority over radiation safety in the Program by
control of resources or equipment, logistics, and personnel management.
The design of the laboratories and equipment requires an administrative
means of operation or it will not be safe.
2.6.1 Program Control - Administration
The UNLV Radiochemistry Program is controlled by a broad scope
type B radioactive materials license under the authority of a Radiation
Safety Officer with support of a committee of volunteers known as the
Radiation Safety Advisory Committee. The Committee meets quarterly to
discuss items of concern to the Radiation Safety Officer and provide
him/her with their guidance. This system has been in place for more
than ten years and has worked well for the radiation safety program.
However, even with support of the committee, the radiation safety staff
has not kept up with the demands of the UNLV Radiochemistry Program.
In the past five years there has been a progression of Radiation
Safety Officers responsible for the radiochemistry laboratories. Each has
had a different idea about how radiochemistry work should be controlled.
The most important aspects of control in the operation of these
laboratories are to keep the radioactive material secure, minimize dose to
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personnel, and recover and reuse radioactive materials. Each of the
radiation safety personnel that came through the radiochemistry
laboratories looked at the controls in a different way and provided some
degree of enhancement of the radiological control program. Everybody
looks at things different; the support provided by these individuals has
improved the radiochemistry laboratories.
The Radiation Safety Office provides the license authority and an
independent evaluation capability that cannot be a part of the
radiochemistry program so that decisions can be made in favor of safety.
The line of authority for the Radiation Safety Office is to the president of
the University through a pathway that avoids any research conflict of
interest.
2.6.2 User Designation and Support
Authorized Radioactive Material Users are trained faculty members
and staff members who are trusted by the Radiation Safety Officer and
the Radiation Safety Advisory Committee to control the laboratories
where radioactive materials are used and stored. They also control all
work within those laboratories in accordance with the conditions of
UNLV’s radioactive material license, State of Nevada regulations, and
Federal Regulations regarding the use of radioactive material. A simple
loss

of

communication

between

the

Authorized

Users

in

the

radiochemistry program could cause work to be done without the
knowledge of the User on duty and result in someone doing work in a
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method that results in serious injury or death to a student or other
faculty member. This would be devastating to the researcher’s family and
friends, the User on duty, and every member of the radiochemistry
program.
Authorized Users recognize that the authorization is a privilege
granted to a trusted person who will protect the radioactive material
license while doing their research. This same degree of trust is provided
to the students and staff of an Authorized User who use radioactive
materials in research under the authority of that person. The interaction
of Users in a single laboratory is where this need is most easily
recognized. Consider the following situation; a researcher working for one
User takes an action that puts another researcher who works for another
User at risk. A correction should be made to prevent the first researcher
from causing risk to anyone else in the laboratory. A conflict may arise
when the second User instructed his researcher to do it that way.
There must be an ultimate authority within the radiochemistry
laboratory management that has the ability to correct this type of
situation as it is discovered. The correction is always unpleasant for
somebody, but the needs of the program must be fulfilled. Depending on
the RSO to take corrective actions in this situation places control of the
disagreement in a different management chain. This is undesirable. The
RSO provides a needed service to the Radiochemistry Program and
communication between the RSO and any person using radioactive
materials must never be stifled. Situations that involve deviation from
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regulations or even from good work practice by Authorized Users should
be resolved by Authorized Users, the ability to resolve all situations like
this should reside in a Radiation Safety Committee that has supervisory
authority over all work with radioactive materials and radiation
producing devices. Only with that authority can these differences of
opinion be resolved without a loss of communication.
2.6.3 Transportation Challenges
The shipping and receiving of radioactive material is governed by
regulations of the Department of Transportation in the United States
[49]. All radioactive materials must be controlled to prevent unauthorized
transport from the UNLV campus. In order to support radiochemistry
experiments, materials and equipment may require movement to
laboratories in other buildings or transport to laboratories in other
states. All transporters, either on campus, or off-campus must be
properly trained and follow the shipping regulations and guidance
provided by the DOT and the International Air Transport Association.
Even the most detailed preparation of packages will occasionally fail
inspections required by carriers. It is essential that personnel who ship
radioactive materials for the Radiochemistry Program receive detailed
training to ship radioactive packages and collaborate to ensure that each
package is properly classified, packaged, labeled, and marked.
The authority to ship radioactive materials for the Radiochemistry
Program

must

be

granted

from
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the

highest

levels

of

program

administration. The Radiation Safety Office must work together with the
radiochemistry program to ensure that the details of all shipments are
properly evaluated and addressed. There are times when a rush to meet
deadlines for experiments may cause a desire to ship inappropriately,
this must never happen as it will put all operations of the program at
risk.
2.6.3.1 Actions to Support Relocation of Materials
Transportation on campus is as important to the program as when
a package is moved off-campus through the public. A policy imposed
early in the program was for transportation of any materials that could
cause an area to be contaminated. The policy was specified in
radiochemistry newsletter number 7, and is presented in Appendix B.
The basic concepts are:


A user must be aware of the transfer of radioactive material
between buildings and there should be a more senior student or
User accompanying the transporter.



The package must be capable of containing the material and must
be labeled to indicate the radionuclides and activity.

2.6.4 Planning Experiments with Radioactive Materials
When work with radioactive materials is considered for any
purpose, an evaluation must be done to establish control measures for
protection of personnel and the environment. This evaluation may be
simple and associated with no personnel risk and no environmental
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effect, or it may require controls to reduce external dose rates, intake of
radionuclides, contamination control measures, and environmental
protective measures. The evaluation of radiation work and an organized
documentation of that work can be done with the aid of software.
2.6.4.1 Work Planning Challenges
Early in the evolution of the program considerations given to the
work did not consider all aspects appropriate to safety although when
activity (>1 MBq) was used, a discussion of the work to be done and the
need to minimize the probability of airborne activity and surface
contamination was held. One of the first set of experiments to use a high
activity concentration in solution involved > 10 MBq of

237Np.

A detailed

training of the researchers was held to ensure that everyone was aware
of the serious nature of using this radionuclide with a total activity
greater than 2000 times the ALI by ingestion and 250,000 times the ALI
by inhalation.
The dominating challenge associated with work planning is
assuring that all Users are satisfied with the planned controls and
sufficient communication has occurred so that supervision of the work
will be available when the work occurs. A general policy early in the
program was the presence of a senior member of the staff or faculty was
required before work with radioactive materials could proceed. This
challenge has become difficult with the increased number of researchers
and more need for User coverage.
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2.6.4.2 Actions Taken to Support Work Planning
In 2010, a method was implemented to keep track of the
experiments that were planned for each upcoming week. Each researcher
is required to submit a “Plan of the Week” form that describes to the
group of Users that may be responsible that week, what will be done. The
plan requires the identification of radionuclides and activity, the
researchers and the laboratory, and the methods that will be used.
Before implementation of the plan, the approval of the Authorized User is
required.
This method provides a communication between the researcher,
the Authorized User, and other Users who may be responsible for the
laboratories when the work is done. The form provides a basic
description of the work to be done including:


Starting date and expected end date,



Name of the researcher,



Radionuclides and mass or activity,



Laboratory designation,



Environmental influences that will be experienced by the material,



Analyses to be done,



Allowance for User evaluation notes, and



User Authorization.
Depending on the application, control measures, interaction of

multiple work groups, and degree of liability accepted to do this work;
multiple

levels

of

authorization

may
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be

required.

The

level

of

authorization provided should be commensurate with the degree of risk
associated with the work. The degree of risk should consider not only
radiation hazards, but also other liabilities in doing the proposed work.
For large experiments with high risk, the radiation safety office should be
a required authorization.
Issues not presented by the Plan of the Week but require
consideration are purchasing of materials, the limits of activity
appropriate for the experiments, protective clothing requirements,
external and internal monitoring requirements, and surveys to be done
before during and after the work.
Upon authorization to begin work, authorization may be made to
purchase

radionuclides,

protective

equipment,

and

other

needed

supplies. As the work continues, monitoring of the work area provides
information related to job progress, interferences to radiation safety
measures, the need for more or less protection, or the need to stop work
and reconsider the work plan. In the event of high exposure to personnel,
loss of contamination control or unanticipated airborne activity, work
would be stopped and the cause evaluated. To continue, corrective
actions would be taken, plans reviewed, control measures evaluated and
assigned, and re-authorization considered.
Upon completion of the work, it is customary to evaluate the work
area with a post job survey to identify the degree of hazard that remains
or was created as a result of the work. This survey considers surface
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contamination, external dose rates, and airborne activity. The post job
survey requires review by the radiation safety organization.
2.6.5 Surveys and Monitoring Hypothesis
The purpose of monitoring is multifold. Surveys identify the
condition of a work area before, contamination and dose rates they are
exposed to during, and the situation that remains after work. Whether it
is contamination or dose rate, the condition of the area after work should
not be worse than before work was done. With appropriate training and
experience in how to do surveys researchers will be able to maintain their
areas to ensure minimal personnel contamination, and dose.
2.6.5.1 Challenges to Surveys and Monitoring
Early in the radiochemistry program it was decided to allow
contaminated areas to remain in fume hoods or glove boxes in an effort
to reduce the amount of time spent cleaning those areas and thus reduce
the dose received during the cleaning. The concept seems sound, but the
level of contamination will build to the point where it cannot be
contained in that area and will spread to areas where it becomes a
concern. It may be reasonable to allow a buildup to some factor of 2 to 5
times the contamination control limits but this must be periodically
evaluated and cleanup must prevent excess buildup. Areas immediately
outside of those areas must be assessed for contamination on a more
frequent basis.
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The most important areas for contamination control

in a

radiochemistry laboratory are associated with process locations where
samples are cut, ground, pulverized, polished, heated, pressed, bubbled
or weighed. Each of these operations creates small particles that may be
spread around due to the motion of the particles when they are created,
heated, or bubbled. Smear surveys alone are not sufficient to ensure a
clean area after using one of these processes. In some cases, the process
needs a contained area with little air movement to ensure control of the
particles created.
2.6.5.2 Considerations for Surveying Radiochemistry Areas
In radiochemistry materials are manipulated in powders and
solutions that may have high concentrations of radionuclides. When the
process is complete a detailed evaluation of the work area for a spread of
contamination is expected. This must be a slow continuous direct survey
with an appropriate survey meter and a detailed smear survey to
demonstrate the area is clean for the next person who will use it. When
activity

is

found

in

an

area,

the

researcher

is

responsible

to

decontaminate the area.
A program was implemented which made surveying work areas
simple and keep the spread of contamination under control. From March
of 2010 until the end of the year, hundreds of surveys were performed
and documented to control radioactive materials at each of the
radioactive material work areas. If you were a researcher in the
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laboratories and did surveys, there was probably a time when you
thought that all of your actions were deliberate and appropriate and you
could not have spread contamination from your work area. However,
when you counted your smears, there were surprises that indicated the
presence of removable contamination in areas that you considered clean.
The discovery of radioactive materials in a work area immediately
after work with radioactive materials is done should never be construed
as a loss of control. A loss of control is when activity is found in a work
area that a researcher has left contaminated. If radioactive materials
could be seen as huge colorful spots as we work, then recognition and
cleanup would be easy. However, a contaminated area cannot be found
until an appropriate survey is completed. Table 2-4 displays the mass
equivalence of activity of radioactive materials that used in the
Radiochemistry Program at the contamination limit of 1000 dpm/100
cm2 (16.7 Bq/100 cm2). With the typical density of that material, a
particle size is also provided.
The approximate limit of our ability to see particles if we have good
vision is a particle of contrasting color with a diameter of 0.1 mm (100
micron) [50] at 0.3 meter from the particle. Some people may see better,
some not as well. This particle size is based on observation at a specific
distance to identify an object of contrasting color. Table 2-4 is a
reasonably close approximation of the size of radioactive particles.
Another important aspect to consider when looking at the
radiological control aspects of this contamination is that a person will
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not spend a great deal of time scanning the work area for barely visible
particles, they may look like dust particles or just some dirt. As shown in
the table, this size particle is much more easily detected with a radiation
detector for most radionuclides.
Table 2-3. The Size of 16.7 Bq Particles for Common Radionuclides

Nuclide
99
Tc
232
Th
238
U
235
U
233
U
237
Np
241
Pu
240
Pu
239
Pu
238
Pu
243
Am
241
Am
244
Cm

Specific
Activity
(Bq/g)
8
6.27x10
4
4.04x10
4
1.25x10
4
7.93x10
8
3.50x10
7
2.61x10
12
4.16x10
9
8.38x10
9
2.26x10
11
6.43x10
9
6.86x10
11
1.28x10
12
3.08x10

Density
3)
(g/cm
11.5
11.7
19.05
19.05
19.05
20.45
19.84
19.84
19.84
19.84
13.6
13.6
13.51

Particle
Volume
3
(cm )
-9
2.32x10
-5
3.53x10
-5
7.04x10
-5
1.11x10
-9
2.50x10
-8
3.13x10
-13
2.02x10
-10
1.00x10
-10
3.72x10
-12
1.31x10
-10
1.79x10
-12
9.62x10
-13
4.01x10

Particle
Diameter
(mm)
0.0120
0.2980
0.3750
0.2020
0.0123
0.0286
0.0005
0.0042
0.0065
0.0099
0.0051
0.0019
0.0007

In Table 2-4 a determination is made of the particle diameter for
different radionuclides with the consideration that it is a pure metal with
the specific activity and density provided. Considering that the limit of
our vision is indeed a particle that has a diameter of 100 micron, an
approximation of the activity can be made as shown in Table 2-5. In this
table it is considered that the volume of that particle is 1.33x10-6 cm3
and the activity in Bq, is the activity that is in that volume.
The shaded information in Table 2-5 shows those radionuclides
with a specific activity that enables them to be easily detected with a
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radiation detector even though the particles are not likely to be visible to
most people. Consider also that a particle 10% of that size will not be
visible, yet it will still have an activity greater than the contamination
control limit. This table shows that a smear survey provides what can be
found with a slow scan survey using an alpha/beta scintillation detector
such as the Ludlum model 43/93. This instrument is typically available
in all of the radiochemistry laboratories at the HRC.
Table 2-4. Activity of a Visible Particle for Different Radionuclides
Nuclide
99

Tc
232
Th
238
U
235
U
233
U
237
Np
241
Pu
240
Pu
239
Pu
238
Pu
243
Am
241
Am
244
Cm

Specific
Activity (Bq/g)
8

6.27x10
4
4.04x10
4
1.25x10
4
7.93x10
8
3.50x10
7
2.61x10
12
4.16x10
9
8.38x10
9
2.26x10
11
6.43x10
9
6.86x10
11
1.28x10
12
3.08x10

Density
3)
(g/cm
11.5
11.7
19.05
19.05
19.05
20.45
19.84
19.84
19.84
19.84
13.6
13.6
13.51

Activity (Bq)
3

9.61x10
0.631
0.316
2.01
3
8.89x10
2
7.12x10
8
1.10x10
5
2.22x10
4
5.98x10
7
1.70x10
5
1.24x10
6
2.32x10
7
5.55x10

The current series of surveys that are completed in the laboratories
to maintain control have evolved over the years so that mistakes can be
recognized and action taken to correct unfortunate errors before they
affect others in the laboratories. The three levels of contamination control
survey protection are good and exist as shown in Table 2-6. Use of a
system of contamination control that provides checks by multiple groups
provides protection for the program and UNLV.
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Table 2-5. Contamination Control Survey Frequency

Survey Type

Frequency

Work space control

Each time work is done in a
work area.

Laboratory control

Weekly

Program control

Monthly

Surveyor(s)
Individual Researchers
Laboratory Support
Professionals
Radiation Safety Office
Personnel

2.6.6 Identifying Non-Compliance
In any large program where radioactive materials are used, there is
a license requirement to evaluate the radiation safety program annually.
This overall evaluation of the program is a function of the radiation safety
office. However, in order to minimize non-compliance situations in the
large scale review daily evaluations of compliance are recommended for a
radiochemistry program.
2.6.6.1 Challenges to Compliance with License Conditions
Non-compliance with laboratory rules is discovered when adverse
situations result. In order to identify non-compliance which might result
in harm to personnel, the current Radiation Staff frequently visit the
radiochemistry laboratories for the purpose of assessing compliance.
Usually it is another researcher that identifies if someone has
contaminated an area and did not clean up. This is because the
researchers are required to do surveys every time they work.
Early in the program a student used a large UV light and observed
the distribution of uranyl compounds on surfaces in laboratory MSM-164
[51]. Even though a person could visually identify the presence of these
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compounds, the absence of surveys caused contamination of keyboards,
phone keypads, door knobs, and bench tops. As the routine laboratory
duties are accomplished, a laboratory inspection is done. This includes
looking to see what is in the trash, review of the setup of each
experiment, observation of how and where samples are stored,
determination of what is reasonable for waste that is collected from that
area and what notation is expected on the waste inventory form for each
laboratory. When items that deviate from good work practices are found,
action must be taken to correct the situation, or if it is a task that would
require hours, document it, photograph it and let people know about it.
The following items of concern have been found periodically in the
radiochemistry laboratories:


radioactive material found in clean waste,



untrained personnel in a radiochemistry laboratory,



sloppy control of radioactive material work areas,



contaminated equipment (furnaces, pellet press, gloveless box),



contamination in normally clean areas,



contaminated PPE in a clean area (laboratory coats),



unsecured radioactive materials,



safety glasses in a contaminated work area,



blocked safety equipment,



blocked emergency exits,



fume hoods for radioactive work inoperable,
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argon glove boxes without adequate argon supply, and



contaminated radioactive material storage areas.

Each of these items could have become an item of non-compliance or
caused injury to personnel if it was not discovered and corrective action
taken.
2.6.6.2 Actions Taken to Avoid Non-Compliance
A daily review of all laboratories before work with radioactive
materials and a walkthrough before leaving for the day are actions that
will identify conditions adverse to good radiological controls before they
cause harm or become items of non-compliance. This walkthrough
should be done by a senior researcher or Authorized User with the
specific intent of identifying problems that need correction.
Because of the ‘area possessive’ nature of researchers, the
Authorized User of that area will easily be identified and they will
recognize the need to fix items that deviate from proper control. If the
need for cleanup or a change to control habits is not identified, it must
be easy to cut off access to the laboratories until the offender recognizes
the need to clean up the area or provide more control. The real
unresolvable difficulty is associated with the people whose time is wasted
by the inconsiderate actions of some others.
Every person who has access to the radiochemistry laboratories
has the power to violate a regulation that would cause the immediate
failure of the Radiochemistry Program. The honesty of every person in
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the program and the trust in every person who is allowed access to the
laboratories by faculty and staff are two of the main components that
fight non-compliance. If at any time, a trusted member of the
organization observes a situation adverse to the goals of the program, the
Authorized Users must be notified and action must be taken.
2.6.6 Emergency Preparedness
“The ultimate objective of disaster management is to bring the
probability that damage will occur from an event as close to zero as is
possible” [52]. In radiochemistry or any area where there are a number
of hazards, the awareness of risks created by the researcher or others in
the laboratories is essential. Hazards and risks that will be dictated by
nature or equipment failure are not possible to prevent, but easy to
prepare for.
As the Radiochemistry Program grew and the need to prepare for
an emergency situation was recognized, the laboratories were stocked
with fire extinguishers, first aid kits, absorbent materials, protective
clothing, and a laboratory presence so that people recognized there was
help if it was needed. The support staff has 40 hour HAZWOPER
(Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response) training [53], a
confidence in the laboratories that comes from years of experience, and
familiarity with the equipment and facilities.
Training of personnel in how to respond to an emergency is
extremely important. Drills of postulated situations make people aware of
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what actions are best to help people that may have been hurt and take
action to return the laboratory spaces to normal after the event. In 2005
the Environmental Health and Safety department conducted a chemical
spill drill that had participation from the Clark County Hazmat team. It
is always possible that the unexpected occurrence will cause a fire, a
spill of hazardous or toxic or radioactive material that will result in some
degree of harm to one or more people. Obviously, the frequency and
severity of such events must be minimized, but any time that humans
are involved in an area such as the radiochemistry laboratories, it is
possible that an accident will happen. If personnel are trained and ready
for an adverse situation, it might be avoided or the probability of harm as
a result of it might be reduced.
The first drill training occurred in November of 2010. The first drill
was conducted in December of 2010 and the actions taken by the
student responder were excellent. The drill team needed to improve their
operations, to more appropriately conduct and evaluate the drill, but
drills are held so that everyone learns from the experience. Drills
associated with possible undesirable events in the radiochemistry
laboratories should be held more frequently to ensure that proper actions
will be taken should a real event occur.
2.6.7 Radioactive Material Security
Security of materials that might cause harm to members of the
public has become more of a concern since 2001 and the concept of
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public terror became an important aspect of life in the United States.
Radioactive materials in large quantities may cause a dose to personnel
that could result in undesirable effects; small quantities of radioactive
materials are ingested, inhaled, and absorbed into our bodies every day.
The distinction in the radiochemistry laboratory has to be associated
with the fact that the materials used are licensed.
Security of the radioactive material in a radiochemistry program is
directly controlled by the radioactive material user. Since the start of the
program, the Authorized Users are the only people to have access to the
laboratories supply of radioactive material. In radiochemistry at UNLV,
access to the material requires access to the building, the laboratory bay,
the laboratory containing the storage room, the room where the material
is located, and the combination to the safe in which it is stored. Each of
these access points requires a method of access controlled by the
Authorized User, building management, and the Radiation Safety Officer.
Licensed radioactive materials must be controlled in a manner that
prevents the likelihood that they will be uncontrolled when outside if the
radiochemistry laboratories. When out of any laboratory posted for
control of radioactive materials, they must be properly packaged and
labeled so that in case of an emergency, the correct people can be
immediately notified to establish control while the emergency is handled.
Licensed material is under inventory control at all times. A semi-annual
inventory of the materials verifies their location, who has possession of
the material, and the condition of their container.
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For special nuclear material controlled under the Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards policies and distribution of the material must be
controlled for each researcher. Disposal by the researcher is recorded
and the disposition of material in milligram amounts is ensured in this
manner. Periodic reporting to the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and
Safeguards is required to verify that the material is properly controlled to
disposal or transfer.
2.7 Management
The most important aspect of any radiation safety program is
support from management of the licensed entity whether it is a
university, government facility, or industrial facility. Good management
of a Radiochemistry Program comes from recognition of the hazards that
will be created and providing for proper protection of the people that will
do the work. The important aspects of radiation protection are discussed
by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) in
[54]. These are refined by the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements (NCRP) in their reports over the years and discussed
in detail in [55]. In the United States, the fundamental principles of
radiological protection are incorporated into regulation based on the
recommendations of the NCRP.
2.7.1 Management Challenges in Radiochemistry
When using radioactive materials in powder and liquid forms, the
primary hazard for actinides is from inhalation and ingestion. The degree
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of hazard associated with each experiment can be based on some simple
management tools that are derived from the work developed at the
University of Massachusetts at Lowell [56]. This work was developed over
the years based on the recommendations of the ICRP in several
publications, the initial work in ICRP 2 [57] and later, ICRP 30 [58].
As a radiochemistry program grows, the costs associated with
operating such a program also must grow. The radiation safety support
in time, surveys, evaluation of the laboratories, bioassay sample
analysis, and job coverage will grow in proportion to the increase in the
number of laboratory spaces and the number of personnel in the
program. The following considerations for cost should be revisited at
least annually.


radiation safety and laboratory support manpower



radiation safety technical support capability



survey instruments at the laboratories



supplies and equipment to conduct and analyze smears



support for bioassay requirements

2.7.2 Actions to Facilitate Management Support
The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is the coordinator for all
radiation work. Authorized Users are the trusted extension of the RSO to
implement requirements of the radioactive material license and protect
workers. The person in the position of Radiation Safety Officer has now
changed six times in six years (2006 to 2012). A stable program can only
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be achieved with a stable radiation safety office and the support of upper
management. The American Academy of Health Physics published [59]
standard qualifications for a university RSO in 2003.
Radiochemistry faculty must be more than capable to control the
work and teach the students, and the laboratory manager must
understand the issues required to control the laboratories. These
features must provide for the control of work with radioactive materials.
In doing so, the information needed must be provided in detail for high
risk work so that there is clear understanding between the researchers,
the Authorized Users, the laboratory managers, and the radiation safety
staff. The details of controlling will depend on many factors, the
radionuclides, the activity, the methods, and the interaction between the
people involved [60]. Before each experiment there must be a detailed
analysis of the possible outcome, potential undesirable results, and
possible actions that may be needed to recover from those results.
Good radiation safety management is the only acceptable, safe
pathway to work with radioactive materials and radiation producing
devices. It is also important that corporate management maintain control
of a radiation safety program to ensure that the impact of events does
not destroy a program or the company. In 2006, just after transitioning
to the radiochemistry program two papers were presented at the Health
Physics Society annual meeting in Portland Oregon [61] [62]. The first
paper provided a discussion of the need for any radiation protection
program to have a reporting chain to the highest levels of management of
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any corporation or entity which allows the use of radioactive materials.
This paper was a discussion of first-hand experience in association with
the management of radiation protection organization which had become
dysfunctional and a comparison of this with the program described in a
paper delivered just six months previous to that time [63]. The second
paper outlined the risks associated with managing a radiation safety
program in a poster style that questioned people about their actions as
RSO should a person be hurt due to accident or program failure. This
paper displayed the many risks that must be considered and the
responsibility that a large program Radiation Safety Officer accepts.
There were no answers provided in this presentation, only questions
asked in hope that the reader would acknowledge the many aspects of
program control that are necessary.
For example, regarding regulatory compliance - A good radiation
safety program provides compliance with all regulations.
•

What if you don’t have sufficient resources to provide compliance?

•

What if you get lucky and appear to comply but have some serious
problems that go unnoticed?

•

What if an audit finds that you are not in compliance?

•

Will management help you achieve compliance or pay the fine?
Every safety program manager must accept that unpleasant things

can happen. Unpleasant things happen every day, they just don’t
necessarily happen to you. When commitment is made to management of
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a program for minimizing the probability of harm to workers, the public,
or the environment, the greatest achievement is prevention of injury.
2.7.3 Perceptions of Work with Radioactive Materials
The radiochemistry program is in a fish bowl where everyone
outside is watching to ensure that no one in the program takes an action
that could be perceived as hazardous to personnel outside of the
program, even if there is a very low probability of harm. Every participant
in the program must recognize the fragility of the program. Participants
may be strong in the science, they may be strong in protection, but they
are humans in a sea of other humans who do not have the same goals
and ambitions. The fear of radioactive materials continues to propagate
throughout our population due to ignorance.
The Yucca Mountain Project is a classic example of ignorance
preventing a project that is needed for protection of the American people
[64]. As the politics has changed over the recent past regarding the
desirability for nuclear energy, the need for long term isolation or for
used

nuclear

fuel

reprocessing

has

not

been

recognized

as

a

responsibility of our government. The failure of the politicians in the
state of Nevada to recognize the need to provide education for the people
in their state is a serious deviation from science based decision making.
Using fear as a way to prevent something that people need to know the
truth about is inappropriate.
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The actions taken by students in the radiochemistry group,
teaching people about science and radiation has been outstanding. The
participation in the Health Physics Society, American Nuclear Society,
and providing support for the Boy Scouts of America Nuclear Merit Badge
program is great. The professionals working with radioactive materials
and radiation producing machines, providing teaching, or radioactive
products must also participate if we are to grow as a State and country.
2.7.4 Visitors to the Radiochemistry Laboratories
Visitors to the radiochemistry laboratories are very important. They
provide the opportunity to highlight laboratory capability and knowledge
of personnel in the program. They also present a challenge for program
participants to get the visitors out of the laboratory in the same condition
that they entered.
During 2009 representatives from a Department of Energy facility
that is very important as a funding source, a collaboration source, and
as a future employer for our students toured the radiochemistry
laboratories. During one of the tours a visitor observed what appeared to
them to be less than satisfactory controls. Rather than ask about the
situation as it occurred, that person reported to his management that
controls at the UNLV radiochemistry laboratories were not very good. All
students and faculty are encouraged to question anything that they
perceive as inappropriate but training was not provided to visitors to
encourage them to express their views so that all learn together.
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As a result of that incident, a letter was written to the facility
management to indicate that they must bring items of concern to the
attention of the staff so that everyone would learn from them. A
document was prepared that all future visitors must sign [65]. The
document provides five simple statements of training and requires that
all visitors read and sign the document. The document is then held for
future reference should there be a case similar to what happened as a
result of that tour.
The document describes that radioactive materials are used in the
area in quantities that require radiological controls to;


minimize external dose to personnel in the laboratories,



minimize intake of radioactive materials,



prevent exposure of visitors to our laboratories,



prevent

exposure

of

workers

who

maintain

utilities

in

laboratories, and


prevent exposure to other members of the public who may come
in close proximity to laboratories.

It then provides a number of guidance statements for all personnel
who intend to enter the laboratories for the purpose of touring or
repairing utilities. The laboratory visitor must read and sign that they
understand all of the statements made in the document. This simple
action provides the visitor with a comfort that no matter what they see, if
in their opinion, it does not look right, they can report it and they will get
an answer to their concern. No one does everything right all of the time,
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but researchers and managers can only try harder if the issues are
known. Communication of thoughts to the leaders of the radiochemistry
program will ensure that the program continues to grow with minimum
adverse influences due to lack of knowledge.
2.8 Implementation
The radiation safety program for radiochemistry at UNLV was structured
as previously described. This section describes the actions necessary and
the program administrative structure that was beneficial to implementing
the program. An important consideration in the establishment of new
controls is the need to ensure that researchers have had sufficient
training and have confidence in their actions to prevent extreme
reactions with chemicals in an area where the event could not be
controlled.
2.8.1 Abstract
Incorporation of a Radiochemistry PhD Program into an academic
radioactive

materials

license

is

challenging

and

requires

strong

management support to sustain operation. A radiochemistry program
uses long lived, low Annual Limit on Intake (ALI) radionuclides in order
to observe chemical reactions and take measurements, over period of
time, that would not be possible with short lived radionuclides. A
program designed for control of short lived beta emissions may have a
decay in storage program and thus have no radioactive waste disposal
program; this also is not possible for a radiochemistry program.
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Collaboration with scientists from other facilities requires shipping
specialists to ensure safe transfer of samples. As events occur, actions
must be taken to evaluate the cause and reduce the probability of
recurrence and thus protect the program.
2.8.2 Discussion
The University Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is responsible to the
regulator or to a Radiation Safety Committee to establish controls
appropriate to maintain exposure to university employees, visitors, and
students ALARA. Some factors that are important in that action are as
follows:


Management

support

to

a

program

using

alpha

emitting

radionuclides requires attention to facility capability, observation
of work, review of experiments, accountability of materials, license
changes, and detailed surveys to verify appropriate control
measures are taken by the researchers.


Management of the Radiation Safety Office requires technical
support to be able to properly evaluate issues that might arise
regarding exposure of researchers.



Low ALI (high toxicity) radionuclides in powder form, not in
solution, are required to be controlled in hoods or glove boxes.



High toxicity radionuclides must be maintained in a controlled
state or in solution at all times.
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Locations

where

radionuclides

are used

in

quantities that

represent a potential to cause high dose to researchers require
more attention. At least daily visits to these locations are
necessary.


Abnormal events are evaluated via critique. A critique is a method
to document the occurrence from the eyes of each participant so
that a root cause may be identified and action taken to prevent
recurrence of the event by identification of possible solutions in the
data gathering process.



Documentation of contamination control surveys by researchers is
essential. A delay in this requirement as a means of minimizing
survey burden on the researcher was detrimental to the program
and recovery was difficult for a group that was not previously
required to document their surveys.
In the beginning years of the UNLV Radiochemistry Program

radiation safety support was provided by a Certified Health Physicist
(CHP) as RSO with the knowledge that three other CHP’s were on campus
and could assist if needed. This support ensured appropriate attention to
issues required to keep the program in operation. The knowledge and
experience of radiation safety personnel must be strong to support this
type of program. After leaving the UNLV EHS organization, the former
RSO joined the Radiochemistry Program as the Radiation Laboratory
Director, the Health Physicist responsible for radiation safety for
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radiochemistry. This was a good fit for the individual and the laboratory
based radiochemistry program.
When mixing chemicals, radioactive or stable, inhalation or
ingestion are the most important pathways for exposure. Most long lived
alpha emitting radionuclides do not emit gamma radiation, but some do.
Therefore, internal exposure is the pathway of interest. Since exposure of
the lungs is of primary concern for alpha emitting radionuclides, the
inhalation exposure pathway is most important to control. With internal
exposure as the most important pathway, prevention of exposure is
typically simple: keep the radionuclides in solution or in a situation
where intake via inhalation or ingestion is not possible. Two simple
techniques to prevent airborne activity are; 1. Keep the activity in
solution, 2. Keep the activity controlled in a hood or glove box.
Training is the most important way for a researcher to know the
rules and minimize their exposure to radiation; safety training must also
provide protection techniques. Supervision is the only way for Authorized
Users, Health Physicists, or Radiation Safety Office personnel to identify
work practices that may lead to intake of radioactive materials and
provide guidance to change them. The authorized user, responsible for
radiation protection must be present in the laboratories at all times when
research is in progress. Radiation Safety Office personnel should visit the
laboratories frequently, at least daily when work is in progress.
When things go wrong there must be learning of how it happened
and what can be done to minimize the probability for it to happen again.
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In research, actions are taken that will occasionally provide unknown
results. These results or other actions may cause an undesirable
situation to exist or unplanned exposure of personnel to radiation or
other hazards. A critique of the situation should document who was
involved, what happened from the perspective of each person, and a
discussion of the best ideas to prevent recurrence. Management should
then implement the best solution identified.
In the first four years of the radiochemistry program there was
reluctance by the Authorized Users and the radiochemistry health
physicist to require documentation of contamination control surveys. It
was considered more appropriate to enable the researchers to focus on
their science and for others to focus on radiation protection. In
hindsight, this was inappropriate and did not encourage researchers to
do the required surveys. Documentation provides that encouragement
and should be required. Surveys done by researchers should be for
simple dose control or contamination control. Requiring surveys that are
lengthy and take much of their time will cause issues of non-compliance;
they will not be done as needed.
2.8.3 Summary
A radiochemistry program has special needs for radiological control
that are not provided by radiation protection programs designed for short
lived beta emitting radionuclides or those that only require protection
from sealed sources. Control of long lived alpha emitting radionuclides
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must consider contamination control measures as most important,
provide for supervision of all aspects of research, and ensure that there
is learning from events that cause undesired consequences.
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3. CHAPTER 3
RECOVERY FROM DECONTAMINATION
3.0 Hypotheses
Radioactive waste production can be reduced and sustainability of
the resources of the Radiochemistry Program can be accomplished
through recovery of materials from contaminated surfaces. Specifically,
resource recovery can be enhanced with use of new decontamination
agents. In addition, a new decontamination gel is a useful, protective
sampling tool.
3.0.1 Literature Review
This section describes a project which originated with the removal
of technetium from surfaces of a research hood [66]. The evaluation of
surfaces of the fume hood was made using techniques commonly
described for radiological characterization surveys [67] [68] these are
direct measurement using gas proportional detectors and indirect
measurement using smears. The results of the characterization survey
were reported in Operational Radiation Safety [69]. Since the Baker
Atomic

Weapons

contamination

of

test
ships

near

Bikini

and

land

Atoll

[70]

surfaces,

that

led

methods

to

gross

have

been

researched to remove radioactive contamination from surfaces. There are
many mechanisms to remove contaminants from surfaces. Reference [71]
documents

some

general

considerations

from

the

1950

era.

Decontamination techniques include; washing using surfactants [72],
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oils [73], or caustic solutions [74]; abrasion by blasting with CO2 pellets
[75], abrasive foam pellets [76] [77], sand, zeolite; peelable polymer
surfaces [78], foams, sugar solutions [79], and many more [80]. Each of
these methods fit a specific need; however, every one either causes more
radioactive waste than desirable, is time consuming, or is inefficient in
decontamination.
The following is a discussion of several available decontamination
methods and the rationale for selecting the one used in this research.
Most commonly, contaminated surfaces are washed with surfactant
compounds (detergents, soluble foaming agents, emulsifiers, etc.) that
provide a removal action by lowering the surface tension between the
decontaminating liquid and the surface to be cleaned [81]. These
compounds are inexpensive, readily available, and easy to use. However,
there is typically physical scrubbing required to break the contaminant
free from the surface and wiping or rinsing action to remove the solution
creates volumes of liquid waste. This is not a desirable option for large
scale decontamination of a fume hood because it is time consuming,
requires scrubbing in hard to reach areas, and creates liquid waste. The
surfactant is good for removal of contaminants from small areas.
An original technique for removal of contamination from ship
surfaces after the Bikini Atoll tests was scrubbing with fuel oil. The
method was abandoned after several attempts because the removal of
contamination was difficult and efficiency was low. A more common use
of oils for cleaning is associated with removing surface dirt and dust from
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wood surfaces. The wood is not damaged and in fact is protected in the
process and the cleaning compound typically provides a pleasant aroma.
In the case of large areas of stainless steel and plastic surfaces with
baked on contaminants, oil does not assist in removing the contaminant,
it typically provides a slick layer that may also require treatment for
removal. Oil was not a consideration in this case because it would
require physical scrubbing and may leave a contaminant on the hood
surface (the oil) that could damage experiment purity.
Blasting surfaces with sand and zeolite have been common for
paint removal for many decades. A more modern approach in blasting
was introduced in the 1980’s using dry ice or abrasive foam pellets.
Similar to the hard materials, these abrasives are blasted at the surface
to be decontaminated and the contaminant is removed. The major
difficulty associated with this process is the displacement of the
radioactive contaminant from the controlled state on the surface to the
free, loose state in the air. In addition, the abrasive blasting process may
cause damage to the surface and other items that it hits. The most
promising of these at nuclear plants was the dry ice blasting where it
could be used on highly contaminated surfaces in a controlled
environment with collection of the airborne activity via filtration. For the
situation in a small radiochemistry laboratory, use of abrasive blasting
would make the contaminant airborne and simply allow for its collection
on other surfaces or in HEPA filtration systems. This technique is not
desirable for fume hood decontamination.
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A common method in dealing with highly contaminated surfaces is
binding the contamination to prevent re-suspension and a high
concentration of airborne activity. The contamination is attached to the
surface using a sprayable fixative that is not soluble in water and is able
to be stripped to remove a large fraction of the contaminant thus
reducing the dose rate in the work area. This is frequently used during
refueling processes at nuclear power plants where contaminated surfaces
from refueling water may reach levels of MBq/cm2. When the refueling
water is removed from the refuel pool, contamination collects on the
sides of the pool. The fixative is then sprayed onto the surface to reduce
the amount of activity that would become airborne. After removal of the
fixative from the pool walls, it is collected in shielded drums for disposal.
The cost of this method is high but it has good decontamination
efficiency, controls the spread of contamination and does not require
physical scrubbing of the surface.
Another novel technique that was used in a highly contaminated
area of an abrasive blasting room at Allied Technology Group facilities in
Richland Washington was fixing the contamination with a fine spray of
sugar water. The sticky surface provided good attachment of the activity
to the surfaces so that they could be easily decontaminated using water
and a vacuum cleaner with HEPA filtration that was set up for liquid
collection. While the concept appeared sound, the use of sugar caused an
unexpected problem, insects. A rapid infestation caused the cleanup to
be much more difficult than anticipated and the method was not used
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again. One aspect of this technique that was desirable was the solubility
of the fixative.
3.1 Selection of Technique and Evaluation
From the commonly used decontamination methods, the most
desirable properties could be selected as follows:
1. Provides encapsulation of the contaminant.
2. Allows for removal of the contaminant from the surface.
3. Is collected from the surface by peeling.
4. Is in the form of a solid upon removal from the surface.
5. Attenuates emissions from radioactive material collected.
6. Does not create large quantities of waste.
7. Does not cause other problems (insects, mixed waste, etc.)
The search for the most desirable decontamination product
identified a new fixative with all of the properties identified above. A
small volume of this agent [82] was purchased and tested on some spills
at UNLV and tests at other facilities [83] [84] were published. This
product had one property not present with other usable decontamination
techniques. The decontamination material could be put back into
solution and the recovered material extracted and reused. This property
was discussed [85] with the developer of the material who indicated that
research had not been conducted. After this initial evaluation, the known
information about the gel indicated it that it meets all of the most
desirable

properties

of

a

decontamination
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method

as

previously

described and more, it provides the opportunity to research recovery of a
contaminant for reuse.
3.2 Experience Using the Gel at UNLV
Several events occurred in 2008 that prompted review of currently
available decontamination methods, these events are described in a
series of communications beginning with the description of a personnel
contamination with

99Tc

[86]. The second event involved a spread of

contamination from researchers working with

239Pu

contaminated soil

[87]. This was a minor loss of contamination control during the
separation of hot particles from soil samples that had been collected from
a nuclear weapon accident site [88]. The loss of control was recognized
immediately by the researcher and action was taken to control the
situation and remove all personnel from the area of the spill. Before any
attempt at decontamination, the researcher recovered as many of the
particles as possible for continued research. The floors in the laboratories
where these two events occurred are designed to be slip resistant. This
property is achieved by small hard shards that stick up from the rubber
floor. When particles fall onto the floor they are difficult to collect and
washing the floor surface will not remove radioactive contamination
caught in the floor penetrations.
After initial cleaning which consisted of removal of sand and dust,
decontamination gel [89] was applied to the floor in the affected area to
immobilize identified contamination and collect as much of the
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contamination as possible. It is noted at this time that no special
preparation of the surfaces was done other than simple cleaning. The
area adjacent to the gel was surveyed by direct measurement with an
alpha/beta scintillation probe, no activity was found. The gel was allowed
to dry overnight, it was peeled from the floor surface and all activity in
the area was removed. Smear and direct measurement surveys were
used to verify that the contamination was removed to below acceptable
guidelines established by the UNLV Radiation Safety Office. The primary
guideline in this case was a surface contamination limit of 20 dpm/100
cm2 (0.33 Bq/100 cm2). The mass of

239Pu

associated with the

contamination was less than 10 micrograms, a mass that is below
recovery considerations.
In an event involving

233U

contamination of a concrete floor in one

of the radiochemistry laboratories [90], the hydrophilic gel was spread on
the floor covering the extent of the spill area. Approximately 2 liters of gel
was poured from the container and spread over the contaminated floor
area, approximately 5 square meters, with a thickness that ranged from
2 to 5 mm. The gel was spread by hand; the surface was not prepared in
any way. The contamination on the floor was slightly above the
contamination control limits with a maximum alpha emitter surface
activity concentration of 20 dpm/100 cm2. Considering that an area of 1
meter by 5 meters was contaminated to that level, then a maximum
activity, AMAX, for

233U,

could be determined as follows: AMAX = 100 cm X

500 cm X 20 dpm/100 cm2 X 1 Bq/60 dpm and AMAX = 1.7x104 Bq, with
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an approximate specific activity of 3.5x108 Bq/g, the mass associated
with this activity is estimated to be 4.8x10-5 grams. Recovery was not
considered for this material; it was not thought of as an option at the
time of these events.
The gel was allowed to dry for 24 hours and then it was peeled off
of the floor as a solid. A survey of the floor after decontamination
revealed that the floor showed no detectable removable or fixed

233U

contamination. Removable activity was evaluated by smear surveys. The
smears were counted on a Tennelec LB 5100 gas proportional counter.
Fixed contamination was evaluated using a Ludlum 2360 rate meter with
a 43-93 alpha/beta probe.
If

recovery

were

considered;

using

the

method

previously

described, the value of that recovery is determined as follows: The value
of an uncertified nitrate solution of 48 micrograms of

233U

is less than

$30.00 [91]. The cost of disposal of waste (2 liters of solid gel) is
determined from the fraction of a 55 gallon (207.9L) drum times
$1000.00 per drum. This is about $10.00. The cost of labor to recover
the material would certainly be more than an hour, with a labor rate of
$50.00 per hour. Therefore the cost of recovery is more than the worth
of the material plus the cost of waste and recovery is unreasonable.
3.3 Recycling of Tc from a Research Hood Decontamination
In four years of working with

99Tc

in milligram to gram quantities

to make many different compounds and provide the resource for the
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generation of several publications, a contamination problem was
identified. Work in one of the fume hoods used by the UNLV
radiochemistry program was contaminated to a degree that resulted in a
significant increase in contamination events outside of the controlled
hood as discovered in weekly surveys. Section 3.4 describes some of the
chemistry that was done in this hood. It was decided that the hood
should be decontaminated when the researchers were away, during the
winter break in December 2009. The hood, until just before the winter
break, held equipment from years of operation, as shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. The Technetium Research Hood Before Cleanup

The

99Tc

research fume hood is a Kewaunee Supreme Air Fume

Hood with open bypass operation with high efficiency particulate air
filters in the exhaust train. The hood wall and back surfaces are
stainless steel coated with anticorrosion material which is hard and
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smooth allowing for reasonably good removal of surface contaminants.
The 1¼ inch epoxy resin base is the surface where all of the equipment
and supplies were placed. The cup drain from this hood has been sealed
flush with the level of the base. The sash is coated safety glass and is
very easy to clean. Decon gel was not used on the sash, it was easily
cleaned with a common cleaning liquid in the laboratory, Radiacwash® is
one used in the Radiochemistry Laboratories, but many similar cleaning
solutions are adequate for this type of surface.
3.4 Assessment of Previous Use of the Hood
This hood has been the location where many researchers have
collected to work with

99Tc

in mg to gram quantities to investigate the

chemistry of technetium. The primary focus of the research done here is
on fundamental and applied technetium chemistry [92] [93].
In general,

99Tc

compounds and associated materials are subjected

to a number of environmental influences in attempts to create new
compounds or recreate those known to exist in order to characterize their
behavior. Over the years, the research in this hood included: heating
compounds in tube furnaces, mixing compounds in acids and bases,
working with volatile and stable compounds, and working with various
gases. Compounds have been spilled, splashed, sprayed, bubbled with
gases, and vaporized in this fume hood.
Twelve grams of

99Tc

in the form of ammonium pertechnetate

(NH4)TcO4-, or similar forms were used in research projects in this fume
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hood. This relates to an activity of

99Tc

of 5.3 GBq. The experiments

included investigation of the applied aspects of technetium chemistry
with

special

emphasis

on

synthesis,

separations,

and

materials

chemistry [94]. Synthetic chemistry focused on metal-metal multiple
bonding, oxides and halides. Synthesis and characterizations of (nBu4N)2Tc2X8, Tc2(O2CCH3)4X2 (X=Cl or Br), TcO2, Bi2Tc2O7, Bi3TcO8, TcBr3
and TcBr4 have been performed. Some recent work included preparation
of TcCl4 from the reaction of

99Tc

metal with excess chlorine in sealed

Pyrex ampules at elevated temperatures [95].
Heating in tube furnaces has introduced thermally hot discharges
of air entrained with

99Tc

in different chemical forms into the exhaust air

flow of the hood. The cooler surfaces of the hood and exhaust ducts have
caused the Tc to attach to the baffles and plenum surfaces, as the
particles contacted those surfaces. It is possible, but difficult to prove,
that more than 10% of the activity used in these experiments has been
attached to the hood and plenum surfaces or impacted the HEPA filters.
Equipment present in the hood over the years has been a rotovap
apparatus, mixers, hot plates, tube furnaces, cooling baths, Schlenk
lines and associated clamps and racks, vacuum pumps, glassware,
contaminated tools and many different gases.
3.5 Initial Assessment of Activity in the Hood
The first step in the decontamination was to conduct a reasonable
assessment of the surface activity concentration within accessible areas
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of the hood and assess the total activity present in the hood. The results
showed an approximate ‘loose surface activity concentration’ of 20-100
Bq/100 cm2 with the highest activity concentration on the sides of the
hood, possibly the result of sprays of activity from apparatus. As a result
of the magnitude of this activity concentration, it was decided that the
decontamination of this hood could provide some valuable information
about the distribution of

99Tc

(the major radioactive contaminant in the

hood) and the effectiveness of the selected decontamination compound,
Decon Gel™ 1101 [89].
The hood surfaces were marked into a grid pattern based on the
size of a large area Berthold Xe counter [96] [97]. Smears were taken on
several surfaces within the hood and counted on a Tennelec LB-5100
Alpha-Beta Counter [98]. The hand held Berthold LB-122 and the
Tennelec LB-5100 were calibrated to the same

99Tc

source [99]. Decon

gel was applied to 15 of the grid squares; five before the initial smear
sample results were determined and 10 after the initial smear sample
results were reported. The gel was applied before the smears on some of
the grids to determine if the gel would remove some or all of the loose
activity. This initial test provided reasonable assurance that the gel
would be effective at removal of the

99Tc

from the hood without

scrubbing. The activity distribution in the initial survey of the hood is
shown in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2. Display of the grid system used to evaluate smears, direct

readings, and gel samples – Activity units = dpm/smear.
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The contamination levels shown in Figure 3-2 are in units of
dpm/smear with each smear representing the area of a Berthold LB-122
gas proportional detector, 14 cm by 22 cm (322 cm2). The sensitive area
of the Berthold LB122 Xe gas detector is 11.8 cm by 18.9 cm (223 cm2).
The

Berthold

measurements

LB122
on

was

the

selected

hood

as

surface.

the
This

detector

for

instrument,

primary
in

the

configuration used, has a sealed xenon detector with a 5 mg/cm2
titanium foil window. Using the electroplated
efficiency for

99Tc

99Tc

standard, the detection

beta emissions was determined to be 0.0635

counts/transformation. The background response rate in the vicinity of
the hood was 13.1 counts/second. The response shown in Figure 3-2 is
not indicative of a severe contamination problem, since the material was
contained in a HEPA filtered fume hood. However, there was an
increased frequency of higher than normal activity on smears outside of
the hood, which could be attributed to the only source of high

99Tc

contamination, the hood.
The gel samples were collected from locations S1 through S15
shown in Figure 3-2. Samples S1 through S5 were immediately analyzed
for contained activity by direct measurement using the Berthold LB122.
Direct measurements were taken on the front and back surfaces of each
gel sample and then the samples were dissolved in water for analysis by
liquid scintillation counting. These measurements did not reveal
information about the depth of activity within the gel because the gel
thickness

varied

between

samples.
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To

obtain

a

more

complete

assessment of the activity contained within the gel, each of the samples
was dissolved in deionized (DI) water (18.0 M cm-1). Aliquots of 100
microliters each were taken from the top, middle, and bottom of the
beaker containing the solution created by the dissolved gel and analyzed
on a Perkin Elmer 2700TR Liquid Scintillation Counter (LSC) [100]. This
provided for the determination of the total activity in each gel sample.
The liquid scintillation counting results are summarized in Table 3-1.
The results of this analysis indicated that the activity in the gel
was distributed evenly in the solution created by dissolving the gel in the
DI water. This demonstrates that the activity was present as an even
distribution on the surface and not attached particles with high

99Tc

content.
Table 3-1. Estimate of

99Tc

activity in gel samples based on LSC analysis

Location
Designation

NET
Sample
Mass (g)

Activity of
Gel
Solution
Sample 1
(top)
(DPM)

S1

6.02

673.2

691.8

731.8

698.9

559147

9319

S2

7.14

441.8

487.1

441.8

456.9

365520

6092

S3

5.92

397.6

391.5

325.2

371.4

297147

4952

S4

5.10

326.9

320.7

319.7

322.4

257947

4299

S5

8.12

364.4

204.4

246.2

271.7

217333

3622

Activity of
Gel
Solution
Sample 2
(middle)
(DPM)

Activity of
Gel
Solution
Sample 3
(bottom)
(DPM)

Average
Activity of
Gel
Aliquots
(DPM)

Total
Activity in
Gel Sample
(DPM)

Total
Activity in
Gel Sample
(Bq)
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The next planned evaluation was a more detailed smear survey and
a direct reading survey to identify the extents of the loose surface activity
and the fixed activity on the hood surfaces. From there, the plan was to
spread the Decon Gel™ 1101 onto the surface and allow it to dry. The gel
would then be removed in grid squares and the gel squares analyzed by
direct measurements using the Berthold LB-122, smears on the gel and
on the surface where is was removed would be taken to determine if the
gel encapsulated the activity and the fraction of the surface activity that
was removed by the gel. Smears of the gel would be analyzed by a gas
proportional counting system and the gel in solution would be analyzed
using a LSC.
3.6 Data Collection
There data collected from the hood decontamination would answer
many questions, including:


What fraction of the activity on the hood surfaces was collectable
using a smear?



What fraction of the activity on the hood surfaces was removable
with the decontamination gel?



Was

the

activity

collected

in

the

decontamination

gel

encapsulated?


What fraction of the activity collected in the decontamination gel
was recoverable?
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The importance of these questions is as follows:


The fraction of activity collected by a smear has been a question

among radiation protection specialists for many years. The quantification
of activity on surfaces has been “estimated over the years by taking a
smear of 100 cm2, evaluating that smear and reporting the concentration
of removable activity on that surface as the activity on the smear per 100
cm2. This is incorrect; the actual surface activity is on the average 10
times more.


The fraction of activity removable with the gel is important as a

parameter of the gel that makes it useful. If you have some reason to
believe that the gel will effectively remove the contamination, it is a
useful decontamination product.


The fraction of the activity collected that is encapsulated by the gel

is important because it determines the desirability to use the gel as a
sample collection mechanism. If the gel can collect a sample and hold
that sample without the spread of contamination, this is a useful
property for movement of the sample as if moving a sealed container.


The fraction of activity collected by a gel that was recoverable is

important because it may be desirable to use the gel as a collector of
valuable material, and then recover the material from the gel. This may
be by chemical or physical means. Only chemical means were
investigated in this research.
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In order to answer each of these questions, a plan was devised to
do a more detailed evaluation of the activity on the hood surfaces. Direct
measurements of accessible areas of the hood before and after
application of the gel using the Berthold LB122 would be obtained. A
smear survey of all areas of the hood before and after application of the
gel would be conducted. Finally, the gel in each individual grid square
would be collected for further analysis and possible recovery of the

99Tc.

In following the plan, a detailed smear survey of the hood surfaces
was conducted. The smears used were the common variety, sticky back,
5 cm diameter, paper smears [101]. The pressure exerted when taking
each smear was similar over all of the surfaces surveyed. Figure 3-3
provides a distribution of the loose surface activity in the hood
immediately after the initial survey. The back surfaces of the hood are
used as examples to demonstrate the survey results and provide some
perspective on the effectiveness of the decontamination methods.
Although the activity on the back surfaces of the hood is higher than the
other areas, activity on all hood surfaces showed similar activity
distribution.
The detailed smear survey showed that each of the areas where the
decontamination gel was used had less remaining removable activity
than those which did not have the gel applied. This result was expected
and showed that the gel was effective in removing loose surface activity
from the hood surfaces. This survey also showed that there was
significant activity in some areas of the hood and much less in others.
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The areas of highest activity were toward the back of the hood, following
the flow of air, but there were some areas on each side of the hood that
were also high and indicate possible sprays or spills that were not
affected by air flow.

Figure 3-3. Distribution of Removable Activity on the Back Hood Surfaces

The most revealing measurements regarding the total activity in
the hood were direct measurements of the hood surfaces. The total
activity on the hood surfaces was found to be as much as 100 times
more than the removable activity within a grid square. Figure 3-4 shows
the approximate distribution of total surface activity concentration on the
back surfaces of the hood before decontamination.
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Figure 3-4. Distribution of Total Activity Before Decontamination

When compared to the direct measurement of the surfaces in the
same grids as the smears were taken, the distribution of total activity
was found to be significant. Figure 3-5 shows a histogram of the fraction
of activity that was removed by the smears. The average fraction of
activity removed by the smear was calculated to be 14.7% with a median
value of 12.8%. Of the 123 readings and smears taken on smooth
accessible surfaces, 89% of the smears taken removed between 5% and
30% of the surface activity.
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Figure 3-5. Histogram of Fraction of Surface Activity Removed by Smear

3.7 The Decontamination
3.7.1 Decontamination Set-Up
As

indicated

previously,

the

decontamination

method

used

DeconGel™ 1101, a commercially available decontamination product
from Cellular Bioengineering, Inc. The gel that was purchased for use in
the radiochemistry laboratories at UNLV came in a 20 liter bucket. The
gel is blue, viscous, and appears to penetrate into pores and tight places,
but is easily removed after it dries. This project is our third large scale
use of the gel; the other two uses were for cleanup of a
239Pu

233U

spill and a

hot particle spill. The gel was effective in both cleanups.
The decontamination gel was spread onto the hood surfaces using

a small putty knife. It stuck easily to most surfaces although it tended to
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drip from the hood ceiling, and collect in lumps from the vertical surfaces
of the hood. Even though there was dripping from these surfaces, enough
gel stayed on the surface to cause removal of radioactive contamination.
The gel was allowed to dry for approximately 24 hours before removal.
Figure 3-6 shows the hood surfaces after application of the gel.
After the gel dried onto the hood surfaces, it was cut at the grid
lines and peeled from the surface. Each grid square was labeled and
placed between two sheets of paper for later analysis. After removal of the

Figure 3-6. The

99Technetium

Research Hood coated with the gel.

gel, the grids were surveyed by direct frisk using the Berthold LB122 and
by taking smears which were evaluated using a low background gas
proportional counter.
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3.7.2 Results of Decontamination
In the same fashion as before contamination removal, the survey of
the hood surfaces was first done by direct measurement, then by smear
to prevent further removal of activity prior to the evaluation of total
activity. The results from the survey of removable activity are shown in
Figure 3-7. The reduction in surface activity due to decontamination
using the gel is significant with the removable activity almost completely
collected by the gel.

Figure 3-7. Distribution of Removable Activity After Decontamination
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Figure 3-8. Distribution of Total Activity on the Back Surfaces of the
Hood After Decontamination

In

addition,

Figure

3-8

provides

a

display

of

the

direct

measurement survey results. This survey indicates that much of the
activity displayed in Figure 3-4 was removed but there is an area of the
back of the hood where the activity was not removed. To further evaluate
this small area, more decontamination gel was applied to the area. There
was some further removal of activity by this second application, but it
amounted to less than 5% of the total activity that remained. A third
application of decontamination gel to this area did not cause any further
reduction in the activity on that surface. This indicates that the activity
in these grid squares was much more strongly attached. There was no
further attempt to remove the activity.
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3.7.3 Decontamination Factors
In radiation safety, the decontamination factor is a measure of the
effectiveness of a decontamination process. It is the ratio of the original
surface activity (before decontamination) to the remaining surface activity
after decontamination: 1,000 and above is usually considered excellent;
100 to 1000 very good and 100 and below are possibly valuable
depending on the situation. In this situation, we are interested in the
decontamination of the total hood activity which includes elimination of
the removable activity and reduction in the fixed activity which has a
stronger attachment to the hood surfaces.
The decontamination factors observed for removable activity were
determined from a comparison of smear results for the grid squares
before the decontamination gel application to after gel removal. These
decontamination factors averaged 450 with a range from 2 to more than
7000. The distribution of decontamination factors for removable activity
over the hood surfaces is shown in Figure 3-9.
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Figure 3-9. Decontamination Factor Distribution for Removable Activity

The decontamination factors for total activity on hood surfaces
were determined by comparing the direct measurement of surface activity
before the decontamination gel was applied to the direct measurement of
surface activity after the decontamination gel was removed. The average
decontamination factor was found to be more than 7,000, however, the
range of decontamination factors for total activity varied from 2 to more
than 100,000. The distribution of decontamination factors for total
activity over the hood surfaces is shown in Figure 3-10.
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Figure 3-10. Decontamination Factor Distribution for Total Activity

From the survey data, the fraction of the total measured activity in
the hood that was collected can be determined by subtracting the total
activity remaining after decontamination gel removal from the total
activity originally measured and dividing the result by the total activity
originally measured.

(

–

)

Equation 2-1

Where: FR = The fraction of the total surface activity removed by the gel
AT = The total surface activity before the gel application
AF = The total surface activity after the gel removal
The value of the fraction of the total activity removed from the
hood by the decontamination gel varied from 51.6% to 100% with a
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median value of 95% and a mean value of 93.6%.

See Table 3-2 for

details of this evaluation.
The total accessible activity in the hood could be estimated from
the hood surface area and the average surface activity concentration.
Within the hood, there are 4 areas which contribute significantly to the
total activity in the hood; the two walls, the base, and the back. Each
grid square has an area of 322 cm2. The hood contains two walls each
with 16 grid squares, a base with 36 grid squares, and a back containing
44 grid squares. The remainder of the inside hood surfaces that was not
included in the surveys contain the equivalent of approximately 40 grid
squares. The total accessible surface area is approximately: (16 * 2 + 44
+ 36 + 40) * 322 cm2 = 48944 cm2. With an average total surface activity
concentration of 62,500 DPM/probe area, the total activity in the hood
before decontamination is estimated to be 3x109 DPM (5.1x107 Bq).
Since approximately 90% of that activity was recovered by the
decontamination gel, the collected activity should be approximately (32 +
44 + 36)/(32 + 44 + 36 + 40) * 0.9 * 5.1x107 Bq = 3.38x107 Bq. The
specific activity of

99Tc

approximately 53 mg of

is 6.27x108 Bq/gram; therefore, this represents
99Tc.

In order to determine if the

99Tc

collected by the decontamination

gel was encapsulated, smears were taken on the side of the hardened gel
that contacted the contaminated surface. This result would be valuable
in considering collection of samples of activity from the site of a
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Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) [102] explosion. A first responder
team could place the decontamination gel in a survey fashion at locations
identified

as

areas

of

concern

by

portable

instrument.

The

decontamination gel could be collected after drying without concern for
contamination spread and the samples taken to a laboratory for analysis.
Since the back of the hood showed the most significant surface
activity concentration, the data from that area will also be used to
demonstrate the findings for this evaluation. Each of the gel samples
removed from the back was covered with paper and moved into a low
background area. The background response measured in this area was
12.6 cps. The response from the decontamination gel was measured with
the Berthold LB122 at both sides of each sample. Each smear was taken
over the entire surface of the dried gel that contacted the

99Tc

contaminated surface of the hood and counted on a Berthold low level
gas proportional counter. The maximum activity of a smear taken on the
dried decontamination gel surface was 2.4 Bq. The maximum fraction
removal of activity from a decontamination gel surface after it was
removed from the contaminated surface was 2.21x10-3. The average
fraction of activity removed from the decontamination gel was 3.3x10-4
with a median fraction of 1.3x10-4. Some samples indicated that there
was no activity available for transfer from the gel.
details of this evaluation.
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See Table 3-3 for

Table 3-2. Fraction of Activity in the Gel Available for Transfer

Location
Designation
B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10
B11
B12
B13
B14
B15
B16
B17
B18
B19
B20
B21
B22
B23
B24
B25
B26
B27
B28
B29
B30
B31
B32
B33
B34
B35
B36
B37
B38
B39
B40
B41
B42
B43
B44

Activity of
Gel by
Direct
Response
(DPM)
123978
172167
186340
114246
95537
111506
112356
137584
137206
135411
110466
180671
192576
135033
122183
125395
196167
221490
227631
242372
278466
192198
39411
41017
61616
68041
72576
44324
31946
49805
46403
27694
17584
26466
33080
47254
44230
65112
60482
33647
26561
37616
14939
13143

Count Rate on
Smears of Gel
Side Facing the
Contamination
(CPM)
2.950
22.200
13.200
5.050
8.370
7.860
3.170
11.200
3.020
17.300
8.770
9.450
3.310
3.090
1.900
4.890
2.460
7.870
3.260
6.570
0.950
5.950
1.830
2.090
1.140
2.080
1.820
2.580
2.060
3.700
5.880
9.520
7.800
9.880
3.720
7.640
16.800
34.700
7.030
6.730
1.700
1.550
1.390
0.638

Activity in Smear
of the Gel Side
Facing the
Contamination
(DPM)
7
90
51
16
31
28
8
43
8
69
32
35
9
8
3
16
5
28
9
23
0
20
2
4
0
4
2
6
3
10
20
36
28
37
11
27
67
144
25
24
2
0
0
0
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Minimum
Detectable
Activity (DPM)
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Fraction of
Activity in
Gel
Available for
Transfer
0.00006
0.00052
0.00028
0.00014
0.00032
0.00025
0.00007
0.00031
0.00006
0.00051
0.00029
0.00020
0.00005
0.00006
0.00002
0.00012
0.00003
0.00013
0.00004
0.00009
0.00000
0.00011
0.00006
0.00009
0.00000
0.00005
0.00003
0.00013
0.00011
0.00021
0.00043
0.00128
0.00160
0.00140
0.00032
0.00058
0.00151
0.00221
0.00041
0.00070
0.00007
0.00000
0.00000
0.00000

One attractive aspect of the DeconGel™ 1101 is its ability to collect
materials that would otherwise go to disposal, and recover them for
purification and conversion to usable forms for reuse in future
experiments. Members of the radiochemistry community can utilize these
compounds and this would also reduce costs for radioactive waste
disposal.
3.7.4 Analysis of Activity in the Gel
Liquid Scintillation Counting (LSC) provides a simple means to
determine the activity of a sample of the decontamination gel in solution.
For samples that are expected to provide a substantial response, the
volume of solution required is a very small fraction of the volume of LSC
cocktail required for the analysis. This minimizes the self-absorption of
the emissions from the gel, and thus maximizes the detection efficiency
of those emissions. Another desirable feature of LSC with emission
analysis capability is the discrimination of beta energy. For example, the
beta energy spectrum of

99Tc

has a maximum energy of 293.7 keV with

an average energy of 84.6 keV with a 100% beta yield. The beta emission
spectra from [103] is shown in Figure 3-11. Using this information and
the desire to minimize conflicts with other low energy beta emitters in the
liquid scintillation counter, the regions of interest on the liquid
scintillation counter were set up as channel A: 0-50 keV, channel B: 50300 keV, and channel C: 300 – 2000 keV.
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In order to improve efficiency, after it was found that there were no
low energy interferences, channels A and B could be summed. For

99Tc,

the expected detection efficiency is 95% to 100% (0.95 to 1 count per
transformation). The gel is proven to be useful for decontamination of
contaminated surfaces after it is reconstituted with water or ethanol. In
the next section experiments are done to determine if radioactive
contamination encapsulated in the gel can be recovered.

Figure 3-11. Energy and Yield for Beta Emissions from
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99Tc

3.8 Recovery of Tc from Decontamination Gel
3.8.1 Introduction
The hood decontamination provided an opportunity to evaluate
radionuclide recovery from the gel material. Analysis of the gel solution
created from the dissolution of the gel in DI water was completed by LSC.
The gel has proven to be useful for decontamination of surfaces and after
it is reconstituted with water or ethanol it can be reused. In this section,
experiments are described that will show radioactive contamination
encapsulated in the gel can be recovered.
The tests for materials recovery from decontamination gel have
shown that it can be made very dilute or can be broken down into a fluid
aqueous solution that is filterable. Attempts at destroying the viscous
nature of the gel were made using four types of concentrated acid: nitric,
acetic, sulfuric, and hydrochloric. The selected acids may provide for
future considerations such as evaluation of acidic gel solutions for
corrosive decontamination on metal surfaces. The idea of this set of
experiments was primarily to evaluate whether the gel could be broken
down to the point where it could be filtered or otherwise treated and
recovered for reuse.
3.8.2 Experimental Set-up
In a very basic experiment with the gel, 10 mL of water was added
to one gram of the gel, an attempt was made to force the water through a
0.45 micron filter without success. The applied pressure allowed only a
drop of liquid to pass though the filter. A second attempt was made with
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a dilution of one gram of gel in 50 mL of water; a 5 mL aliquot of that
sample could be filtered with high pressure on a syringe/filter assembly.
Based on these two simple tests, it seemed that a breakdown of the
gel is necessary for recovery of particles in the gel matrix. From the four
attempts at breaking down the gel, the method that appeared to have the
most reasonable degree of success in a short time was determined to be
the nitric acid dilution. The following sections provide more detail.
The gel was first put into water to make it liquid before the
addition of the acids. A grid square consisting of a variable mass of the
gel in a rectangle the size of the base of a Berthold LB-22 gas
proportional detector was dissolved in 100 mL of deionized water. Twelve
containers were prepared for each acid test; each container had 5 mL of
the gel from a sample collected in decontamination of the fume hood,
with known activity. To each sample, increasing volumes of acid were
added to allow observation of the effects of the acid on otherwise similar
solutions of gel and water with an entrained contaminant. A control
sample of the gel for each dilution was also saved.
3.8.3 Experiments with HCl
The

hydrochloric

acid

(HCl)

stock

was

concentrated

HCl

manufactured by Baker Analyzed, lot number E45048. This acid is a
strong mineral acid with uses in cleaning metal surfaces and in
production of gelatin. Perhaps its use in this set of experiments would
lead to a stronger gel that had the ability to remove some depth of metal
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surface in its decontamination of a metal surface. Increasing volume of
HCl, varying from 0.1 mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in
deionized water. The viscosity of the gel at low HCl concentration was the
greatest with only a slightly more fluid indication at the highest HCl
concentration. In these experiments, the viscosity was observed as the
ability of the gel and acid mixture to flow. A free flowing mixture would
be considered less viscous than a slow moving gel. As can be observed in
Figure 3-12, the color of the gel changed from blue (control) to light
green, to translucent yellow with increased concentration of HCl.

Figure 3-12. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HCl (The control gel is on the left,
acid concentration increases toward the right)
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The HCl did not reduce the viscosity of the gel. This was
determined by tipping the containers and watching the flow of the gel on
the side of the tube. The color change indicates that there was a variation
in the compound and was not investigated further. The HCl molar
concentration is displayed in Figure 3-13 in a graphical form for each of
the containers of gel. This display format was continued for each of the
gel and acid mixtures.

Figure 3-13. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HCl – The molar concentration of
HCl is displayed.

3.8.4 Experiments with H2SO4
The sulfuric acid stock was concentrated H2SO4 manufactured by
Baker Analyzed, lot number G44434. Similar to hydrochloric acid,
sulfuric acid is a strong mineral acid, but it is not used in gelatin
production. However, its use in corrosive decontamination of metal
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surfaces may be of interest. Increasing volume of H2SO4 varying from 0.1
mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in deionized water.
Figure 3-14 displays the color change that occurred with increasing acid
concentration from the control sample with no added acid on the left to
1.9 M H2SO4 in the far right sample. The gel with the lowest H2SO4
concentration flowed more freely than the gel with the highest H2SO4.
The color change was from blue to green then light green and a more
solid yellow at the highest acid concentration than with the addition of
HCl. Once again, the color change indicates a change in the compound;
the similar viscosity indicates that the gel is still intact.

Figure 3-14. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying H2SO4 (The control gel is on the
left, acid concentration increases toward the right)
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3.8.5 Experiments with CH3COOH
The acetic acid stock was concentrated CH3COOH from Baker
Analyzed, lot number J08N52. The selection of this carboxylic acid was
based on its use in production of vinyl acetate and wood glue. It is
commonly available in nature and could be an easy and inexpensive
method to break down this polymer. The drawback in this acid is its
strong corrosive effect on skin. Increasing volume of CH3COOH varying
from 0.1 mL to 1 mL was added to the 5 mL of gel diluted in deionized
water. The resulting molarity of the acid in the gel ranged from 0.2795 M
to 2.7949 M. The viscosity of the gel did not change with the increased
acid concentration as determined by visual observation of the movement
of the gel-acid mixture as the tubes were tipped. The color also did not
change, as is displayed in Figure 3-15. Since there was no color change
or viscosity change with the addition of the acetic acid, it appears that
there may have been no change to the hydrogel compound. The rationale
for this, as with the reason for an observed change with the addition of
the HCl and H2SO4, was not investigated.
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Figure 3-15. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying CH3COOH (The control gel is on the
left, acid concentration increases toward the right)

3.8.6 Experiments with HNO3
The addition of nitric acid in the same fashion as the other acids
showed a change of the gel at the higher acid concentration. This
corrosive mineral acid is a strong oxidizing agent and has the highest
potential as a useful method to break the polymer chains. The change
caused observed in the gel and nitric acid mixture was a free flowing
liquid. The concentrated nitric acid was prepared by Seastar Chemicals,
lot number 1207060. Figure 3-16 displays the samples to which nitric
acid was added, increasing acid concentration from left to right. The
nitric acid appeared to change the gel to a non-viscous and nearly
colorless liquid in less than 30 minutes.
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Figure 3-16. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HNO3 (The control gel is on the left,
acid concentration increases toward the right)

In the case of each acid except the nitric and the acetic, the
viscosity became greater. However, only in the case of the addition of
concentrated nitric acid did the gel completely breakdown More
experimentation was needed to verify that the dissolved gel solution
could be manipulated to remove the contaminants. The influence of acid
concentration or neutralizing the solution and gel reformation needs to
be examined. The color change in the gel with the addition of HNO3 is
shown in figure 3-17.
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Figure 3-17. Hydrogel Polymer with Varying HNO3 (The control gel is on the left,
acid concentration increases toward the right) – no scale.

A 10 mL sample of deionized water was added to the acid gel
mixture. It demonstrated that the gel was indeed broken down by the
addition of the HNO3 and did not have the original viscosity of the
decontamination gel. A 5 mL sample of the liquid was then removed to a
syringe and squeezed through a 0.45 micron filter. The gel and nitric acid
solution, the diluted gel/nitric acid solution, and the diluted/filtered
gel/nitric acid solutions were all sampled and analyzed by LSC. Table 34 shows the results from the LSC analyses and indicates that the
unfiltered and filtered solutions demonstrate that the
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99Tc

is in solution.

The differences in activity between the filtered and unfiltered samples are
not significant. From this information, it is reasonable to believe that
extraction techniques typically used to remove these radionuclides from
nitric acid would be appropriate to remove them from the acid solution
that remained after destruction of the decontamination gel.
3.8.7 Discussion of Recovery Considerations
As shown in section 3.8.6, the nitric acid solutions appeared more
fluid and could be pushed through a 0.45 micron filter. In the case of the
other acids, the gel either did not change in viscosity or became more
viscous. The viscosity was determined by a qualitative observation of the
rate of movement of the gel when the test tube holding the gel/acid
mixture was tipped to a 60o angle from the bench-top.
From this set of experiments, it was found that nitric acid is useful
in changing the polymer to allow filtration. A nitric acid solution in the
gel of 1.5M is the lowest concentration at which the liquid is clear. The
final step is re-concentration of the

99Tc

in the solution to see if the

polymer is reconstituted. A further experiment could be to determine if
the

99Tc

can be removed from the solution by precipitation with

tetrabutylammonium chloride. This was successfully attempted in
removal of

99Tc

from one of the residue recovery experiments. Table 3-4

provides data from the attempt to filter the
shows that the

99Tc

99Tc

from the mixture. This

was in solution and filtration was not effective at

removal.
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Table 3-3. Analysis of

99Tc

in Unfiltered and Filtered Gel/Acid by LSC

The original sample of gel was
from decontamination of the
MSM-173 hood. The solution
was approximately 10 grams of
gel in 50 mL of deionized water.
Sample Description
Tc Gel 0.1 mL Concentrated
HNO3 + H2O
Tc Gel 0.2 mL Concentrated
HNO3 + H2O
Tc Gel 0.3 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.4 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.5 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.6 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.7 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.8 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 0.9 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O
Tc Gel 1.0 mL Concentrated
HNO3+ H2O

Acid/Gel
Acid/Gel
Diluted &
Acid/Gel
Diluted
Filtered
Solution Activity Concentration (dpm/0.1 mL)
315

173

188

342

191

168

340

146

142

376

161

146

372

120

128

358

124

123

373

125

124

399

137

135

386

138

124

384

145
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3.9 Considerations for Reuse of the Decontamination Gel
The Material Safety Data Sheet for the gel provides indications that
the primary hazardous constituents of the material are ethanol and
sodium hydroxide. The gel is relatively benign when compared with many
chemicals in the radiochemistry laboratories but handling the gel does
require hand protection to prevent drying, cracking, and defatting of the
skin. The gel also has a flammability property which may be enhanced
when reconstituted with pure ethanol or acetone. The gel dries to a
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flexible solid, and envelops contaminants to remove them from surfaces.
There may or may not be a chemical reaction with the contaminant,
depending on its chemical characteristics and the gel is not selective in
removal

of

materials

from

surfaces.

The

material

used

in

the

decontamination experiments is a hydrogel polymer. Hydrogel polymers
can absorb large amounts of water without dissolving due to physical or
chemical cross-linkage of the hydrophilic polymer chains [104].
The developers of the decontamination gel indicated that they had
not tested it for reuse [85], but based on the MSDS a reconstitution with
ethanol or water should allow reuse. Some simple initial experiments by
addition of arbitrary amounts of water, ethanol and acetone, and reapplication of this mixture to a contaminated surface in the

99Tc

hood

demonstrated that the gel seems to be reusable after reconstitution.
Furthermore, the more volatile the additive, the quicker the gel would
dry. This aspect of the gel was not pursued and is certainly an area
where future work should be done.
Gels are generally affected by temperature and are observed to
‘melt’ as the temperature increases and they ‘gel’ or harden as the
temperature decreases. Furthermore, they seem to be incompressible but
squeeze through spaces that are large enough for their molecules to
pass. Hydrophilic gels will freeze but have a lower freezing point than
water.

In

some

cases,

the

gel

may

provide

several

uses

for

decontamination depending on the mass of material to be collected, the
contaminants that may affect the performance of the gel, and the dose
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rate from radionuclides collected. The gel that was collected in the
decontamination of the chemical fume hood contaminated with higher
levels of

99Tc

was not degraded nor did its ability to collect more activity

change noticeably after use. It is however possible, that there is a point
at which the gel is no longer effective in collection of contamination, but
that point was not reached during these experiments. This aspect of the
gel is a subject for future work.
There may be a time when the gel could be used many times after
a period of decay in storage. For example, if the gel was used for
decontamination of surfaces that are contaminated with a short lived
radionuclide, the material will be an extremely small mass and will not
likely affect the performance of the gel for reuse. Consider
half-life of 60 days, a spill containing only 1 microgram of

125I

125I

with a

will have

an associated activity of 643 MBq. If the surface was clean except for the
125I,

the gel could be used to decontaminate the surface, stored as a dry

solid mass for a time long compared to the half-life, then reconstituted
with water and used again for decontamination.
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Consider that the mass of

131I

in a 30 GBq dose can be calculated

from the definition of activity:

Equation 2-2

Where: A = activity
 = the decay constant for
N = the number of

131I

131I

atoms

For this situation:
30 GBq = ln(2)/(8.05 days x 24 hrs./day x 3600 s/h) x N
N = 3.0x1010 Bq / 9.97x10-7 s-1 = 3 x1016 atoms
Once

the

number

of

atoms

is

determined,

the

following

relationship allows determination of the mass of the radionuclide.

(

)

Equation 2-3

Where: m = mass (grams)
N = atoms of

131I

NA = Avogadro’s Number (6.02x1023 atoms/gAw)
M

131I

= 130.9 g/gAw

m = 3x1016 atoms/6.02x1023 atoms/g-mole * 130.9 g/g-mole
= 6.5x10-6 g
m = 6.5 µg
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As you can see, this mass would be a very small fraction (<1x10-6)
of the mass of the material spread onto a surface for decontamination
which may be on the order of grams per 100 cm2. The most significant
contaminant that the gel would collect would likely be surface dirt from
the area decontaminated. Once the radionuclide collected has decayed,
the gel will likely contain primarily non-radioactive contaminants (dirt,
grease, etc.) that were on the surface with the radionuclide collected. The
gel could be surveyed and disposed of as clean waste, or reconstituted by
adding water and reused to collect more contamination. The number of
times that the gel could be reused would then be extended by ensuring
that the area contaminated for a procedure is cleaned prior to use of
radioactive materials on that surface. This type of use in a medical
setting where surfaces are required to be clean and short lived
radionuclides are common may be a good match. Reuse of the gel for
decontamination is most obviously best for use with radionuclides that
are easily collected, are typical contaminants around a biology laboratory
or medical facility, and have very short half-lives. The radionuclides
32P,

and

35S

131I,

might be ideal candidates for decontamination and reuse of

the gel. As with any chemical cleaner, some simple experiments to
determine that the compound will be compatible with and collected by
the gel should be done.
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3.10 Radiation Attenuation by the Gel
A desirable property for use of the gel as a sampling tool is the
ability to encapsulate the material that is sampled and not be affected by
its emissions. This section provides a discussion of the efficiency with
which the decontamination gel is able to attenuate the beta emissions
from

99Tc.

This attenuation would be associated with the constituents of

the gel and its mass density thickness. For

99Tc,

the only published rule

that can be associated with the range of beta emissions of the energy
emitted is published as equation 6.15 in [105]. This rule applies to all
beta emissions with energy greater than 10 keV and less than 2.5 MeV.
Therefore, for

99Tc

emissions, the rule can be stated as follows:
(

)

Equation 2-4

Where:
R is the range of the beta particle in the material in units of mg/cm2, and
E is the beta particle kinetic energy in MeV.
Using equation 2-4 with the maximum energy of the beta
emissions from
from

99Tc

99Tc,

293.7 keV, the maximum range of beta emissions

is 75.8 mg/cm2. The gel has a density similar to water, so the

maximum linear range of beta emissions from

99Tc

in the gel would be:

75.8 mg/cm2 ÷ 1000 mg/cm3 = 0.0758 cm or 0.758 mm
Therefore, a thickness of 1 mm spread on a surface contaminated with
99Tc

will attenuate all

99Tc

beta emissions from that surface. An
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approximate mass absorption coefficient can be identified for any beta
energy [106] in unit density material by the equation:

Equation 2-5

From the Half Value Layer (HVL) for beta particles with kinetic energy E
in MeV determined in equation 2-5, the approximate attenuation
coefficient in unit density material is given by Equation 2-6.

Equation 2-6

Where:
is the linear attenuation coefficient for the beta particle in the material
in units of cm-1, and E the beta particle kinetic energy in MeV. Using this
relationship, the attenuation coefficient, , for the

99Tc

maximum beta

energy emission is 68.7 cm-1. Using this coefficient, the fraction of the
emissions from a

99Tc

contaminated surface that would penetrate 1 mm

of the gel covering that surface would be:
I/Io = e-x = e(-68.7

/cm *.1 cm)=

0.001 or 0.1%, where I/Io is the un-

attenuated fraction of the beta flux incident on the gel.
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3.11 Conclusions
This chapter discussed removal of

99Tc

from the surfaces of a fume

hood and subsequently from the gel used. The details of the
decontamination provided collection efficiency and breakdown of the gel
was

determined

to

be

possible

with

concentrated

nitric

acid.

Decontamination of equipment and facilities is always a concern from
many viewpoints. The decontamination should be non-destructive in
most cases, the cost should be reasonable and not prevent future work,
and the operation must be safe for all participants and future workers.
This fume hood decontamination produced acceptable results, the cost
was reasonable, there was no detectable exposure of personnel
associated with the decontamination, and the degree of hazard for work
in this fume hood has been reduced for future workers.
The fraction of surface activity removed with smears was found to
average between 10% and 15% for most areas surveyed. The distribution
of smear results shows that the range of activity removal for smears was
between 5% and 20%. This result confirms the idea that smears remove
approximately 10% of the surface activity.
The ability to efficiently decontaminate surfaces without destroying
or disabling functions that they perform is a goal of any decontamination
operation. In a fume hood that will be used in the future, it is desirable
to bring it back into operation as soon as possible. To facilitate this
desire, a high decontamination factor is needed. In this case, the
decontamination factor was the highest for fixed activity removal because
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essentially all of the activity was removed from some of the grid squares.
An important consideration here is that more than 90% of the activity on
the hood surfaces that was removed by the decontamination gel in one
application.
The total activity of

99Tc

on the accessible surfaces of the hood was

estimated to be 3.38x107 Bq (approximately 53 mg of

99Tc).

The majority

of activity in the hood is considered to be under the back baffles, where
oils and dusts provide an area for much greater collection of activity
because they do not get cleaned. Currently, there is no estimate of
activity in these areas.
The smear survey of the gel squares provided reasonable evidence
that the decontamination gel encapsulated the majority of the

99Tc.

The

fraction of activity removable from the gel by dry smear was small,
averaging less than 3.3x10-4. This supports the idea that the gel could be
used as a sample collection mechanism for materials that may have
come from a radiological dispersal device. The samples should be
collected in a container such as a bag, bottle, or box. In addition, the
material collected in this evaluation did not cause any degradation of the
decontamination gel as it was drying. However, some areas where
sampling is desired may be wet, may include oils, alcohols or other
liquids that would prevent the decontamination gel from drying. Some
variations of this type of decontamination gel that would allow it to
collect materials without regard for the solubility of the gel may be
appropriate for those areas. Results from this study could be used to
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address matrix issues in a future investigation of the decontamination
gel in various environments.
The decontamination gel can be broken down with concentrated
nitric acid. A concentration greater than 1 M will remove the cross
linking and cause the gel to become a free flowing liquid. This result is
valuable in the removal of the encapsulated material from the gel. It is
also important to note that for the case of technetium, filtration did not
remove the Tc from the liquid. A chemical method such as the
precipitation of Tc with tetrabutylammonium would be a reasonable
method to remove the Tc from solution. The gel was not broken down
with other acids, although this may also be a useful result as perhaps
those gels may provide a corrosive decontaminant useful for fixed surface
contamination on metal.
3.12 Implementation
A program for recovery of radionuclides from decontamination
materials requires consideration of the emission characteristics of the
radionuclides to be recovered. In this section consideration is given to
implementing a program for use of a decontamination gel for cleanup
and recovery of radioactive materials.
3.12.1 Abstract
Decontamination materials that are not hazardous, shield soft
emissions, are efficient and transportable, and can be reused are
desirable in radiochemistry. A decontamination gel was tested and
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results reveal an available gel that could be specialized to allow
entrainment of a caustic solution to make the gel more effective for
removal of fixed contamination on a solid surface. In addition, the gel
may provide a means to remove surface activity from porous surfaces
with minimal degradation of the gel, providing reusability.
3.12.2 Discussion
Hydrophilic

polymers

have

been

shown

to

be

useful

decontamination media and useful for collection of surface samples. A
sample of a surface contaminated with radionuclides may be taken by
simply applying the gel, allowing it to dry, and collecting the solid
sample. The material collected may be a very small fraction of the
surface, but analysis by gamma, x-ray fluorescence, of x-ray diffraction
spectroscopy may provide a non-destructive analysis of the surface.
Further analysis of the material contained within the gel may be made by
breaking down the hydrophilic polymer and analyzing the solution by
atomic emission or mass spectroscopy.
Collection of the surface samples for containment and ultimate
analysis is useful. Breakdown of the polymer through the action of an
acidic or basic solution or by thermal destruction may provide a means
to recover the material collected. Thus the purpose of the gel as a
decontamination agent may be enhanced by using it as a sample
collection mechanism and a recovery method. Non-destructive analysis
techniques such as gamma spectroscopy, x-ray fluorescence or x-ray
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diffraction could be used as needed to evaluate a sample within the
matrix of a polymer with known composition.
There are several important considerations regarding use of a
decontamination solution that are important to recovery of a useful
radioactive compound for analysis. These considerations are:
 The

decontamination

solution

should

hold

the

radioactive

compound without bonding with the compound.
 The solution should be removable from the activity without
production of an unacceptable amount of waste.
 The removal of the activity from the solution should allow the
activity to exist in a usable form for future research.
For a sample collection mechanism, the action taken to remove the
activity from the decontamination solution should:
 Minimize the creation of radioactive waste while maximizing the
radionuclide recovery.
 Allow for a reasonably rapid collection and analysis in relation to
the half-life of the radionuclide.
 Consider techniques for removal of the radionuclide(s) from the
solution if needed.
 Maintain the radionuclide(s) in an unchanging matrix to ensure
consistency in analysis.
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The neutral nature of the gel is valuable to prevent damage to
surfaces and encapsulate activity but removal of activity fixed on
surfaces may require consideration of the following:
 Adding a caustic agent to the gel may make it capable of removing
the surface bound activity by breaking chemical bonds that are
holding the activity or chemically etching the surface to take some
of the surface with the activity.
 The gel may be re-hydrated with solutions that allow for faster
drying, weaker bonding with the activity, or less attachment to a
surface.
The re-hydratable nature of the gel used for decontamination allows
recovery of activity with several methods using the following concepts:
 The gel polymer could be broken down chemically or thermally.
Then chemical methods may be useful in removal of the activity.
 The radioactive component may be removed chemically

or

mechanically (centrifugation, magnetic attraction, or through
bonding with another compound that allows other removal
methods).
3.12.2 Summary
While the decontamination gel used in decontamination of a highly
contaminated fume hood has properties that are attractive for activity
collection, some changes may enhance its ability to remove fixed
contamination from surfaces or improve the desired properties for use as
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a sample collector. The gel used, Decon Gel 1101 from CBI Polymers Inc.
provides an off the shelf solution to simple decontamination. There are
many aspects of a radiochemistry program that may benefit from this gel,
the research to explore these properties may provide for more useful
products.
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4. CHAPTER 4
RADIONUCLIDE RECOVERY FROM EXPERIMENT RESIDUE
4.0 Hypothesis
Mixed waste production can be eliminated and radioactive
materials recovered for reuse with properly planned experiments and
appropriate documentation of wastes created. Sustainability of a
Radiochemistry Program can be enhanced by reducing the loss of
resources to dispose of waste and recovery of radionuclides from
experiment residues.
4.0.1 Literature Review
In

this

chapter

the

removal

of

useful

radionuclides

from

experimental residue to allow reuse is presented as a novel option. Reuse
of radionuclides not previously used is a reasonable action because these
materials are expensive to use, manage, and dispose [107]. Recovery for
reuse is accomplished on a large scale; reprocessing of nuclear fuel [108]
[109] and recovery of nuclear fuel from surplus nuclear weapons [110]
are two examples. A key feature of reuse of radioactive materials is the
savings realized by avoiding disposal of the residue as mixed waste [111].
This is allowed because the residue is in a transition between its original
condition and a reusable product, since it is not ready for disposal, the
regulation of a radioactive hazardous waste [112] is avoided. This
concept is independent of radionuclide, hazardous components, or the
expected chemistry to recover materials. As a component of any
experiment, the chemistry to return the waste products to a hazard free
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form should be done. The recovery strategies are commonly used in
experiments

for

separations

of

radionuclides

from

mixtures

or

environmental media. A resource for common extraction techniques for
different radionuclides is the V.G. Khlopin Radium Institute [113].
4.1 Constituents of Waste Products
Since the beginning of radiochemistry experiments at UNLV in
2004, many liquid waste products have been received from experiments
in the UNLV radiochemistry laboratories. The Laboratory Support Group
[114] for the radiochemistry program collects these wastes in order to
provide consolidation of like products, recovery of desirable materials,
and proper disposal of hazardous wastes in accordance with safety
requirements. These products, in general, have a documented content
from hazardous waste logs [115] with the following chemicals: TBP (tributyl phosphate), THF (Tetra-hydro Furan), AHA (Aceto Hydroxamic
Acid), ethanol, methanol, oxalic acid, sodium hydroxide, ammonium
hydroxide, nitric acid, bromine, vacuum pump oil, and radionuclides
(238U,

239Pu, 244Cm,

and

99Tc).

There were no cases where documentation

provided quantitative analysis of chemical content or activity of
radionuclides.
Products

from

past

experiments

have

not

been

accurately

identified and documented due in part on the researcher’s desire to focus
on the residues of the future and abandon those of experiments from the
past. While this allows for the creation of more residues and valued
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compounds through more research, a short time spent documenting the
content of all products would provide for easier and less costly
evaluations in establishing the value of recovery. This documentation
would also assist the identification of chemical processes that could be
used to return the products to a useable form. Although the primary
radionuclides and the chemicals that are used for compound synthesis
may be known, the mechanisms to recover radioactive materials from
some of these residues are complex, time consuming, and could create a
more hazardous situation. The procedure for evaluation of residues
derived from this work will identify a method for documentation of the
potential for radionuclide recovery.
Radionuclides that are a component part of a solid mass
containing metals, soils, and other difficult to dissolve materials, may not
be reasonable candidates for radionuclide recovery. This statement is
based on the concept that the radioactive material is a very small mass
in a mixture or attached to a much larger mass. In this situation, these
items might be quickly evaluated and the decision made to contain the
hazard and dispose of the material as radioactive waste.
Based on the information available through discussions with the
researchers [116], recovery of a usable fraction of radioactive material in
residues is possible in many cases. This is most desirable for liquids
where a quantity of valuable activity of a radionuclide could be easily
recovered. This must be seriously considered when recovery is much less
expensive than disposal. Also, from these same discussions with the
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researchers who generated the most recoverable waste, it was evident
that the chemicals that are most commonly used in the experiments
comprise a short list. A table of the residues that were processed for this
work is shown as Table 4-1.
Table 4-1. Residues from Radiochemistry Experiments

Residue
Number
12-27-10-1
12-27-10-2
12-27-10-3
12-27-10-4
12-27-10-5
12-27-10-6
12-27-10-7
12-27-10-8
12-27-10-9
12-27-10-10
12-27-10-11
12-27-10-12
12-27-10-13
12-27-10-14
12-27-10-15
12-27-10-16
12-27-10-17

Radionuclide Matrix

Volume

99Tc

100 mL
200 mL
30 mL
800 mL
300 mL
25 mL
125 mL
100 mL
400 mL
200 mL
300 mL
800 mL
500 mL
200 mL
500 mL
50 mL
450 mL

99Tc
239Pu

&

238U

99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc
99Tc

(0.5 g)

99Tc
99TcO4

TBP-TcO4
Dark liquid – no label
n-dodecane
Organic acid
Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic
H2O
Waste
No notation
Orange liquid
Organic
H2O, NOx
Organic acid
MeOH, Acid
Sn(II)Cl2 & thiourea

From a labeling aspect, there is a need to provide much better
information for the solutions that are turned in for radionuclide recovery
or waste. A form such as that illustrated in Figure 4-1 is recommended
for documentation of the production of a byproduct of experimentation
that has both hazardous and radioactive properties. The form will
possibly not fit all situations and will evolve with growth the program.
Information important to recovery of materials from the waste and other
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appropriate hazard data should be indicated by the researcher. This can
be accomplished with an in-process waste database.
UNLV Radiochemistry Program
In-Process Experimental Products
Products Produced by ____________ (Researchers Full Name)
Date of Storage

__________________

Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes , No )
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes , No )
Volume of solution _________ mL Solution pH ______
Radionuclide (1):______ ; Mass (1)_______ g; Moles (1)_______; Activity(1)_____Bq
Radionuclide (2):______ ; Mass (2)_______ g; Moles (2)_______; Activity(2)_____Bq
Radionuclide (3):______ ; Mass (3)_______ g; Moles (3)_______; Activity(3)_____Bq

Chemical compound(s):_________________________________________
Chemical compound(s):_________________________________________
Chemical compound(s):_________________________________________
Hazardous Components:

Flammable 
Oxidizer



Corrosive 
Toxic



CAS Number of Hazardous components: _________________________
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is it
possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? Yes , No )
Hazardous waste + radioactive waste is mixed waste. If recovery of the
radionuclides in this product is not desired and it contains hazardous
material that cannot be rendered non-hazardous, then the product may
be a mixed waste. Label the material as radioactive and hazardous and
notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office.
Figure 4-1. Documentation Form for In-Process Products
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Protocols are required at UNLV for current work with radioactive
materials [117] [118]. Protocols should require documentation of inprocess products, with specification that mixed wastes are only allowed
to be made with the permission of the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer so
that provisions for their disposal can be made. Specification of ways to
minimize the creation of undesirable waste should also be included in
the protocol. When properly used, protocol waste specifications should
help to prevent the creation of wastes that are dangerous to personnel
and the environment or are prohibitively expensive to dispose. In the
selection of the waste materials that were to be evaluated for recovery,
there was little previous knowledge of the components of the waste. The
researcher that created these wastes was consulted for information about
the waste and the technique that he recommended for recovery of the
99Tc.

In all cases, the method recommended was addition of hydrogen

peroxide to break down the organic constituents and recovery of the

99Tc

from the liquid. The liquid in each of the containers was dried in glass
beakers and hydrogen peroxide was added slowly as reactions were
common.
4.2 Recovery Decisions
The residue matrix documented on waste containers was not
useful in determining the best chemical methods which could facilitate
returning radionuclides in liquids back to a reusable form. There was no
information allowing identification of the quantity of any of the liquids
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that were in the samples or the amount of hazardous components
created with the residues. Figure 4-2 is typical of the containers of
material that were received for disposal.

Figure 4-2. Waste Container from the Accumulation Area

Establishing a basis for recovery with samples that are well
documented could be a simple minimum mass-to-recover or a minimum
mass concentration to make it worthwhile. However, evaluation of other
properties of the material should be a consideration, such as the amount
and type of hazardous materials in the residue and the cost of disposal of
the waste that will result from the recovery effort.
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A low residue volume with a high concentration of recoverable
material may be quite attractive for recovery. Removal of the activity from
the hazardous component of the residue may simply be a filtration and
cleaning of the filter as in sample # 12-27-10-6 (Table 4-2). In this case a
simple filtration, washing of the filter, and removal of the activity from
the filter was all that was required.
Table 4-2 provides the results of analysis of 0.1 mL from each of
the waste products that were available for recovery experiments and
listed in Table 4-1. The analysis was completed using a LSC, while the
volume was small for this analysis; the activity present in each sample
was more than adequate to make a reasonable estimate of the
contained

in

each

sample.

With

this

data,

the

desirability

radionuclide recovery can be more reasonably determined.
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99Tc

for

Table 4-2. Analysis Results for Experiment Residues

Residue #

Volume
(mL)

Activity
Concentration
(MBq/mL)

Total Activity
(MBq)

Total 99Tc
mass (mg)

12-27-10-1

100

0.00456

0.5

7.28E-01

12-27-10-2

200

0.00054

0.1

1.72E-01

12-27-10-3

30

0.00031

<0.1

1.49E-02

12-27-10-4

800

1.68751

1350.0

2.15E+03

12-27-10-5

300

3.66804

1100.4

1.75E+03

12-27-10-6

25

2.94610

29.5

4.70E+01

12-27-10-7

125

7.93699

992.1

1.58E+03

12-27-10-8

100

0.06937

6.9

1.11E+01

12-27-10-9

400

0.08037

32.1

5.12E+01

12-27-10-10

200

2.48515

497.0

7.92E+02

12-27-10-11

300

0.01224

3.7

5.85E+00

12-27-10-12

800

0.88036

704.3

1.12E+03

12-27-10-13

500

0.74110

370.6

5.91E+02

12-27-10-14

200

0.82096

164.2

2.62E+02

12-27-10-15

500

2.74065

1370.3

2.18E+03

12-27-10-16

50

0.29831

14.9

2.38E+01

12-27-10-17

450

0.29630

133.3

2.13E+02

4.3 Radionuclide Recovery Method
The researcher who created the waste for these experiments was
consulted to ensure that recovery of the radionuclides by chemical
methods would not make a more hazardous situation. The samples with
the highest activity ratio were selected for simple recovery, first by
evaporating the liquids, then attempting physical removal of the
radionuclide to an aqueous solution by the addition of H2O2 to break out
the technetium. After breakdown of the solids to the point where no
further reaction was observed, the liquids were removed from the solids
with disposable pipettes. The clear liquids were then analyzed for activity
content and placed in separate containers. A model Standard Operating
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Procedure for removal of radionuclides from experimental residue is
provided in Appendix D.
Using a modified version of the form depicted in Figure 4-1, a
visualization of how the decisions were made with concern for residues
noted in Table 4-1. The completion of the data fields in either form
contribute to the accuracy of the information presented in Table 4-2.
Unless otherwise noted, these materials were collected from the satellite
waste accumulation area in the Radiochemistry Laboratories. The
methodology of sample liquid dispersal experiments is more completely
covered in the Sample Material Analysis section. Tables 4-3 and 4-4
provide the recovery results. The data from this set of experiments is
included in Appendix E.
4.4 Recovery Results
The result of experiments done to recover activity in a residue for
reuse is presented in Table 4-3. This table lists the original volume of
solution, the original radionuclide mass based on LSC analysis of an
aliquot of the solution, and the mass recovered, also based on LSC
analysis. This table appeared to indicate that higher activity solutions
will have a larger loss in the recovery process and thus less recovery.
This is also shown in Figure 4-3. As discussed in Appendix D, there are
many other methods for recovery of materials from solution, however,
some introduce more cost or more hazard into the recovery process.
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Table 4-3. Radioactive Material Recovery from Experiment Residue

Sample #

Original
Volume
(mL)

Estimated 99Tc Mass
Available for Recovery
(mg)

Estimated 99Tc Mass
Recovered from Residue
(mg)

12-27-10-4

800

2152

21.6

12-27-10-5

300

1754
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12-27-10-6

25

47

10

12-27-10-7

125

1582

30.3

12-27-10-10

200

792

77.4

12-27-10-12

800

1122

5.9

12-27-10-13

500

591

31.1

12-27-10-14

200

262

24.7

12-27-10-15

500

2184

13.2

12-27-10-16

50

24

3.8

12-27-10-17

450

213

17.2

Most importantly, the recovery yield of technetium from the waste
solutions was very low. This is indicative of the need for solution specific
protocols for extraction of radionuclides from residues such as this. In
general, these attempts at recovery demonstrate that it is not a difficult
process to separate radionuclides from solutions.
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Recovery of 99Tc from Residue
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Figure 4-3. Graph of Percent Recovered vs. Original Radionuclide Mass

Figure 4-4 Recovered Solutions
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4.5 Simple Material Analysis
A rapid technique for evaluation of the liquids as to their
desirability for recovery was evaluated by portable instrument analysis of
the filter paper used for determination of the dispersion of the liquid from
each sample. A dispersal experiment is conducted where ~100 µL is
pipetted to the center of a 15 cm diameter Whatman #1 filter. The sample
color on the filter paper is observed and documented. The dispersion
continues to a previously undetermined diameter and the presence or
absence of a discernible ring is noted. A visual observation of this
technique is noted in Figure 4-5.
Table 4-4 was constructed to indicate the difference in response for
each liquid on the filter for a GM detector and a thin window alpha/beta
scintillation detector. The response data is listed for each of the residues
evaluated. Measurements with each instrument were taken directly over
the center of each filter sample at a height above the sample of
approximately 1 centimeter. Knowing the radionuclide as

99Tc

and the

approximate average emission energy as 100 keV, the nominal detection
efficiency at that location is in the range of 10% for the activity on each
filter.
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Figure 4-5 Dispersion Filter for Residue # 12-27-10-10

Table 4-4. Portable Instrument Response to Residues
Sample
Number
Background
12-27-10-1
12-27-10-2
12-27-10-3
12-27-10-4
12-27-10-5
12-27-10-6
12-27-10-7
12-27-10-8
12-27-10-9
12-27-10-10
12-27-10-11
12-27-10-12

GM Response
(CPM)
100
200
130
100
11,000
44,000
10,000
45,000
250
450
17,000
220
6,500

Scintillation Detector Response
Alpha (CPM)
Beta (CPM)
2
160
4
3145
0
229
6
196
4
154,395
1
789,244
22
308,254
2
846,860
2
4,545
12
12,068
2
369,803
2
1,378
0
107,624
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Table 4-4 demonstrates that a simple direct measurement from a
filter may provide adequate information to qualitatively determine
whether the residue contains sufficient activity to be considered for
recovery. Since the majority of these residues were unknown and
unlabeled mixtures, it was incumbent on the researcher to have an
evaluative process for initial discrimination.
Table 4-5. Comparison of Instrument Response to Residue
Sample
Number
Background
12-27-10-1
12-27-10-2
12-27-10-3
12-27-10-4
12-27-10-5
12-27-10-6
12-27-10-7
12-27-10-8
12-27-10-9
12-27-10-10
12-27-10-11
12-27-10-12

GM Response
(CPM)
100
200
130
100
11,000
44,000
10,000
45,000
250
450
17,000
220
6,500

Scintillation Detector Response
LSC (CPM)
Portable Beta (CPM)
20
160
27382
3145
3245
229
1866
196
10125070
154,395
22008215
789,244
17676626
308,254
47621954
846,860
416217
4,545
482218
12,068
14910872
369,803
73440
1,378
5282170
107,624

The last step to determine the value of the simple analysis
technique used was a comparison of the results of the GM (Ludlum
Model 3 rate-meter with 44-9 GM probe and Ludlum 2360 ratemeter/scaler with 43-93 alpha/beta scintillation detector response to the
LSC response. Table 4-5 provides that comparison. This information
provides a simple technique to determine an estimate of the activity
concentration of a solution and decision criteria regarding the suitability
of that solution for activity recovery. There is not a true calibration of
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such a technique, but a nominal estimation of the detection efficiency,
using the unattenuated efficiency for the detectors used, for the radiation
emitted from the activity in the solution will provide a reasonable
estimate of the activity on the filter.
4.6 Material Recovered in Experiments
This section describes the recovery of

99Tc

from the residues

available as indicated in Table 4-1. Some of the residues were found to
be unsuitable for recovery as noted in Table 4-6, those solutions
highlighted had sufficient activity to attempt recovery. In some cases,
recovery was attempted but an unrecoverable product was identified or
created. The lesson learned from these unsuccessful recoveries is to use
only a small fraction of the solution for initial testing with several
different methods, then select the best method and use that one for the
larger scale recovery.
For each of the residues listed in Table 4-6, the solutions were
evaporated in a HEPA filtered fume hood in their original containers, this
allowed for a very slow removal of the liquid with no external power or
possibility

for

higher

level

contamination

of

glassware

or

other

apparatus. This also minimized the probability that some volatile
compounds of Tc would be lost. Since virtually any compound of Tc
could be present in the solutions, a quick summary of the volatility of
these solutions is presented in [119]. In that document, it is reported
that the melting point of Tc2O7 is 118ºC and its boiling point is 350ºC.
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Complete volatility of

99Tc

when calcining an acid solution was attained

at 350ºC. Mixed oxides have melting points to 1200ºC.
Table 4-6. Identification of Waste Suitable and for Recovery.

Residue #

Volume
(mL)

Activity
Concentration
(MBq/mL)

Total Activity
(MBq)

Total 99Tc
mass (mg)

12-27-10-1

100

0.00456

0.5

7.28E-01

12-27-10-2

200

0.00054

0.1

1.72E-01

12-27-10-3

30

0.00031

<0.1

1.49E-02

12-27-10-4

800

1.68751

1350.0

2.15E+03

12-27-10-5

300

3.66804

1100.4

1.75E+03

12-27-10-6

25

2.94610

29.5

4.70E+01

12-27-10-7

125

7.93699

992.1

1.58E+03

12-27-10-8

100

0.06937

6.9

1.11E+01

12-27-10-9

400

0.08037

32.1

5.12E+01

12-27-10-10

200

2.48515

497.0

7.92E+02

12-27-10-11

300

0.01224

3.7

5.85E+00

12-27-10-12

800

0.88036

704.3

1.12E+03

12-27-10-13

500

0.74110

370.6

5.91E+02

12-27-10-14

200

0.82096

164.2

2.62E+02

12-27-10-15

500

2.74065

1370.3

2.18E+03

12-27-10-16

50

0.29831

14.9

2.38E+01

12-27-10-17

450

0.29630

133.3

2.13E+02

The dried and semi-dried residues were transferred to 250 mL
polyethylene containers and a 30% solution of hydrogen peroxide was
added in steps to allow transfer of the
creation of

99TcO4-.

99Tc

to the solution and the

The volume of concentrated H2O2 used was typically

less than 10 mL. Commonly available 6% solution of by H2O2 was used
to dilute the product and wash the residue. This was done to minimize
impact on the available 30% solution, reducing the cost of the project.
The final amount of H2O2 added was different for each residue and was
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only based on the time required for breakdown of the residue and
removal of Tc to a liquid. In some cases this was easily identified as the
solid was eliminated, in others it appeared that any reaction had
stopped. The approximate amount of H2O2 added was 0.1 mL of H2O2 per
gram of solid residue; this data was not collected for each recovery. The
materials that were present in the original residues were unknown. One
residue, sample number 12-27-10-9, did not breakdown and was disposed
as solid waste.
Some important safety concerns for use of H2O2 in high
concentrations are that it can give off vapors that can detonate above
70oC at atmospheric pressure. This can then cause a boiling liquid
expanding vapor explosion of the remaining liquid. In small volumes, this
volatility is less of a concern, but to be safe, samples 12-27-10-4, 12-27-105, 12-27-10-12 through 12-27-10-15 and 12-27-10-17

used in these experiments

were placed in water baths to maintain the solution at a temperature
below 50ºC. It should be noted that with a rotovap or other similar
equipment, processing time and efficiency could be improved.
Hydrogen peroxide vapors can form sensitive contact explosives
with hydrocarbons such as greases [120]. Hazardous reactions ranging
from ignition to explosion have been reported with alcohols, ketones,
carbolic

acids

(particularly

acetic

acid),

amines,

and

elemental

phosphorous [121] [122]. Concentrated hydrogen peroxide if spilled on
flammable materials such as clothing the material may spontaneously
ignite [123].
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Considering these potentially hazardous situations and selecting to
use 30% H2O2 and keep it cool, seems to be an adequate method to
recover

99Tc

from many of the products that have been cast aside for

recovery. However, it certainly is not the most efficient. In the situation
where the content of the residue is not known, it may be one of the safer
methods. For Tc recovery, many of the compounds of Tc, two important
aspects are:


The reaction of Tc(III), Tc(IV) and Tc(V) with hydrogen peroxide in
aqueous solutions immediately yields Tc(VII).



Tc(VII) is easily lost upon evaporation of acid solutions unless a
reducing agent is present or the evaporation is conducted at low
temperature. [124]
The reaction of hydrogen peroxide with other compounds of Tc in

medicine

has

been

shown

for

example

to

decompose

pyrophosphate to pertechnetate (99mTcO4-) [125]. The mass of

99mTc-

99Tc

was

determined from LSC analysis of a clear solution before and after
recovery. The solution before recovery consisted of solvents, acids, and
various solids. The effect that the H2O2 may have had on the LSC
cocktail could have been a cause for underestimate of the

99Tc

concentration, however, these samples were analyzed again four months
later and the deviation from the original analysis was minimal. The
maximum deviation from the original values in the

99Tc

activity was 7.6%

lower and the average deviation was 1.2% lower over seven samples that
were re-analyzed.
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After recovery, the solutions were transparent and were removed
from the solids by pipetting. The purity and cleanliness of the

99TcO4-

in

solution was not a concern to this research, other than a more pure
solution may be needed for further use of the

99Tc

provide evidence that the recovery of the

from products previously

99Tc

solution. The results

considered as waste products for disposal is possible. The concept that
radioactive materials in waste products could be recovered is valid. The
purity of the final product will again cause a loss of some of the product
but it is reasonable to indicate that recovery efficiency would be improved
with the use of other techniques.
Table 4-7 provides the recovery yield of
processed. The total mass of

99Tc

99Tc

from the residues

recovered was approximately 393.2 mg.

The average recovery fraction was 6.21%. The minimum recovery fraction
was 0.5% and the maximum 15.8%. The difference in the initial activity
determined to be in the residues and the activity determined to have
been recovered may have been due to a number of issues such as a
higher affinity of the

99Tc

for another component of the residue. The

consistently low yield of recovery

appears to indicate that the

determination of the activity in the residue was reasonable because there
were no unreasonably high estimates of the original activity in the
residue. Another reason for the appearance of a low activity yield might
be enhanced detection efficiency for the determination of activity in the
residue by materials in the residue that may have caused a detectable
luminescence. This was not investigated.
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The establishment of recovery goals was not possible because the
residue compounds were unknown. It appears that a reasonable
minimum goal should be on the order of 5%. It also appears that most of
the activity was disposed of as solid waste with the hardened organic
remains after extraction of the

99Tc

using H2O2. In cases where the

residue contains a very valuable product it might be reasonable to take
further action to remove the product. In cases where the solid completely
dissolved in the hydrogen peroxide, other loss mechanisms such as
evaporation must have occurred.
Table 4-7. Radioactive Material Recovery Yield from Samples

Sample #

Recovery
Volume
(mL)

Estimated 99Tc Mass
Recovered from Residue
(mg)

Estimated Percentage of
the Original 99Tc in
Residue that was
Recovered (%)

12-27-10-4

800

21.6

1.0%

12-27-10-5

300

168

9.6%

12-27-10-7

10

30.3

1.9%

12-27-10-10

125

77.4

9.8%

12-27-10-12

400

5.9

0.5%

12-27-10-13

200

31.1

5.3%

12-27-10-14

800

24.7

9.5%

12-27-10-15

500

13.2

0.6%

12-27-10-16

200

3.8

15.8%

12-27-10-17

500

17.2

8.1%

To identify the degree of cost savings by this small scale research
effort, one must consider the cost of disposal for unknown chemical
compounds with radioactive components in addition to the cost of
recovery using simple methods and minimal analyses costs and the fact
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that activity was recovered and could be reused. The cost avoidance of
disposal of these materials as mixed waste is the real cost savings.
With the information known thus far, this cost avoidance can only
be guessed to be significant, and it depends on many factors such as the
content of hazardous materials in the waste. Consider an unknown
mixed waste consisting of toxic and radioactive characteristics. The
process for recovery would require a safety analysis to prevent personnel
exposure to, and cause destruction of, the toxic material. Analysis must
identify and quantify the hazards and in addition, the hazardous
component must be abated or confined. These costs may be substantial
for a small waste management program of a research organization. Based
on past experience with hazardous waste disposal and information from
a simple web search, in the recent past, costs of disposal for mixed waste
may exceed $40.00 per liter.
In this study, the volume of residue collected was almost four liters
of waste that had an easily detectable concentration of

99Tc.

The 393.2

mg recovered can be estimated to be worth approximately $800.00 at
$2.00 per mg. The materials put into the recovery of the

99Tc

cost less

than $100.00, so the cost avoidance can be estimated to be close to
$1000 for this simple attempt at recovery of

99Tc

from the waste residue.

Greater cost avoidance with less risk to the researcher would be expected
if the content of the residue was known and the chemistry was more
accurately designed to remove known compounds of Tc from the waste
solutions.
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4.7 Safe Practices in Recovery of Radioactive Materials
Whenever something is made that has multiple hazardous
constituents, the behavior of that compound or solution is not likely to
be well known. If the constituents react with one another at different
temperatures or in different atmospheres, the hazard may be evident
when those components are first combined. Sometimes incompatible
components that are combined in a waste container may ignite or
explode immediately, or at some time post mixing.
There are many safety reasons such as prevention of explosions or
generation

of

poisonous

or

dangerous

gases,

to

investigate

the

compatibility of chemicals that will be mixed together. If it is unknown
what will happen when chemicals react, it is suggested that the
chemicals are added together in small quantities first. The Material
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) provide information about the properties of
the chemicals, but may not be detailed enough for certain experiments.
In addition, the MSDS may not provide sufficient information to ensure
continued safety of those working in the laboratory.
Whenever possible, appropriate ventilation and the sash of a fume
hood should be used to protect the researcher from potentially
dangerous solutions splattering or venting on the face, hands, or any
other

body

part.

Personal

protective

equipment

such

as

safety

glasses/goggles or full face shield to protect the face, whole body
protection with a laboratory coat and plastic or rubber apron, and hand
protection with gloves appropriate for the chemicals that are handled are
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some ways to protect researchers working with highly reactive or
unknown solutions. Recovery of radionuclides from unknown solution
matrices requires an extra effort to be safe. If it is suspected that there
may be a hazardous situation created, action must be taken to protect all
researchers and the laboratory from damage and consider that
contamination control may be an important issue. It is always important
to ensure that radioactive material stays in the controlled workspace,
therefore it is always important to consider that actions taken to heat,
shake, or bubble a solution may cause activity to become airborne or
spread from the work area.
The first step to radionuclide recovery is to determine what may be
in the solution. The second step is to determine properties of the
hazardous components and whether any attempt at recovery is a
reasonable thing to do. Next, determine the radionuclides and activity of
each in the solution and calculate the approximate mass of radionuclide
that is present in the container.
If the analysis of the solution indicates that the radionuclide
recovery is feasible, then the next step is to remove all liquid from the
residue, if possible. After drying the residue, add the appropriate
chemicals to extract the radionuclide of interest from the solid residue
into a liquid phase. Finally, collect the liquid phase and determine how
much activity (or mass) of radionuclide was recovered.
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4.8 Conclusions
The current practices used to document liquid radioactive waste in
the Radiochemistry Program are inadequate to identify hazardous
materials in the waste and allow safe recovery of radionuclides.
Waste labeling can be effectively used to identify hazardous
constituents and methods to make those characteristics harmless.
Experimental methods should include waste management techniques.
Mixed waste production can be eliminated in the radiochemistry
program by requiring researchers to either recover radioactive materials
from their experimental residue or destroy the hazardous components of
that residue to enable disposal as radioactive waste.
4.9 Implementation
Recovery

of

radionuclides

from

residues

of

radiochemistry

experiments is attractive for two primary reasons; it allows for
sustainability

of

the

radiochemistry

program

through

increased

availability of materials and it reduces the cost of disposal of radioactive
waste. However, a program to allow recovery of radionuclides from
hazardous residues of radiochemistry experiments may also present a
hazard to the researcher that will complete the recovery. Implementation
of a program for radionuclide recovery, and associated precautions and
considerations are presented.
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4.9.1 Abstract
Radiochemistry research has led to great discoveries of the
elements and their isotopes. Recovery with intent to recycle has always
been a part of larger programs where the value of radionuclides is high,
such as removal of enriched uranium or plutonium from used nuclear
fuel. In research laboratories, the financial incentive to recover is not
always present, but the desire to reduce waste costs may be the driver
that makes recycling feasible. In this document a plan for recovery is
proposed for an academic radiochemistry operation. The plan drives
hazardous waste compliance and provides a reasonable basis for a
financially
required

feasible
for

radionuclide

incorporating

recovery

the

recovered

program.

Considerations

radionuclides

into

the

accountability system are identified.
4.9.2 Discussion
Mixed waste is an undesirable consequence of radiochemistry due
to the need to evaluate the properties of radioelements when subjected to
various chemicals in search of the unknown. In some cases, the
hazardous component of the waste can be made to be less hazardous or
non-hazardous, or the radioactive component of the waste may be
recovered for reuse making the waste only hazardous and not
radioactive, or in many cases, less radioactive. A radiochemistry program
has the unique opportunity to do whatever chemistry is required. Other
programs where radioactive materials are used or waste is collected for
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disposal, processing of the waste for radionuclide recovery or for
concentration of the waste is not allowed.
Academic radiation safety programs provide detailed services for
researchers to ensure their protection and the protection of faculty, staff,
students, and members of the public. To devise a scheme for that
indicates the controls provided, consider that the following questions
should be asked by an academic RSO for each of the researchers:
 What am I responsible for?
 Where is it?
 Who has it?
 What are they doing with it?
 What will they do with it when they are done with it?
The reason for these questions is simple and logical and is based on
the premise that radioactive material must be properly controlled to
prevent dispersion and maintain dose to all people ALARA. Some
important concepts are required to be identified so that hazardous
conditions are not created during the recovery.
The method used for recovery of radionuclides from waste residues
or for destruction of the hazardous component of those residues is
devised by the researcher or the research supervisor based on knowledge
of the content of the residue. In the experiments done for radionuclide
recovery, the researcher that created the waste was consulted and
provided the advice to dry the waste to remove solvents and breakdown
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the dried organic residue with hydrogen peroxide to recover the
technetium in the waste. While this was not a detailed chemical
procedure and it provided poor recovery results for several of the
compounds, it was a method that required careful observation of the
materials and did not result in a hazardous product. It is however
essential that all recovery efforts be closely observed and all appropriate
safety measures are taken.
Another important consideration in the recovery of radionuclides is
accountability of the radioactive material. A clean way of doing this is
subtract the activity in the residue (waste) from the inventory and add in
the activity recovered.

In this way, any radionuclides that were not

recovered from the residue go into the waste that is disposed and only
recovered radionuclide(s) are added back into the inventory. In the
inventory control system it may be desirable to maintain the recovered
material as a separate entity since it may not have the same chemical or
radiological makeup as the stock material. The method selected is only
important to the completeness of the inventory.
The separation of activity from a mixed waste is not always
complete and the destruction of a hazardous material does not ensure
that a hazardous component of the waste does not still exist. After
removal of as much of the activity possible, the residue should again be
evaluated to determine if a hazardous component exists. This may be
possible from knowledge of what material went into the waste and what
is likely to remain after the operations to recover activity were completed.
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Advice on disposal of the residue may be sought from a Certified
Hazardous Materials Management professional.
The incentive for radionuclide recovery is inherent in several
aspects of working with radioactive materials that are not often
considered. Some of them are listed here:
 The cost of radioactive solutions is typically high and purchase
may be restricted by license.
 The purchase may require several weeks depending on the
radionuclide, the chemical compound, and preparation time for the
vendor.
 A recovered compound is available when needed and use is only
restricted administratively.
 Disposal of mixed waste is costly because waste sites in the United
States cannot accept it. Typically a waste site will accept a sample
of a waste provisionally to determine if it can be made into an
acceptable waste. If it can be processed, a fee is applied to cover
that cost and the cost of burial.
4.9.3 Summary
Radionuclide recovery is desirable for radiochemistry programs.
The changes to accountability systems are simple and administrative
control of waste products is simplified if hazardous components are less
hazardous, radionuclides are less concentrated, or radionuclides are
completely recovered and the waste is non-hazardous. The measures to
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be taken to recover radionuclides or make hazardous components nonhazardous should be devised by those who know what constituents went
into the residue and what was done to the residue that could have made
any chemical changes.
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5. CHAPTER 5
RECOVERY OF URANIUM FROM COAL ASH
5.0 Hypothesis
Samples of coal and ash from a coal fired plant in Oklahoma
contain uranium at a sufficient concentration to use that material as a
source of uranium for nuclear power generation.
5.0.1 Resource and Criteria
Using the samples provided,

identify the concentration of

uranium. The economic feasibility of uranium extraction from coal ash
occurs at approximately 200 grams of uranium per 900 kg of coal ash
[126]. A total of 24 samples of coal ash, 18 samples of coal, and 6
samples of liquid from plant tanks were received from an AES
Corporation [127] coal fired generating station in Oklahoma.
5.1 Coal as an Energy Source
Coal is very important to the production of electricity worldwide.
According to the World Coal Association, coal fired plants currently
provide 41% of global electricity [128]. In 2011 the United States
electricity production was 42% by coal [129]. When coal is burned to
make steam for an electric plant, ash is produced that contains all of the
heavier elements that were present in the coal. According to the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), coal combustion generates ash
(SiO2-Al2O3-Fe2O3-CaO and element impurities) equal to about 10% of
the original volume of the coal and typically about 95% of the ash is
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initially retained at the site [130]. Typically 70% to 80% of the coal ash is
disposed of in dry landfills [131]. The annual production of coal ash in
the United States alone of about 90,000,000 kg of ash provides a large
waste volume and takes up large land areas for disposal of the ash at
each site [132]. The chemical structure of coal ash varies with the type of
coal burned. Each type has different elemental constituents that are
heated to different temperatures and thus form different fundamental
compounds [133].
5.2 Uranium Content of Coal
Uranium is present in the earth’s crust and is concentrated in
many minerals [134]. The USEPA has published values for uranium and
thorium content of coal in 1984 between 1.3 ppm and 3.2 ppm [135].
Natural uranium contains the fissionable isotope

235U

at a natural

abundance of 0.71% [136]. The primary interest in uranium is as the fuel
source for nuclear power. To be used for nuclear power in commercial
light water nuclear reactors in the United States, the concentration of
235U

is increased by enrichment to approximately 2.5 to 4% [137].

Nuclear power has once again become a power source of interest as fossil
fuels have more control of the economies of the world; as a result
economic outlook for uranium is increasingly positive.
As uranium for use in nuclear reactors is once again considered a
valuable commodity, there is interest created by some publications [138]
[139] which indicated that the concentration of uranium oxide in coal
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ash could be high enough to indicate that recovery is feasible. Values of
uranium concentration in coal ash were reported at 281 ppm U, citing a
study in Yunnan province China [140]. Most of the available information
from these sources cites the coal from this area of China having a
uranium concentration of as much as 300 ppm with an average
concentration of about 65 ppm. With approximately 90,000,000 kg of
ash created each year from burning coal in the United States alone, this
could be a tremendous resource for uranium if the mechanism for
removal is financially reasonable. At 300 ppm, the amount of uranium in
the ash produced is 2.7E4 kg/year, at 2 ppm; it is 180 kg/year. Even
though there are richer deposits of uranium such as high grade ore
which is 20,000 ppm or greater to low grade ore which is 1000 ppm to
20,000 ppm the higher of these concentrations could be financially
acceptable for recovery. However, as shown in this research and in peer
reviewed literature including a USGS study [141], the uranium
concentration cited in the China coal ash are very rare and indicate a
high concentration of uranium in the coal that is burned.
As a result of the publication of this information in trade journals,
many people in the coal industry have shown interest in the use of the
coal ash created at their plant to produce uranium. This section
describes the project.

185

5.3 Sample Description
Several samples of coal ash, and coal from an AES Corporation
power plant in Oklahoma were received for analysis. The coal was labeled
as Hartshorne Coal and the samples were from separate piles of coal and
coal ash. The initial focus of the project was evaluation of the ash. It is a
reasonable consideration that the highest concentration of uranium in
these samples would be in the ash because the waste water has a low
concentration of the coal before burning and much of the mass of the
coal is lost as combustion gasses with the heavier elements becoming
more prevalent in the ash. The ash is a waste product at the plant and
potentially the most plentiful and available reservoir for uranium
recovery.
5.4 Uranium Content of Samples
In order to determine the uranium content of the ash, the most
desirable method from a radiochemistry standpoint was high resolution
gamma spectroscopy. Coal and its ash are very messy and undesirable to
handle in any quantity outside of a closed container. Sample preparation
was simple and utilized inexpensive plastic containers as sample holders.
The instrument of choice was a high purity germanium detector
interfaced through a Canberra DSA 1000 Digital Signal Analyzer. A
uranium standard was prepared using uranyl nitrate in a candle gel. The
gel maintained the uranium in a homogeneous geometry that remained
throughout the project. The standard has similar density characteristics
as the ash without the natural radionuclide content. The spectra
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obtained for both the standard and the coal ash were analyzed using
Genie 2000 gamma spectrum analysis software. Gamma spectroscopy is
possible for determination of
lived daughters of
this

method

238U

content because of the immediate short

238U, 234Th, 234mPa,

showed

and

insufficient

234Pa.

analysis

The first analyses using
time

to

identify

the

concentrations of uranium present in the samples based on the
concentration of the Pa progeny expected to be present in the sample in
equilibrium with the

238U

parent. A second analysis proved that this

analysis technique was usable but the analysis time must be in excess of
250,000 seconds per sample.
Another

method

selected

that

required

minimum

sample

preparation time was x-ray fluorescence analysis of the coal ash. The
actual analysis time was short, a few minutes, but since sample
preparation and analysis required the Geoscience department at UNLV, it
was decided to look into other analysis techniques

for further

confirmation. This method would ultimately provide a technique that
confirmed the results obtained by gamma spectroscopy and mass
spectroscopy.
Samples were prepared for analysis by the Thermo iCAP 6000 Duo
Inductively Coupled Plasma-Atomic Emission Spectroscopy (ICP-AES) by
partial digestion of the coal ash with hydrofluoric acid (HF) and leaching
with concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl). This method would allow
detection of concentrations of uranium in the low part-per-million (ppm)
range. The dilution required for this analysis was approximately 100.
187

A separate analysis of uranium in coal ash was conducted with the
Perkin

Elmer

Elan

DRC

II,

Inductively

Coupled

Plasma

Mass

Spectrometer, and (ICPMS). Due to the sensitivity of the ICPMS, each
sample was diluted to enable detection of a concentration of uranium in
the part-per-billion (ppb) range. The short sample analysis times allowed
for many samples to be analyzed in a reasonable time.
5.4.1 Sample Preparation
In this section the sample preparation for each analysis technique
is discussed. The sample preparation may be as simple as placing the
sample in a standard geometry, such as is done with gamma
spectroscopy. Alternatively, it may require digestion and filtration as was
done to prepare the samples for ICP-AES and ICP-MS analysis.
5.4.1.a High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy
Samples were placed into plastic jars that provided a consistent
geometry to standards that were prepared with uranyl nitrate and a
suspending gel. In the preparation of the standards, 500 grams of the gel
was melted at 200 ºC and a known mass of UO2(NO3)2*6H2O of 1.8 g was
added to the melt. This relates to a total uranium activity of 1.06x104 Bq.
The activity concentration of the melt was then 2.13x101 Bq/g. The net
mass of the uranium and gel melt in HRC-185 was 405.42 g and the
activity of this standard was therefore 8.62x103 Bq. Figure 5-1 shows a
photo of uranium standard HRC-185.
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Figure 5-1. Uranium Coal Ash Standard for Gamma Spectroscopy

The standard solution was stirred for 1 hour and the stir bar was
removed before allowing the solution to cool and solidify to a consistent,
mostly homogeneous solid. A second standard was made with 10% of the
activity of the first standard. The jars used in the analysis were the same
jars that the standards were made in. The standards were analyzed to
provide a spectrum that would be representative of materials that
contained uranium. Samples were placed atop an intrinsic germanium
detector for analysis. The activity in the standards was sufficient to
provide energy and efficiency calibration for the

234mPa

in a short count

time. The long count time for analysis at the level of the activity found in
the samples prevented further analysis due to demand for use of the
instrument by other researchers.
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5.4.1.b X-Ray Fluorescence Spectroscopy
One 15 g sample of coal ash that was analyzed using this method
was prepared by packing the sample media into a metal container that
would present one surface to the x-ray beam for analysis. The sample
thickness (greater than 1 cm) would be considered infinite compared to
the depth of penetration of the x-ray beam. The PANalytical X-Ray
Fluorescence spectrometer was used to analyze the samples. The
analysis parameters were selected by the system operator and were not
provided with the analysis result. No other XRF analysis of these samples
was done.
5.4.1.c Inductively Coupled Plasma Atomic Emission Spectrometry
For analysis using ICP-AES, coal ash samples were first digested
then leached [142]. Two mL of hydrofluoric acid (HF) was added to 1 g of
coal ash for each sample and allowed to set for 24 hours. A 6 mL sample
of concentrated hydrochloric acid (HCl) was added to the partially
digested ash to leach out the released uranium. The mixture was allowed
to leach for 72 hours prior to dilution for analysis. A total of 100 mL of
5% HNO3 was added to provide dilution to a concentration more suitable
for ICP-AES analysis.
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5.4.1.d Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry
Dilution of an aliquot of the solutions prepared for the ICP-AES
analysis by 1:1000 was accomplished with 5% HNO3 then analyzed using
ICP-MS.
5.4.2 Sample Analysis and Results
This section presents the results for each analysis technique. The
results may be in units of activity as in the case of gamma spectroscopy,
or in mass units as reported by the other techniques. In order to
compare the results, they were all put into units of grams of uranium per
metric ton of coal ash.
5.4.2.a High Resolution Gamma Spectroscopy Results
Coal ash sample number 2 (353.1 grams) was counted on a high
purity germanium detector for 50,000 seconds. Coal ash sample number
3 (449.19 grams) was counted on a high purity germanium detector for
5000 seconds. Both of these analyses did not identify the immediate
progeny of
progeny

238U;

of

however both spectra did show some of the short lived

222Rn,

concentration of

238U

214Pb

and

214Bi

indicating

that

perhaps

the

was lower than the detection limit for the analysis.

Hartshorne coal sample number 14 (568.1 grams) was counted on
a high purity germanium detector for 50,000 seconds. The decay progeny
234mPa

was considered to be in equilibrium with the

238U

parent. The

activity identified was 0.107 ± 0.026 Bq of

234mPa

relates to a mass concentration of

of 8.61x10-6 grams/gram of

238U
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per gram of ash. This

Figure 5-2 Calibration Spectra for

238U

in Coal Ash

sample (ash). This concentration equates to approximately 7.8 grams of
238U

per ton (900kg) of coal with a 1 sigma uncertainty in the analysis of

1.9 grams/ton (900kg) of coal. The previous analyses were unable to
identify the

234mPa

at that level.

A calibration spectrum was produced using uranyl nitrate in a gel
solution that would simulate

238U

in coal ash. The spectrum was

collected for 20,000 seconds and the photo-peak of interest for

234mPa,

1001 keV was easily identifiable in the spectra. This is displayed in
Figure 5-2. A long background spectrum was obtained for this
calibration to identify any conflicting photo-peaks. There were no
conflicting photo-peaks at the energy of concern. This is displayed by
Figure 5-2; notice the region of interest markers around the 1001 keV
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photo-peak in all of the spectra. These are present only for identifying the
region and not for quantitative evaluation of the region.

Figure 5-3 Background Spectrum for Energy Region of Interest

Coal ash sample number 15 (412.35 grams) was again counted on
a high purity germanium detector but this time for 300,000 seconds. The
decay daughters of

238U, 234Th

and

234mPa

establish equilibrium within

months of separation of the uranium and provide detectable emissions
that can be identified as specific to

234mPa.

Since the coal ash is in the

form in which it was made, no chemical processes have affected the
uranium content of the ash and it is reasonable to consider the
immediate progeny to be in equilibrium.
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The radionuclide of interest in this analysis,
the beta minus decay of
life of

234Th

234Th,

the immediate progeny of

is 24.1 days and the half-life of

equilibrium from

238U

234mPa

234mPa

is formed from
238U.

The half-

is 1.2 minutes. The

is well established within 10 half-lives (241 days)

of purification of the uranium. Since purification for the standard batch
was conducted many years prior, and the ash is at least moths old,
equilibrium of the short lived immediate progeny

234Th

and

234mPa

is

reasonable.
The most reasonable photo-peak associated with the determination
of

238U

in the sample is the 1001 keV photo-peak from

234mPa.

This peak,

although associated with an emission with a low yield (0.837 %), it is in a
low background region of the energy spectrum and not affected by other
photons with similar energy. Figure 5-4 provides display of the spectrum
of Sample #15.
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Figure 5-4 Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis of Coal Ash Sample #15.

The activity of this radionuclide in the sample was 0.141 ± 0.016
Bq/gram. This relates to a mass concentration of

238U

of 1.13x10-5

grams/gram of sample. This concentration equates to approximately
10.3 grams of

238U

per ton (900 kg) of coal ash with a 1 sigma

uncertainty in the analysis of 1.1 grams/ton (900 kg) of coal ash. Table
5-1 shows the gamma spectroscopy results for analysis of coal and coal
ash from the stockpiles at an AES Corporation plant in Oklahoma.
The results that are presented for coal ash for gamma spectroscopy
and the other methods are reasonably consistent with the results of Coal
Ash presented in NIST Standard 1633b [143]. Since the coal from this
site was only analyzed by gamma spectroscopy, the results presented in
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Table 5-1 may present a question about the closeness of the
concentration of uranium in coal versus the concentration in the coal
ash.

There is approximately a 10% uncertainty in the analysis as

presented. In addition, there is indeed release of uranium from the stack
of the facility, a difference in the uranium content of coal ash and bottom
ash, and possibly a difference in the type of coal burned to produce the
ash that was analyzed and the coal that was analyzed in this work.
A more detailed analysis of naturally occurring radionuclides in
coal, fly ash, and bottom ash [144] indicates a distribution between the
concentration of natural uranium in coal: bottom ash: fly ash as 1:2:3.
This document provides similar information for other naturally occurring
radionuclides.
Table 5-1 Gamma Spectroscopy Results of Uranium in Coal Ash

Sample Type

Uranium (Bq/g)

Uranium (ppm)

Uranium
(g/900 kg)*

Hartshorne Coal

0.107

8.61

7.82

Coal Ash

0.141

11.3

10.3

* Uranium (g/900 kg) is g of uranium per ton of coal or coal ash as appropriate.

5.4.2.b X-Ray Fluorescence (XRF) Spectroscopy Results
A sample was taken from coal ash sample number 3. The sample
mass was 15 grams and it was packed into a container for fluorescence
analysis. The analysis results indicated that there was 3.1 ppm ± 1 ppm
of uranium in the ash. This equates to approximately 2.8 grams of
196

uranium per ton of coal ash with a 1 sigma uncertainty in the analysis of
approximately 1 gram of uranium per ton (900 kg) of coal ash. Table 5-2
provides the complete element analysis for the coal ash sample.
Table 5-2. X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis of Uranium in Coal Ash

Element
Sc
V
Ni
Cu
Ga

Value
Value
Element
Element
(ppm)
(ppm)
46.7
Nb
9.3
Rb
161
Mo
9.8
Sr
75.2
Cs
17.4
Y
57.3
Ba
939.8
Zr
13.9
La
42.9

Value
(ppm)
59.1
423.3
33.2
113.6

Element
Hf
Pb
Th
U

Value
(ppm)
1.4
22.8
14.4
3.1

The results presented by X-ray Fluorescence analysis are similar to
the expected value as identified in published values for coal ash from
burning coal in the United States as indicated in NIST standard SRM
2689 [145]. Table 5-3 provides a comparison of some of the elements in
the results with the certified values (c) or information concentrations (i)
for the NIST standard. It is unknown what standard was used in this
analysis, the laboratory did not provide that information. The comparison
in Table 5-3 is provided for information.
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Table 5-3 Comparison of XRF Results with NIST Available Standards

Constituent
Element
Barium (Ba)
Cesium (Cs)
Lead (Pb)
Scandium (Sc)
Strontium (Sr)
Thorium (Th)
Nickel (Ni)
Uranium (U)
Vanadium (V)

NIST 2689 (ppm)

NIST 1633b (ppm)

800 (i)
11 (i)
52 (i)
32 (i)
700 (i)
25 (i)
122 (i)
Not Reported
Not Reported

709 (i)
11 (i)
68.2 (c)
41 (i)
1041 (c)
25.7 (c)
120.6 (c)
8.79 (c)
295.7 (c)

Analysis Result
(ppm)
939.8
17.4
22.8
46.7
423.3
14.4
75.2
3.1
161

5.4.2.c Inductively Coupled Plasma AES Results
The leaching introduced a dilution factor of 106 as 100 mL of
deionized water (DI) and 6 mL of HCl were used for a 1 gram sample of
ash. No method blank was used because the solid digestion procedure
was sufficient to dissolve the solid and clear yellow solution remained.
Filtering of the solution was used to ensure there were no extraneous
particulates in the sample that could possibly clog the AES sample
introduction tubing or nebulizer. All uranium in expected to have been in
solution and have passed through the filter without retention. The
Thermo iCAP 6000 was operated with a nebulizer gas flow of 0.51 L/min,
an auxiliary gas flow of 0.5 L/min, a coolant gas flow of 12 L/min and a
pump speed of 50 rpm. The analysis included 3 replicates for each
sample and the wavelength of concern was selected as 367.007 nm. The
results indicate a concentration of total uranium as shown in Table 5-4.
However, no other analysis of this ash showed any results even close to
this concentration of uranium. A review of the analysis indicates that the
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results presented in this table were due to an interference peak from
other elements in the sample [146].

Figure 5-5 indicates the analytes

that might interfere at that wavelength. This wavelength (367.007) was
considered to be the most reasonable wavelength to use because other
wavelengths for uranium are less significant. The interference from other
elements

in

the

sample

was

significant

because

of

their

high

concentrations.
Table 5-4.

ICP-AES Results of Uranium in Coal Ash

Sample
FA-4
FA-8
FA-16
FA-20
FA-24

ICP-AES Sample
Result

U (ppm)
(ppm)
3.156
0.084
2.773
0.125
2.634
0.123
2.99
0.057
3.372
0.1

Dilution
Factor

Uranium mass
per (900 kg)
of ash

106
106
106
106
106

303.76
266.9
253.52
287.78
324.55

g
g
g
g
g

Since the result indicated was so very high compared to other
analysis results (gamma spectroscopy, x-ray fluorescence spectroscopy,
and mass spectroscopy) any signal from the uranium in these samples
would be masked by the observed signal at the wavelength selected.
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Table 5-5 Interference Wavelengths from Sample Constituents
Uranium wavelength of
Interest (nm)

Element and wavelength of
interference (nm)

263.557

Molybdenum 263.553

367.007
385.466

Iron at 367.002
Iron at 367.009
Thorium at 367.006
Barium at 385.476

385.958

Scandium at 385.96

393.203

Scandium at 393.202

409.014

Zirconium at 409.051

This analysis did not verify the existence of uranium at the
concentrations indicated in these samples. In conclusion of this section,
ICP-AES is not a good technique to use for the determination of uranium
concentrations in coal ash because of interference from naturally
occurring analytes present in the ash.
5.4.2.d Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry Results
The dilution of the coal ash sample placed the concentration in the
ppb range. The Perkin Elmer SCIEX Elan DRC II mass spectrometer was
operated at a nebulizer gas flow of 0.96 L/min, an auxiliary gas flow of
1.2 L/min, a coolant gas flow of 15 L/min and a pump speed of 24 rpm.
The lens voltage was 6 V, the analogue stage voltage was -1562 V and the
pump stage voltage was 900 V. The monitored masses (M/z) were
234.041, 235.044, and 238.05. There were 10 sweeps per reading, 1
reading per replicate, and 3 replicates per sample.
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The results indicated a practical concentration of between 1.7 and
11.4 ppb of uranium. Since the samples were diluted by a factor of 1000,
the concentrations of uranium in the coal ash samples were 1.1 to 9.5
ppm, or 1.1 to 9.5 micrograms of uranium per gram of ash. Two samples
were excluded from the analysis results because the filters used to
remove the solids broke through (FA15 and FA17). The results indicate a
range of uranium in coal ash of 1.0 to 8.5 grams of

238U

per (900 kg) of

coal ash. This result appears to be consistent with the most common
results in the literature, 0.4 to 3.0 ppm in coal, and 0.8 to 30.1 ppm in
coal ash. The samples from the scrubber tank at the coal plant did not
show any significant difference from the coal ash samples indicating that
this tank is not a concentration mechanism from the plant systems.
Table 5-6 provides the result of the sample mass spectroscopy analysis
with the coal ash sample results indicated in Table 5-7.

201

Table 5-4. Mass Spectroscopy Results for Coal Ash Samples
Sample
ID:
B1- Blank
FA01
FA02
FA03
FA04
FA05
FA06
FA07
FA08
FA09
FA10
FA11
FA12
FA13
FA14
FA15
FA16
FA17
FA18
FA19
FA20
FA21
FA22
FA23
FA24
5 ppb

Analyte
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U
U

Mass
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238
238

Net Intensity
(cps)
11318.042
92776.227
49599.752
45189.494
46880.944
43634.356
48110.877
159180.614
57045.655
56386.8
55461.66
66611.842
57002.71
282733.261
283678.641
1171622.894
167569.231
482149.831
193883.179
156677.984
166408.023
158776.976
128273.136
153241.641
150133.964
155388.587
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Concentration
(ppb)
0.455
2.827
1.329
1.175
1.234
1.122
1.277
5.131
1.587
1.564
1.532
1.919
1.585
9.418
9.451
40.265
5.422
16.339
6.336
5.044
5.382
5.117
4.059
4.925
4.817
5.000

Standard
Deviation (ppb)
0.020
0.049
0.060
0.046
0.045
0.046
0.054
0.075
0.049
0.049
0.046
0.060
0.046
0.128
0.092
0.274
0.067
0.157
0.075
0.067
0.067
0.092
0.060
0.067
0.067
0.060

Table 5-5 Uranium Concentration in Coal and Coal Ash
Sample
ID:
B1- Blank
FA01
FA02
FA03
FA04
FA05
FA06
FA07
FA08
FA09
FA10
FA11
FA12
FA13
FA14
FA15
FA16
FA17
FA18
FA19
FA20
FA21
FA22
FA23
FA24
5 ppb

Concentration
In Coal Ash
(ppm)
0.455
2.827
1.329
1.175
1.234
1.122
1.277
5.131
1.587
1.564
1.532
1.919
1.585
9.418
9.451
40.265
5.422
16.339
6.336
5.044
5.382
5.117
4.059
4.925
4.817
5.000

Net Intensity
(cps)
11318.042
92776.227
49599.752
45189.494
46880.944
43634.356
48110.877
159180.614
57045.655
56386.8
55461.66
66611.842
57002.71
282733.261
283678.641
1171622.894
167569.231
482149.831
193883.179
156677.984
166408.023
158776.976
128273.136
153241.641
150133.964
155388.587

Standard
Deviation
(ppm)
0.020
0.049
0.060
0.046
0.045
0.046
0.054
0.075
0.049
0.049
0.046
0.060
0.046
0.128
0.092
0.274
0.067
0.157
0.075
0.067
0.067
0.092
0.060
0.067
0.067
0.060

5.5 Conclusions
5.5.1 Gamma Spectroscopy Analysis
After the initial research on the likely radionuclide concentration in
the coal and coal ash, it was decided to conduct gamma spectroscopy
analysis of these materials. This selection was made because this
analysis is non-destructive and the 1.001 MeV photo-peak from

234mPa

is

an excellent indicator of the amount of uranium present in the coal
because it is considered to be in equilibrium with the uranium. The
decay scheme in Table 5-8 identifies the
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238U

decay emissions.

Table 5-6. Simple Decay Scheme for

238U

to Short Lived Progeny

Nuclide

Decay
Emission

Half-life

238U

α

4.468x109 years

γ
γ
γ
ββββββγ
β- (15)
γ

234Th

234mPa

234Pa

24.10 days

1.18 minutes
6.75 hours

α

234U

Emission Energy
MeV (Yield)

2.455x105 years

γ
The alpha emission from
decays by beta emission to
the ground state of

234Pa.

238U

234mPa

4.151 (20.9%)
4.198 (79%)
0.06329 (4.8%)
0.09238 (26%)
0.0928 (28%)
0.086 (2.9%)
0.106 (7.6%)
0.107 (19.2%)
0.199 (70.3%)
1.236 (1%)
2.281 (99%)
1.001 (0.87%)
0.548 to 1.244
0.062 to 1.695
4.722 (28.4%)
4.774 (71.4%)
0.053 (.123%)

creates

234Th,

Decay
product
234Th

234mPa

234U
234Pa
234U

230Th

this radionuclide

which decays by gamma emission to

This gamma emission is the 1.001 MeV

emission which has a photon yield of 0.837%. Because of the short halflife of

234Th

parent,

238U.

activity of
234mPa

and

234mPa,

these radionuclides are in equilibrium with their

In equilibrium, the activity of

234mPa.

238U

is the same as the

Therefore, with the determination of the activity of

by gamma spectroscopy, the activity of

determined.
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238U

in the ash is

The difficulty that appeared in this analysis was due to the low
photon yield associated with the decay of

234mPa.

needed to achieve a statistically valid result for the

The analysis time

234mPa

concentration

was 300,000 seconds (83.33 hours). While this may be acceptable for
single samples, it is not acceptable for 48 samples. So a more rapid
analysis technique was sought.
5.5.2 X-Ray Fluorescence Analysis
In XRF analysis, uranium was determined directly as was the
determination of many other metals and compounds. With XRF it is not
necessary to bring solid samples into solution and then dispose of
solution residues, as is the case with all wet-chemical methods. The
main prerequisite for exact and reproducible analysis is a plain,
homogeneous and clean analysis surface. For analysis of very light
elements, e.g. beryllium, boron and carbon, the fluorescence radiation to
be analyzed originates from a layer whose thickness is only a few atom
layers to a few tenths of micrometer and which strongly depends on the
sample material.
5.5.3 ICP/Mass Spectroscopy Analysis
In order to do a more complete analysis of the many samples that
were received, even though they could not be traced to a specific location
or source of the ash or coal, it was decided to do a detailed analysis of
the samples by inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry. Samples
were

prepared

to

have

an

approximate
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anticipated

uranium

concentration in the ppb range. This was the most detailed of the
analysis methods and provided the most comprehensive set of results
with reasonable consistency except for two samples that showed signs of
cross contamination (FA-15 and FA-17).
5.5.4 Comparison with Viable Sources
Three primary methods confirm the results of uranium analysis in
coal and coal ash as between the values of 1.5 grams of uranium per 900
kg of coal ash and 10.3 grams of uranium per 900 kg of coal or coal ash.
The coal ash analyzed in this evaluation contains uranium, but not at
concentrations that are useful for uranium recovery. At the current time,
uranium recovery is viable at approximately 200 grams per 900 kg of
coal ash. The results are in the range of many other analysis results of
coal and coal as in the United States.
5.6 Implementation
When coal ash deposits are identified as viable for recovery of its
components that are identified as valuable, the methods to remove those
components need to be identified and optimized. The composition of coal
ash is such that recovery of uranium is possible via leaching, filtration,
and solvent extraction. IAEA Technical Report Number 359 “Uranium
Extraction Technology” provides for methods of removal with extraction
efficiency of more than 99%. This is a research field that is periodically
evaluated for application of new technologies and implementation is a
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large scale operation. This document provides no new concepts for
uranium recovery from coal ash.
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6. CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
6.1 Radiation Safety for Radiochemistry
An important contribution of this work was creating a radiation
safety program for a Radiochemistry Program in an academic setting.
There were many challenges as it expanded into the program it is today
and the faculty and staff provided many solutions to make controls as
good as they could be with the facilities and resources provided.
Radiochemistry

researchers

should

always

minimize

liquid

radioactive waste as it is important to the survival of any radiochemistry
program. A program should be established for the minimization of liquid
radioactive waste and the elimination of mixed radioactive waste through
recovery and reuse. The current system of passing the waste on for
disposal regardless of its contents is not desirable from a radiation safety
management standpoint. The creation of undesirable waste can be
reduced through radiochemistry.
It is recommended that all of the exhaust stacks that allow for
removal of potentially contaminated air from radiochemical fume hoods
be HEPA filtered and monitored for radioactive material releases. This
was a plan many years ago that was put on hold until the
Radiochemistry Program used more material or there was an indication
that releases from filtered hoods could be significant. At the current time,
the Radiochemistry Program has reached that threshold and exhaust
from laboratories where radioactive materials are used should be
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monitored for release. This demonstrates appropriate controls to
regulators and answers questions about releases without extensive
investigation into events that might have caused them.
In 2006, the UNLV Radiation Safety Advisory Committee decided to
seek a Type A radioactive materials license as it was deemed appropriate
for the future work with radioactive materials that would be done at
UNLV [147]. A Type A license would help UNLV to communicate better
among all Users, effect collaboration regarding safety issues, and allow a
more detailed evaluation of some of the programs that have significant
potential for increased risk to researchers and members of the general
public. The pursuit of a Type A license should be restarted to support
continued growth of the Radiochemistry Program.
Consistency and expertise is required to efficiently protect
personnel using radiochemicals from inhalation and ingestion. The
future administration of the radiation safety program at UNLV should
consider these qualities for members of the radiation safety staff or for
additions to the laboratory support staff.
6.2 Recovery of Materials from Decontamination Solutions
The recovery of radionuclides or other valuable material from a
decontamination gel used to remove radioactive contamination from a
surface has been demonstrated, but more testing is needed to prove the
feasibility. The decontamination gel is a relatively new removal agent that
has been shown to be more useful than other products used for
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collection of high surface activity concentrations in the past. We use
many of them each day such as masking tape and protective film to
protect surfaces. However, their use in decontamination of surfaces is
limited and typically causes more radioactive waste than is necessary.
The gel has a benign nature, is not caustic or toxic and has low
flammability. These features alone make it more desirable to use than,
for example, the strippable coatings of the past that were used for
surface protection or decontamination. These coatings typically had a
characteristic hazard or were more difficult to work with, were not
reusable, and materials could not be easily recovered.
It has been shown that a decontamination gel could be used to
remove technetium from a contaminated surface and a fraction of that
material could then be recovered from the gel. Using the gel for
decontamination and then recovering the contaminant may be valuable
in the case where a material is spilled that has great value, the gel is
used to recover the spilled material and some action is then required to
remove the material from the gel.
Another feature of the decontamination gel that could be valuable
that

has

not

been

researched

is

its

value

in

sampling.

The

decontamination gel encapsulates materials and appears to encapsulate
the hazard associated with materials as it dries. This feature may be
useful in the sampling of hazardous or radioactive materials in the
environment or the area near a detonated radionuclide dispersion device.
In working with the gel for decontamination, it is apparent that its use as
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a

sampling

tool

could

be

valuable.

Many

properties

of

the

decontamination gel have not been fully evaluated but its ability to
encapsulate and collect loose surface contaminants is demonstrated.
Additives

to

a

decontaminating

hydrogel

may

increase

its

effectiveness in removal of fixed contamination from metal surfaces.
Mineral acids with corrosive properties may be held on the metal surface
with the gel and remove a fraction of the surface over some period of time
depending on the concentration and type of acid used.
6.3 Recovery of Materials from Planned Disposal
Recycling of natural resources occurs whether humans participate
or not. In the case of radioactive materials for use in a laboratory or for
use in a nuclear reactor, the benefits from recycling radionuclides in the
form of waste products such as experimental residue, used nuclear fuel,
or weapons can be enormous. In general, it results in cost savings to the
researcher or the general public, and reduced environmental impact
because of a lower, less toxic waste volume. In small scale recycling, the
benefits may not be readily apparent, the cost savings may be small and
the waste reduction may be small, but the act of decreasing the volume
of toxic waste in the environment is desirable. In large recycling
operations, such as recovery of usable fuel from previously used fuel
bundles, the saving of our natural resources is more obvious.
When work at any facility using radioactive material is completed,
the majority of the time, there are materials left over and work must be
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done to verify that the facility can be released without the need for
special controls. In many cases too much original stock material was
procured and the remainder must be disposed of as waste, held in
storage for future use, or provided to other people who are doing work
with those radionuclides. In the case of the ‘UNLV Radionuclide Recovery
Program’,

established

to

obtain

radionuclides

for

the

UNLV

Radiochemistry Program, the recovery of kilogram quantities of uranium
compounds, kilogram quantities of thorium compounds, and 500
milligrams of plutonium is considered a very successful procurement.
The savings from disposal costs on the part of the donors was a success
for their programs and the availability of these materials for the
Radiochemistry Program will yield many successful research projects in
the future.
In order to successfully achieve the procurement of radioactive
materials from donors, solid communication and cooperation with the
donating organization was fundamental. By continuing this program, the
Radiochemistry Program could be successful in the procurement of even
more actinides. Consideration should be given to establishing acceptance
criteria to prevent receipt of materials that are not usable.
Recovery of radionuclides from planned disposal may require an
acceptance criteria be established to prevent a facility from sending a
waste product that is not useful. The criteria may simply be that the
donated compound be in its original container or that a detailed
evaluation of the purity of the compound is provided. These methods
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may provide protection against receipt of a waste product. A more formal
protection method may be written into a binding contract that requires
the donation to be useful. This last criterion may reduce the number of
donations as it has legal implications.
6.4 Recovery of Materials from Experiment Residue
The recovery of materials from waste generated in researchers’
experiments may have already saved many thousands of dollars in
disposal costs simply by destruction of the characteristic hazards of
materials that could be classified as mixed radioactive and hazardous
waste. Over the years many facilities have devised methods of dealing
with a mixed waste problem by focusing on the destruction of the
hazardous material, Some of the techniques used were thermal
destruction, making the waste into a non-toxic chemical product,
neutralizing it, or changing its chemical structure so that it is a more
benign radioactive product that can be disposed of with other radioactive
wastes.
The work discussed for this research focused on the removal of the
radioactive material from the hazard so that the activity might be reused.
This process is a partial solution to a mixed waste problem. The
radionuclide concentration may be reduced, but the resulting waste
product will still contain licensed material and if the hazard was not
destroyed, mixed waste still exists. The future of this work is in the work
of all research in radiochemistry that uses hazardous material.
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Radiochemistry programs should recognize that the creation of a
radioactive waste with a hazardous component is undesirable with our
current technology. Putting radioactive materials that have hazardous
components into storage, in the ground, or in tanks should be prevented
and leaving the problem for future generations to solve has never been
an appropriate solution. The end result of all future radiochemistry
experiments should be a non-hazardous, minimally radioactive waste
where the radioactive materials that could be reused have been removed
from the residue and put into safe storage.
6.5 Recovery of Uranium from Coal Ash
The coal ash samples analyzed from an AES plant in Oklahoma do
not represent ash with economic feasibility to recover uranium. When
compared with documents regarding the concentration of uranium in the
United States, this material seems to have similar concentrations. The
availability of uranium in a form that is easy to process drives the cost
that industry is willing to pay. The cost of recovery of uranium in coal
ash where the concentration is in the ppm range would require chemical
methods that are similar to current methods to extract the uranium, but
with a larger volume of feed material. As a result, the cost to recover the
uranium from fly ash drives the cost of this uranium to a higher price
than that available from mining or leaching at the current time.
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Appendix A – Comparison of UNLV Radiation Safety Program

Table 2-1 Comparison of Radiological Controls at UNLV Before and After

Establishment of the Radiochemistry Program
Radiological Control Procedures Before the
Radiochemistry Program was Established

Radiological Controls Established for the
Radiochemistry Program

Type B Radioactive Materials License
issued by the State of Nevada – 03-130305-01. Allowance for gram quantities of
plutonium and uranium.

Type B Radioactive Materials License
issued by the State of Nevada – 03-130305-01. Line item changes to allow gram
quantities of technetium, neptunium,
americium, and curium.

Special Nuclear Material, Source Material,
and other Radionuclides were allowed for
research in any form with low activity
limits for other radionuclides (100
microcuries).

Special Nuclear Material, Source Material,
and other Radionuclides were allowed for
research in any form. Limits were
increased for actinides. NMSS limits
imposed for control of SNM.

Smears from all UNLV laboratories using
radioactive materials were analyzed by
Liquid Scintillation Counting.

Smears analyzed by Liquid Scintillation
Counting for laboratories using 3H, 14C, by
gas proportional counting for other
laboratories.

Training conducted annually for all groups
without regard to their use of radioactive
materials.

Training provided specifically to the
radiochemistry program participants
because of the increased use of actinides
and high activity of technetium. Monthly
newsletters specifically for radiochemistry.

Contamination controls established to
prevent removal of contamination from
work areas.

Radiochemistry contamination controls
are established to prevent removal of
contamination from laboratories because
the number of sources of contamination in
laboratories increased.

Dose rates in laboratories typically not
measureable except from sealed sources or
radiation producing machines.

Dose rates in radiochemistry laboratories
measureable in source storage areas.

Ventilation from laboratories where
radioactive materials are used is not
filtered.

New radiochemistry laboratories built with
filtered ventilation. Similar controls for
Biology established by Planning &
Construction Group.
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Radiological Control Procedures Before the
Radiochemistry Program was Established

Radiological Controls Established for the
Radiochemistry Program

Visits to most laboratories at least weekly
by radiation safety staff.

Radiation Safety staff established to
provide for needs of the radiochemistry
program.

Number of personnel contaminations and
spills of radioactive material not a
concern.

Increased number of spills and
contamination spread noticeable from
radiochemistry laboratories.

Concern for inhalation or ingestion intake
of radioactive materials is low. There is no
formal bioassay program as part of the
radioactive materials license.

Concern for inhalation or ingestion intake
of radioactive materials increased as the
activity of radioactive material used by
some researchers approaches and exceeds
an Annual Limit on Intake. State
mandates formal bioassay program for the
radiochemistry program. RSO
incorporates program for protocol controls.

Laboratories are primarily the
responsibility of one Authorized
Radioactive Material User.

Workload in the radiochemistry
laboratories requires many users to work
together providing supervision of many
projects simultaneously. New controls to
ensure coverage are provided in a “Plan of
the Week Form”.

Work with radioactive materials was
described in an Authorized Users
application to become a User and seldom
after that.

Work done by researchers in the
Radiochemistry Program is reviewed each
week to ensure that proper controls are
considered by the researcher and the
Authorized User as their research
supervisor.
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Appendix B - Radiation Safety Training Program Newsletters

This appendix includes the technical content of 37 radiation safety
newsletters produced as described in the main text of the dissertation.
When published each newsletter was provided an identifying header and
a message at the end that included contact information for the Radiation
Laboratory Director. When training the instructor must be approachable
and available and when people review the information later and
questions arise there must be a way to resolve those questions. Indicate
time of availability, office location, office phone, cell phone, etc. Make
every reasonable effort to ensure that people believe you to be truthful
and available to them for more information.
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Newsletter 1 – Contamination Surveys
Whenever you work with radioactive materials, there is the possibility
that some of the radioactive material evaded your control mechanism
and may be spread to other parts of your laboratory or even outside of
your laboratory. While the contamination spread is not likely to be
hazardous to anyone, it may be in excess of our license conditions.
In order to prevent this type of situation from developing, we take
measurements of our work areas with portable instruments or in some
cases we take smears for laboratory analysis to identify the level of
surface contamination (or absence of it) in our work areas.
When are contamination surveys required?
Contamination surveys are desired in each laboratory where radioactive
material is used, weekly, or immediately after unsealed radioactive
materials are used in an area, whichever is more frequent. If you are
using high-energy beta emitters, you should also evaluate your body and
clothes for the presence of contamination after each procedure.
What instrument should I use?
The instrument that you use depends on the radionuclide that you use
in your work area. For example if you are using isotopes of Uranium,
Plutonium, Neptunium, Curium, or other radionuclides that have strong
alpha or beta emissions, you should use a Geiger counter with a thin
window to evaluate the surfaces of your work area and the area around
it. These radionuclides are beta emitters whose emissions can be
detected with portable instruments. If you are using 3H (tritium), 63Ni, or
another radionuclide with very low energy emissions, you should
consider use of a liquid scintillation counter (LSC) to evaluate smears of
the work area and the area around it.
What is a smear and how do I take one?
A smear is a small (2 inch diameter) piece of paper or cloth that is wiped
on a potentially radioactive area and then analyzed to determine the
activity of radioactive material present in the area smeared. A smear is
taken wearing gloves by rubbing the paper over an area of approximately
100 cm2 (4 inches by 4 inches). If the area is very dry use a drop of water
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on the smear. Contamination control limits are expressed in units of
activity per 100 cm2.
How do I know when an area is contaminated?
An area is considered contaminated if there is any detectable radioactive
material in that area. It is considered contaminated above limits when
the activity found on a smear is greater than the activity indicated in the
following table for each type of radioactive material listed.
How do I convert count rate from an instrument to activity?
Area
Uncontrolled
Controlled
Restricted

Alpha Emitters
11 dpm/100 cm2
22 dpm/100 cm2
110 dpm/100 cm2

Beta/Gamma Emitters
110 dpm/100 cm2
220 dpm/100 cm2
1100 dpm/100 cm2

The conversion of count rate to units of activity depends on the detection
efficiency of the instrument. Consider the following two examples:
You are using a Geiger counter with a thin window probe such as the
Ludlum 44-9 and you observe a count rate of 100 counts per minute
above background. If the radionuclide emits a higher energy beta particle
such as 32P, the efficiency is about 15% or 0.15 counts/disintegration.
The activity is then 100 cpm/0.15 = 667 dpm. Since the 44-9 probe
(frisker probe) has an area of 20 cm2, the contamination level is 667
dpm/ 20 cm2, or 3333 dpm/100 cm2. We always convert the surface
activity to dpm/100 cm2 for comparison to the limits.
If you are using smears for a low energy beta emitter such as 3H or 14C,
take 100 cm2 smears. Each LSC has a certain detection efficiency for 3H
and this is noted on your calibration documents. Usually this is around
60% or higher for 3H beta particles. If you have a count rate of 100 cpm
for a certain sample (in the 3H channel of course), the activity indicated
by the smear = 100 cpm / 0.6 c/d / 100 cm2 = 167 dpm/100 cm2.
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How do I survey for activity on my body?
When surveying yourself for contamination, hold the probe so that the
window opening faces the surface that you are surveying. Move the probe
slowly over the surface (skin or clothing) at a distance of 1 cm or less
from the surface. If the meter starts clicking faster, stop moving the
probe and evaluate that area more closely. If the meter indicates a count
rate more than 2 times the normal background count rate, there may be
contamination present.
What should I do if I identify activity on my body?
In many cases, simple washing with water will remove activity from the
skin. For clothing, it may be possible to remove the activity by applying
tape to the surface and pulling it off. In some cases the activity may stick
to the tape. In many cases where you are working with organic
chemicals, the materials may bind to the clothing or skin. Some fraction
of the material will then be absorbed into the skin and some will
eventually slough off with dead skin or may be removed by further
washing.
Notify an authorized user or the RSO if there is contamination on the
skin that is difficult to remove or if there is clothing contamination.
The best means of preventing the spread of radioactive materials in
laboratories is prevention of spills. The UNLV Radiation Safety Manual
provides the following safe work practices:
1. Good housekeeping is required where radionuclides are used. Work
areas must be clearly defined and uncluttered.
2. Work surfaces shall be covered to facilitate easy decontamination.
Bench coverings shall be changed frequently, i.e., weekly, or whenever
the covering is noticeably soiled, torn, or contaminated.
3. Locate work areas away from heavy traffic or doorways.
4. When moving radioactive solutions between approved locations, place
the material within covered secondary containers that contain sufficient
absorbing material to absorb twice the quantity of liquid.
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There are many good general rules for radiological control that I have
picked up over the years regarding contamination control. Here are a
few:
When you are working with liquids and there is a potential for a spill or
spray of the liquid, wear a face shield and a plastic apron.
When you are surveying any area with a portable instrument, move the
probe very slowly, 1 to 2 inches per second is the fastest that you should
move a probe over an area. The faster you move the probe -the less likely
that you are to detect the presence of activity on a surface.
In general, you don't have to be concerned about radioactive material
being in high airborne concentrations unless you are dealing with higher
quantities of unsealed activity (greater than 1 millicurie) or the material
is volatile (such as Iodine). If there is a potential for airborne radioactive
materials the work should always be done in a ventilated hood (and the
vent fan should be ON).
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Newsletter 2 - Dosimetry
Radiation Dosimetry is used to determine how much radiation dose we
receive during our work with radioactive materials or radiation producing
machines. In general, we can wear it to identify the dose that we receive
from radiation exposure or to prove that we have not been exposed to
radiation higher than background levels.
The dosimetry that is used at UNLV is from a company named Landauer
and the type is Luxel.
When is dosimetry required?
It is required that we wear dosimetry when the RSO has determined that
it is possible that you could receive in excess of 10% of the Nevada
Administrative Code (NAC) limits for radiation dose. All persons working
with radioactive material in the laboratories at the HRC are trained in
radiation safety and issued dosimetry for 2 month monitoring periods.
Dosimetry is required for work with most radioactive materials at the
HRC because the potential exists for someone to receive a dose in excess
of 10% of the limits. However, you should be aware that no one working
in the HRC in the past 5 years has received a dose in excess of 10% of
the limits. Also, it is very unusual for people working in the HRC
radiochemistry laboratories to receive any exposure at all!
One great thing that dosimetry provides is a feeling that because we are
doing things right, we don’t receive measurable dose – and the dosimetry
results prove it.
How does the Luxel dosimeter work?
The Luxel optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) dosimeter measures
radiation exposure due to x-ray, beta, and gamma radiation using a thin
layer of aluminum oxide. After use, the aluminum oxide is stimulated
with a laser and produces luminescence in proportion to the amount of
radiation dose that the badge received.
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The Luxel dosimeters have several advantages over the monitors of many
other manufacturers, the Luxel dosimeters are:
more durable,
water resistant,
more sensitive, doses possible down to 1 mrem,
more accurate,
allow determination of whether or not the exposure was static.
What are the UNLV Occupational Dose Limits?
The annual limits for exposure to ionizing radiation at UNLV are the
same as those published by the State of Nevada, 5 rem per year Total
Effective Dose Equivalent.
UNLV also has an administrative control level of 500 mrem/year,
investigation is required if any person exceeds 83 mrem for the two
month monitoring period. This is 10% of the annual limits stated above.
What if I lose my assigned dosimeter?
The Luxel dosimeter is the legal means for determination of your dose
due to occupational exposure to ionizing radiation at UNLV. If the RSO
does not get your dosimeter back at the end of the monitoring period, a
dose estimate is made to determine your dose based on the work that
you did or the dose determined from another person doing the same type
of work for the same time period.
If you turn in a lost dosimeter report, the RSO will issue you another
dosimeter. There is no penalty associated with losing the dosimeter. But,
if you lose a dosimeter and do not turn in a lost dosimeter report, the
RSO may not issue you a new dosimeter and will put a hold on your
records with the registrar until either your dosimeter is returned or a lost
dosimetry report is provided so that the RSO can complete your dose
records for you.
What if I'm Pregnant?
If you discover that you are pregnant and you declare your pregnancy in
writing to the Radiation Safety Officer, RMS will provide two dosimeters
to you - one for monitoring you and one for monitoring your future child.
The limits for exposure of your unborn child are more restrictive (500
mrem/ 9 months) than your exposure limits. Depending on your job and
223

past radiation exposure history, the Radiation Safety Officer may
recommend that you be reassigned to a job with less exposure. The
Radiation Safety Officer keeps exposure records for your badge and for
your fetal badge.
How do I get a report of my exposure?
While you are monitored for radiation exposure by UNLV, the UNLV
Radiation Safety Office maintains your exposure records. After you are
officially hired by another company, your records are maintained by
their radiation safety office.
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Newsletter 3 – Training
One of the most important aspects of radiation safety is training all
people that will be working with radioactive materials or radiation
producing machines. Without a fundamental knowledge of radiation
protection, people would not know how to protect themselves from
radiation emissions or prevent the spread of contamination.
When is training required?
It is required that every person that will be exposed to radiation
associated with radiation producing machines or radioactive sources at
least annually.
What courses are required?
There are three basic courses for radiation safety at the Harry Reid
Center. The course sessions that you attend depend on what your job is
and whether you will be working with sealed sources of radiation and
radiation producing machines, unsealed sources of radioactive material,
or working in the laboratories but not working with radioactive materials.
If you are a radioactive material user or assistant researcher and work
with radioactive materials in liquid or other unsealed form, you will
receive unsealed sources training.
If you work with sealed sources or x-ray machines, you will receive
radiation producing devices training.
If you require access to the laboratory areas but do not work with
radioactive materials, you need to attend the Basic Radiation Safety
course.
How will I know when to attend training?
You will be notified by the Radiation Safety Officer or by the Radiation
Laboratory Director when training is required. Failure to attend training
after two notifications will result in loss of privileges to use radioactive
materials, to operate radiation producing devices, or to enter areas where
radiation is produced.
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What if I miss the training?
If you do not attend training, you should not enter areas where
radioactive materials or radiation producing machines are in use. If you
miss the training you should reschedule a session with the Radiation
Safety Office.
Is Computer Based Training Allowed?
No, computer based training for initial or re-qualification training for
work with radioactive materials or radiation producing machines at the
HRC is not allowed. If you take the computer based training provided by
the RMS department, you will also have to take the radiation safety
course offered by the Radiation Laboratory Director.
Does Training from Other Facilities Count?
No, training at other facilities does not qualify radiation workers at
UNLV.
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Newsletter 4 – Radioactive Waste
When radioactive materials are used in an unsealed form, radioactive
waste is usually created. Typically, this waste is laboratory supplies,
protective clothing, pipettes, liquid scintillation samples, and the vials
that the radioactive material came in.
We have several important rules for radioactive waste disposal that
anyone working with unsealed radioactive materials must know and
abide by.
How do I dispose of radioactive waste?
All radioactive wastes are collected by the Radiation Safety Office for
disposal. If you have wastes that should be removed from your laboratory
simply notify Tom or Trevor, and we will package the waste and call the
Radiation Safety Office to schedule a waste pickup. Appropriate and
legible records of waste content must be in order and accompany the
waste.
Where do the wastes go?
Radioactive wastes from laboratories are transported to the Radiation
Protection Laboratory for evaluation, packaging, storage for decay, or
eventual transport to a licensed radioactive waste site.
The exact handling, packaging, and destination site for the waste
depends on the type of material, radionuclide content, radionuclide
concentration, and dose rate from the material.
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How do I segregate radioactive waste in my laboratory?
For laboratory disposal, there are basically 7 types of radioactive waste
as follows:
1. Short-lived solid radioactive waste. This waste consists of materials
contaminated with radionuclides that have a short half-life (less than
90 days), such as 32P, 35S, 125I, etc.
2. Long-lived radioactive waste is solid waste that contains radionuclides
with half-lives greater than 90 days, such as 3H, 14C, 239Pu, 238U, etc.
3. Liquid waste can be the remains of experiments that are liquid and
contain concentrations of radioactive material. If you will be
generating liquid waste you should discuss your process with the
Radiation Laboratory Director or the Radiation Safety Officer.
4. Mixed waste is radioactive hazardous waste. It contains two
components: 1. a radioactive material and 2. a hazardous material. –
Do not create a mixed waste without written permission from the
Radiation Safety Officer and approval of the Radiation Safety Advisory
Committee.
5. Radioactive bio-hazard waste. As the name implies this waste is both
a radioactive material and a bio-hazard. Before delivery of such waste
to the RSO, the bio-hazard must be removed through autoclaving. The
RSO should be involved with the autoclave process for radioactive
waste. Bags containing the waste and waste records must indicate
that it has been autoclaved.
6. Radioactive needles, razor blades, broken glass, or other puncture or
cutting hazard. Do not include these with any other type of waste –
package them separately in a labeled sharps container.
7. Other waste – for other types of waste (those not fitting the definitions
above); please discuss options with the Radiation Laboratory Director
or the Radiation Safety Officer.
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Important Information and Directions
You should use a different container for each type of radioactive waste
that you will create. There are many reasons for this, so let me explain a
few that are very important:
Do not mix long lived and short lived wastes because short lived wastes
are stored in the RPL until they become non-radioactive and can be
disposed of in normal trash.
Do not mix hazardous and radioactive waste because mixed waste is
approximately 20 times as expensive to dispose of as radioactive waste.
Also, special handling of this waste type is required.
Do not throw non-radioactive waste in radioactive trash. All waste in a
radioactive waste container is treated as radioactive and this will
unnecessarily increase costs of radioactive waste disposal.
Do not place containers of liquids in bags. They might leak and cause a
serious spill of radioactive materials onto non-radioactive materials
increasing waste volume and associated cost of cleanup.
Do not place sharps (needles, razor blades, broken glass) into any
radioactive waste bags. They may cause puncture injury to persons
carrying the waste or break through the bags to cause a spill of
radioactive material.
How does the RSO keep track of radioactive waste?
Each user of unsealed radioactive sources that creates radioactive waste
must document this by using a Waste Disposal Inventory, RSO form
number 3 or equivalent method approved by the RSO. Each time
material is put into a radioactive waste container, the appropriate waste
inventory log should be updated. Records must be legible.
The RSO must take the log from each user as the waste is picked up and
provide an accounting of the radioactive material in each radioactive
waste container that we send to a licensed radioactive waste site.
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The waste log from each user must be accurate regarding what
radionuclides and the activity of each radionuclide in the waste.
How much does it cost to dispose of radioactive waste?
It really depends on the type of waste but a general figure that could be
used to determine the cost of bulk solid radioactive waste disposal is
approximately $1000 to $2000 per drum including packaging, handling,
waste site fees, regulatory agency fees, and transportation charges.
With everyone’s help we can reduce the amount of radioactive waste that
is generated. Think about what you are throwing away as radioactive. Is
it really radioactive?
High activity sources and high concentration waste may significantly
increase the cost associated with disposal or transportation or both.
Of course the most important aspect of radioactive waste disposal is
associated with its final resting place. Ensure that radioactive waste is
properly controlled, properly disposed, and does not represent a hazard
to anyone else.
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Newsletter 5 – Security of Radioactive Materials
Areas where radioactive materials are used or stored must have special
security precautions to prevent unauthorized exposure of untrained
personnel to radiation and also to prevent theft of the material.
The State of Nevada Radiological Health Office and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission have increased their efforts to ensure that
facilities using radioactive materials properly control and secure those
materials.
What if the sources are very low in activity?
Many sources of radioactive material at the HRC are very low in activity,
however, some are not. The radiation hazards are minimal to trained
people, but the degree of regulatory concern is significant. All radioactive
sources must be secured when not in use. If we don’t live by the rules,
we can lose our authorization to use radioactive materials.
How should sources be stored?
When not in use and under the direct supervision of an authorized User
of radioactive materials, they must be locked in a secure location.
The UNLV policy for radioactive material security is as follows:
All areas where radioactive materials are used shall be posted with a
“Caution Radioactive Materials” sign. All radioactive materials shall only
be used by trained personnel. All personnel working in a laboratory
where radioactive materials are in use shall be aware of the presence of
the material in the laboratory. All radioactive materials not in use shall
be in a locked container.
If at any time, radioactive materials are identified as missing from the
laboratory, the RSO shall be contacted immediately. Contact numbers for
the RSO and Alternate RSO are posted in each laboratory using
radioactive materials.
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Why is security of low level sources of radiation important?
Although low activity radioactive sources have virtually no potential for
health effect, if they are handled correctly, public fear of radiation has
caused regulatory agencies to provide enforcement actions that minimize
public outcry.
These actions are intended to prevent untrained persons from getting
radioactive materials so that fear of perceived health effects is also
minimized.
What if sources are missing?
Radioactive material users should always be aware of the status of
radioactive materials that have been trusted to them by the RSO and the
State. If you identify that one or more radioactive sources are missing,
search the area, notify the radioactive material user – if it is gone, the
user should call the RSO immediately.
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Newsletter 6 – Contamination Control
Radioactive contamination is radioactive material where it is not
wanted.
Control of radioactive contamination in the laboratory is the responsibility of
each Radioactive Material User at UNLV. In controlling the spread
radioactive material we minimize the potential for intake and reduce
external dose rates in the laboratory.
Contamination control is discussed here for all personnel who enter the
HRC laboratories to enable an understanding of the radioactive material
user’s responsibility.
Things you should do to maintain control of radioactive material:
1. Delineate a work area in your laboratory. Ensure that the area is not
subject to high personnel traffic that may cause items to be touched or
knocked off of the laboratory bench.
2. Wear protective clothing (gloves and laboratory coat) to prevent the
spread of contamination.
3. Complete surveys each time that you use radioactive materials to ensure
that no material is spread to other parts of your laboratory. Surveys may
be done by direct monitoring for some radionuclides but must be done
using smears and liquid scintillation counting for others.
4. Ensure that you monitor any items that are taken out of the
contaminated area. Remember, anything in that area is suspected of
being contaminated until proven not to be.
5. There must be no food, drink or cosmetics stored or used in any
laboratory where there exists a potential for intake of radioactive or
hazardous materials.
6. All containers for radioactive or hazardous materials must be labeled
appropriately and should not be food or drink containers.
7. Alpha emitting radionuclides and volatile radioactive materials must be
maintained in sealed containers to prevent an unknown spread of
contamination. These items can escape an open container and cause
contamination outside the container if just left open.
8. Work areas should be covered with an impermeable material to protect
the work bench from getting contaminated from small spills.

233

9. If the technique used for transfer of radioactive materials to your samples
causes splashing or splattering – you are doing something wrong. Use a
technique that prevents these phenomena.
10. When transferring materials from your work area to an analysis area or
other location, ensure that the material cannot spill. Always use a
secondary container with enough absorbent to contain twice the
amount of liquid in the container.
11.

Remember, gloves are not just to protect you from getting materials on
your skin. They are also to prevent the spread of contamination from
one area to another. If you suspect that your gloves are contaminated,
don’t touch other items, change your gloves. Only wear your gloves
when handling potentially contaminated materials. Take them off to
handle materials outside the contaminated area.

12. Never leave a container of radioactive material uncovered. Remember
Murphy’s law, only vials that are uncapped will fall over.
13. If you use a detection instrument, have it turned on and adjacent to
your work area so that you can check your hands or items moved from
the contaminated area to the clean area frequently.
14. Keep the laboratory area clean. Cleanliness is good radiological control.
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Newsletter 7 – Transporting Radioactive Materials at UNLV
Whenever working with or transporting radioactive materials you must
ensure that the samples or sources are protected from damage or spills.
The best ways to do this is to provide a secondary container for the
material, select a path for transportation that is not crowded or difficult
to get through, and ensure that someone else knows that you are
transporting radioactive materials in case you need help.
What are the requirements for transporting radioactive materials?
Radioactive materials have different transportation requirements
depending on whether they will be transported on campus or off campus.
The Department of Transportation has many requirements for transport
of radioactive materials on public roads. These have to do with
packaging, labeling, security, documentation, emergency procedures,
posting, placarding, and contents of packages.
Only the UNLV RSO can authorize transport of radioactive materials
from UNLV on public roads. Do not transport radioactive materials off
campus without specific permission of the UNLV RSO.
Persons, who transport sources off campus must be trained in DOT
requirements, understand the source control measures needed for
transportation of their specific source; know how to use the
transportation checklist for radioactive materials, and how to provide the
DOT required documentation for their shipment.
What about transporting radioactive material between laboratories?
Whenever transporting radioactive materials between laboratories in the
same building or in different buildings on campus, you should be
primarily concerned with preventing a spill of the material. The radiation
safety manual provides guidance as follows: Always use rubber or plastic
gloves when handling radioactive material. Laboratory coats shall be
worn in the laboratory and left in the laboratory. Do not wear gloves or
laboratory coats out of the laboratory unless PPE is required when
transporting radioactive material (ask the RSO for guidance).
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Some Other Transportation Considerations
Always work over trays or work surfaces lined with absorbent material.
Keep and transport radioactive materials doubly contained.
When moving a radioactive solution to another approved location, place
the solution in a covered secondary container to prevent a spill.
When moving radioactive material between non-connecting rooms, fluids
must be in closed containers to prevent spills and solids must be
completely enclosed. The exterior container must be free of
contamination. The transfer shall be made directly, such that radioactive
material is not carried about more than is necessary and is never left
unattended. Hard beta and gamma sources must be adequately shielded.
There are many other logical control measures that should be taken
when transporting radioactive materials, consider the following:
Bring protective clothing on your transportation journey (a minimum of
gloves) just in case you have a spill. Use absorbent in the transport
container and bring some extra absorbent material to recover from a
spill.
Carry a cell phone or have another person with you to ensure that you
can contact help if you need to. In case you are transporting a sensitive
source or sample and need assistance, contact the RSO for assistance.
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Newsletter 8 – Using Radiation Detectors
The only way to identify the immediate presence of ionizing radiation is
through the use of a radiation detector. There are many different types of
radiation detectors depending on the type and quantity of radiation you
must measure.
What kind of instrument do I need?
The type of instrument required for your application must take into
account the type of radiation emitted from the material or machine that
you are using, the energy of that radiation, and how much radiation is
emitted.
If you are using 3H or 63Ni, the energy of the beta radiation emissions
from these radionuclides is very low and a portable instrument is not
very useful to detect them. Control should be by the use of smears
counted on a liquid scintillation counter.
If you are using 99Tc, 33P, 32P, 35S, or 14C, a pancake GM is adequate for
contamination control because the energy of the beta emissions can be
detected with this type of instrument.
If you are using 241Am, 239Pu, or other alpha emitting radionuclide, the
most appropriate instrument may be an alpha scintillation detector for
contamination control.
If you are working with high intensity x-ray machines (analytical), the
most appropriate instrument is a thin wall ionization chamber. This type
detector will adequately alert you to a high dose rate hazard associated
with scatter from this type of machine.
If you have a new application or use for radioactive materials or radiation
producing machines, please contact me. I will evaluate your situation
and recommend the most appropriate instrument.
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What is the basic procedure to use an instrument?
Before you use any radiation detector to measure radiation you must:
1. Look at the instrument for damage,
2. Look at the calibration sticker to see if it is in calibration (the
calibration due date should be in the future),
3. Turn the instrument on and check the battery (there may be a battery
check position on the dial, or you may have to push a battery check
button),
4. Turn the instrument to the scale that you want to use and place the
detector over the check source. You should get a response as
indicated on the calibration sticker,
5. Write down the reading on the survey form for your laboratory.
What if the battery check indicates a less than satisfactory
reading?
In this case, don’t use the instrument until you change the batteries.
The readings will only be valid with a satisfactory battery check.
You can replace the batteries just as in a flashlight or TV remote control.
Find the compartment and identify the battery orientation. Remove the
old batteries and place the new batteries in the compartment – close the
battery compartment cover and once again check the batteries.
When do I have to take measurements?
You should take measurements each time that you use radioactive
materials or use a different scattering configuration for the radiation
producing machine. These measurements may be for dose rate or surface
contamination. The instrument will give you an idea if the magnitude of
dose rate or contamination where the measurement is taken. If
measurements are different than expected, contact the RSO.
What is background and why must I measure/record it?
Background radiation is the radiation emitted from the materials that
make up our earth and from materials and machines in our laboratories.
Any response from your instrument that is not what you want to
measure can be considered to be from background emissions. These
measurements should be subtracted from your readings of the things
that you do want to measure. The net result is the measurement that
you are interested in and all measurements must be recorded.
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What is the difference between dose rate and count rate?
Dose is the deposition of ionizing radiation energy in a material like our
bodies. Dose rate measurements from an instrument indicate how much
energy would be deposited in our bodies in a time period. The units of
measurements on dose rate meters are usually millirem/hour or microrem/hour.
Count rate is typically associated with the response of an instrument
designed to measure surface contamination. The “count rate” is due to
the number of radiation interactions in the detector per unit of time. The
unit of measurement for count rate meters is typically counts per minute
(CPM).
What do the readings mean?
If you have a dose rate meter, the reading on the meter is the dose rate in
the units for that meter setting (millirem/hour or rem/hour). Don’t forget
to use the scale multiplier. Take a reading outside of your laboratory –
this is the background dose rate. If the readings in your laboratory are
similar, you are only exposed to background radiations. The background
dose rate is usually less than 20 micro-rem/hour in our buildings and
outside. If you have dose rates in excess of 1 millirem/hour and the RSO
is not aware of your operation, please contact him or her. You may have
a condition that warrants further control measures.
If you have a contamination measurement instrument such as a pancake
GM detector, the reading indicates CPM or counts per minute. Take a
reading on a surface outside of your laboratory; this is background
(typically between 20 to 200 CPM for a beta/gamma instrument and 0 to
20 CPM for an alpha instrument.
How do I convert CPM to surface activity concentration?
The conversion of count rate to surface activity is dependent upon the
type and energy of the emissions from the radionuclides that you use in
your laboratory. The detector used will have different detection
efficiencies for the emissions from different radionuclides. This efficiency
is indicated in percent or in counts per disintegration.
Consider that the count rate from a smear is 2000 CPM, the radionuclide
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is 14C, background is 100 CPM and the detector is a Ludlum 44-9 probe.
The detection efficiency for this detector, for this radionuclide’s emission
is approximately 10% so the surface activity “seen” by the detector is
approximately:
A = (2000 CPM – 100 CPM) / 0.1 C/D
A = 19000 DPM.
19,000 DPM /60 Bq/DPM
A = 317 Bq
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Newsletter 9 – Laboratory Access
Laboratory access to the radiochemistry laboratories is strictly controlled
via proximity cards and keys to provide security for our instruments,
radioactive materials, and experiments.
Who has access to the radiochemistry laboratories?
General access to the laboratories is authorized by the Directors and
Primary Investigators of the HRC. People allowed access include faculty
and staff of the Nuclear Science and Technology Division, students in the
radiochemistry program, safety personnel who may provide an
emergency function, and visitors from other universities or national
laboratories working with the radiochemistry program.

CAUTION
Do not allow anyone that you do not know to use your proximity card.
Each card provides information to the proximity card tracking system
that identifies the card used to open any door. If you loan your card to
someone else and they are not trustworthy – you are responsible for any
loss of material, loss of instrument function, or damage to the laboratory
that was entered.
How are keys and proximity cards controlled?
The Radioactive Materials Laboratory Manager is responsible for
proximity card access to the laboratories through coordination with the
lock shop. The Facility Director controls key access to any part of the
Center. Laboratory access using keys is only allowed for emergency
purposes or special access to rooms that do not have proximity access.
What if I do not have a proximity card and need one?
Contact your supervisor and have them submit a key or proximity card
request. If they need assistance, then have them contact the RSO, or
Laboratory Manager. If your request is granted, a card will be delivered to
you within a week. If it is not, then you may contact the Laboratory
Manager to find out why.
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What if I need access to another room that was not on my
original authorization?
Similar to the authorization for a proximity card, contact the Laboratory
Manager and indicate your need. The need will be discussed with your
supervisor and you will be notified of the decision regarding your access
to the room.
What if someone else needs access and I have it? Can I let them in?
If someone that has access to the laboratories needs something from a
laboratory that they do not have access to, then consider the need and
provide access if the request is reasonable. However, if you allow
someone into a laboratory, ensure that you accompany them for the
whole time that they stay – otherwise don’t let them in. All authorized
people should be very cautious to only allow access to people that they
know and trust.
What if someone is outside of the laboratories and doesn’t have a
proximity card?
If the person does not have a proximity card and you don’t know them as
a part of the program, then have them contact the Authorized User for
the laboratory or the Laboratory Manager. Do not let anyone into the
laboratory area unless you absolutely know that they are allowed to be
there.
What if a maintenance technician needs access to fix something in
the laboratories?
In the case of an emergency, let them in and stay with them so that they
can check themselves out of the area. Be sure that our contamination
control measures are always followed. Contact the Laboratory Manager
immediately.
If it is not an emergency, then do not allow them to enter, contact one of
the Authorized Users so that the person can be escorted into the area
and assist them if equipment needs to be moved or turned off and so that
the can check themselves out of the area. The Laboratory Manager is the
primary contact for work in the laboratories.
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What if I find a door to one of the laboratories open or unlocked?
If a door is open and should be closed, close it. If a door is unlocked that
should be locked, then call the laboratory manager and let him/her know
about the door.
What if I see someone in the laboratory area that I have never
seen before?
In this case, introduce yourself and find out who they are. If they don’t
belong in the laboratories, then either ask them to leave or contact the
Laboratory Manager to help them find their way out of there.
Some Final Words:
Every person who does work in the Radioactive Materials laboratory area
is allowed to work there based on the fact that they received training and
understand that work in the laboratory is governed by a radioactive
materials license that defines controls. Compliance with the rules is not
an option, it is a necessity!
The risk associated with allowing unauthorized people to enter
laboratories without controls cannot be understated. The ability to do the
type of research that is allowed here is based on the ability to meet the
conditions of the radioactive materials license. It is up to each person
authorized to work in the laboratories to ensure license compliance so
that research can continue.
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Newsletter 10 – Personnel Contamination
Personnel decontamination methods should be of interest to all
personnel using radioactive materials. If you are an “Authorized or
Assistant User”, the people that you supervise are under your direct
care and as such may need your assistance for decontamination. If
there is any instance of personnel or clothing contamination ensure
that there is appropriate documentation of the event.
The most important response will ensure that the contaminated
person is not injured by the material either as a result of its
chemical or radiological properties. In most of our laboratories the
chemical properties of the materials handled will present the most
important hazard. If personnel are contaminated with chemicals,
ensure that there is immediate response to any event that may
cause injury.
In documentation identify the people involved, the radionuclide(s),
chemical form, activity, body location, skin area, and other
information pertinent to estimation of skin dose as a result of this
occurrence. If you have a camera, get a picture.
Please review this newsletter to identify the proper technique for
decontamination and your responsibilities should you, your
assistants,
visitors,
or
students,
experience
personnel
contamination.
Skin Contamination: Your Own or Someone Else's.
Upon finding contamination on the skin, use the proper survey
instrument for the radionuclide present to determine the highest contact
response rate and the highest response rate at 10 cm from the
contaminated body location. Use a Geiger counter, gas proportional
detector or scintillation detector, as appropriate and note the meter
readings (measured in counts per minute CPM) and the estimated size of
area that is contaminated.
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Do not use abrasive soaps or brushes to remove the contamination.
This may remove the protective layer of the skin, opening up the
body for intake.
Wash the contaminated area with soap and warm water. Cold water will
constrict the pores of the skin making it more difficult to remove the
contamination. However, hot water may expand the pores of your skin
that may allow the contamination to further penetrate the skin surface.
Notify the Radiation Laboratory Director or the RSO as soon as
possible.
After the first washing, re-survey the contaminated area, noting the
response and determine if the decontamination has caused a reduction
in the response of the meter.
If there has been no reduction, do not proceed with further
decontamination. Wait for the Authorized User or the RSO to assess the
contamination and prescribe any further actions.
If the contamination has been removed, record the information required
on form RSO-D1. Notify the Authorized User and the RSO of the event
and ensure that you have documentation of the individual’s name, date,
the model number of the instrument used, the maximum response of the
instrument used, duration of activity on the skin, location where the
event occurred, and reason for the contamination.
If the first decontamination attempt was somewhat successful, conduct
another wash (do not exceed two washes without the Authorized User or
the RSO present). After the second wash re-survey the area with the
appropriate contamination survey instrument and record the
instrument response and information similar to the previous paragraph.
After the contamination has been removed, the information will be sent
to the RSO who will document a dose assessment. Knowing the activity
of the material that was on the skin and the time it was there will
greatly assist in RSO's efforts to accurately estimate a skin dose.
Remember, contamination of the skin can be avoided with good
laboratory practices as well as using the appropriate personal protective
equipment such as laboratory coat, gloves, etc.
Clothing Contamination
Remove contaminated items immediately. Monitor the skin under the
contaminated clothing. If skin is contaminated, use the skin
decontamination procedure. Place all clothing items that are
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contaminated in a bag and label with the individual’s name, date,
radionuclide used, the type of meter used (model and serial number),
and the count rate observed.
Notify the Radiation Laboratory Director or the UNLV RSO as soon
as possible.
Contamination of the Eyes
NOTE: Chemical contamination of the eyes is the greatest threat
to loss of sight and must be of primary concern.
Immediately flush eye(s) with water. Evaluate the results of the flushing
periodically to determine its effectiveness. Do not flush more than twice
without one of the HRC Users or the RSO present. Each flushing
should not exceed 2 minutes.
If there is apparent damage and sight is not immediately restored, notify
a physician! Call 911 for emergency assistance.
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Newsletter 11 – Protective Clothing
Protective clothing is worn when working with radioactive materials to
prevent contamination of the skin and minimize the spread of
contamination from the work area.
When working with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry
laboratories, always wear your laboratory coat, gloves, and safety glasses
as the minimum PPE (Personal Protective Equipment). Consult your User
for additional requirements.
The UNLV Radiation Safety Manual provides the following guidance
for protective clothing use (page 21):
"F. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING POLICY
1. Personnel working in areas designated on laboratory maps where
radioactive materials are in use or stored must wear protective
garments. Open toed shoes and sandals are not permitted. The usual
laboratory coat and disposable gloves are considered minimum
fulfillment of this requirement. Persons working with greater than 1
mCi of an unsealed source of radioactivity must cover their legs with
pants or a long skirt to protect them against absorption of activity in
the case of a spill. Additional protective garments may be required by
the User or the UNLV RSO.
2. Maintenance/custodial personnel shall receive access clearance and
protective clothing requirement instructions prior to entering and
working in designated radioactive material storage and use areas."
Protective clothing is the responsibility of the Authorized User of
radioactive materials. If there is ever a question about the need for more
than the minimum requirement the appropriate User for the material
that you are using should be contacted.
Every effort must be made to use engineering controls to ensure that
personnel are not exposed to unnecessary levels of airborne radioactive
materials. In the unusual case where engineering controls are not
available or cannot provide adequate control, respiratory protection may
be required. If respirators are required, you must be medically evaluated
to ensure that the respirator will not damage your respiratory system,
you must be fit tested, and you must be trained to use the specific
respirator that you will wear.
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Check Your Protective Clothing Before Wearing It!
Any time that you will be wearing protective clothing; take the time to
ensure that it will provide the proper protection.
For gloves, check to ensure that they do not have holes and are not
degraded to where they will develop holes or tears when you wear them.
For laboratory coats, leg covers, or coveralls, ensure that they do not
have holes or rips in the fabric. If you are using liquids, wear a fabric
that will not allow transmission of the liquid to you or your clothing.
®

Plastic clothing or Tyvek will usually provide this protection.
For face masks, ensure that they do not obscure your vision as a result
of scratches in the mask. Also, ensure that the head straps are adequate
to hold the mask firmly in position over your face.
For respirators, check to ensure that the mask is clear, the straps are
not worn or abraded, the inlet and outlet valve work properly, and you
get a tight fit each time that you wear one.
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Newsletter 12 – Ventilation of Radiological Laboratories at HRC
Laboratories where radioactive materials are used or stored have
ventilation requirements to minimize or prevent inhalation or ingestion of
radioactive materials. This ventilation may be provided by a chemical
fume hood approved for the radionuclides and/or chemicals used in the
laboratory.
The following are details of the UNLV Chemical Fume Hood Guide:
Facilities Maintenance Personnel shall contact the person responsible for
the laboratory to schedule service, and shall not enter a laboratory or
area posted for radiation safety unless accompanied by the authorized
user or Radiological Safety Office personnel. Written Radiological Safety
Officer (RSO) approval shall be posted on a radiological hood prior to
servicing.
Any person working on or assisting with fume hood repairs in radioactive
materials laboratories must be under the direct supervision of the
responsible laboratory director or a member of the Radiation Safety
Office staff. The only exception is work that has the specific written
approval of the RSO.
The RSO shall routinely monitor fume hoods during inspections, routine
surveys, at the request of the authorized user, or prior to scheduled
repair or maintenance.
The authorized user of radioactive materials
radioactive materials used in hoods as follows:

shall

control

Radioactive materials shall be secured against unauthorized removal,
and all surfaces decontaminated and surveyed to assure that no
contamination remains when unattended. This is to ensure that no
radiation hazard is present during routine non-scheduled maintenance
activities.
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The authorized user or his assistants shall promptly notify the RSO
of any spill, accident, or any operation which may have
contaminated the hood or released any contamination through the
hood to ductwork or air in an uncontrolled area. THIS IS
IMPORTANT!
The ventilation systems in the radioactive materials laboratories
discharge through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) systems.
Surveys
If you do work with radioactive materials in a hood you should recognize
that some materials may easily spread from the work location to other
parts of the hood because of turbulence and air movement in the hood.
OBJECTS SHOULD NOT BE PLACED AT THE REAR OF THE HOOD
WHERE THEY MIGHT IMPEDE AIR FLOW.
Smear surveys should be done in the hood right after any use of
radioactive materials especially if work is done with other materials that
are not radioactive.
A hood is not necessarily a shield for your material and high activity
gamma or neutron emitting sources may cause high dose rates on the
other side of the wall that the hood is mounted on.
REMEMBER THAT ANY TIME YOU CAN SMELL A CHEMICAL OR
SOLVENT, YOU ARE BEING EXPOSED TO THAT SUBSTANCE.
NOTIFY YOUR SUPERVISOR IMMEDIATELY IF YOU THINK THAT
THERE COULD BE A PROBLEM WITH A LABORATORY HOOD!
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Newsletter 13 – Postings for Radiation Safety
This month's newsletter discusses how areas and materials are labeled
or posted to provide awareness of potential hazards. Signs are used to
identify the presence of radioactive materials or radiation producing
devices in rooms or buildings on campus. Labels are used to identify the
radionuclides, activity, or hazard class of radioactive materials or the
emission location for x-rays from a machine.
Rooms or buildings where radioactive materials are used or stored are
posted with a "Caution Radioactive Materials" sign. This type of sign may
have many different phrases. A typical sign on campus where radioactive
materials are used may be as follows: A common feature of radiation
safety signs is the trefoil, the international symbol for radiation or
radioactive materials. The trefoil is usually magenta on a yellow
background but may be red on yellow or black on white or silver.
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Areas where the dose rate is greater than 5 mrem/hour are posted
"Caution - Radiation Area". If the dose rate is greater than 100
mrem/hour, the area is posted "Caution - High Radiation Area". We do
not have any High Radiation Areas or Very High Radiation Areas in the
Radiochemistry Laboratories. The posting for a radiation area may be as
follows:
When you are in a laboratory where a radiation area exists from a source
or a radiation producing machine, be aware of the location of the highest
dose rates and minimize the time that you might be close to the source
or to the location where radiation is emitted from a machine.
Use time, distance, and shielding to minimize your dose when in these
areas!

252

There may be any number of ways a source of radioactive material is
labeled. A typical label indicates the radionuclide, activity, and dose rate
at a specific distance from the material.

X-ray machines are required to be posted with specific wording to alert
the patient and the operator of a potential radiation hazard.

Other signs and labels may be used on campus to identify radioactive
materials or the existence of radiation at levels higher than normal
background radiation. Be aware of the postings and labels used, the
location of sources of radiation, and how to minimize your dose. If you
have questions, please call an Authorized User or the RSO!
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Newsletter 14 – Radioactive Materials Regulations
All people using radioactive materials at UNLV are required to ensure
that the regulations of the State of Nevada and our radioactive materials
license are complied with. This newsletter provides you with some simple
reasons why these regulations are important and the ways that
compliance is typically achieved.
Why is radioactive material licensed?
Most governments require the control of radioactive materials or
radiation producing devices to ensure that they are used safely and their
use does not cause harm to other people or to the environment.
Radioactive material licenses require the submission of an application
that describes what material is licensed, why the material is required,
how the material will be controlled to prevent unnecessary exposure of
people, safety procedures, emergency procedures, worker’s training and
experience, facility diagrams, personnel and facility monitoring
information, and environmental protection.
What regulations govern work with radioactive materials at
UNLV?
The State Radiological Health Section in accordance with the provisions
of NAC 459.010 through 459.794 regulates radiation sources at UNLV,
and has specified its own rules and regulations for the control of
radioactive material and radiation producing devices (RPDs).
These regulations are available at the RSO offices and on the
internet at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/NAC/NAC-459.html.
While regulations may be subject to interpretation, they are interpreted
by the regulators in the strictest possible way for UNLV because we are
expected to be working with these materials correctly and by the rules. In
the words of a regulator, we set the example for our students and thus
we are “held to a higher standard”.
The State of Nevada issued UNLV our radioactive materials licenses. It is
required that we not only abide by the regulations, but that we also
conduct our work with radioactive materials in accordance with our
license and license conditions.
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What is a radioactive materials license?
This is a privilege bestowed upon the University to enable the use of
radioactive materials for research. UNLV has two radioactive materials
licenses to enable use and storage of radioactive materials and also to
provide radioactive material analysis services to customers outside of the
University.
The license indicates how much of each radionuclide we are allowed to
have in our possession, who the Radiation Safety Officer is and what
his/her qualifications are, how we will work with radioactive materials,
and where we will work with these materials.
How does UNLV comply with these regulations?
UNLV has established a Radiation Safety Office to be headed by a
qualified Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) who is responsible for developing
and implementing policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the
regulations (with approval from the State Radiological Health Section).
The RSO is directly responsible to the State of Nevada in all matters of
radiation safety.
The RSO is specifically indicated by name on the Radioactive Materials
License as the supervisor of all radioactive materials use and radiation
producing machine operation on the campus. Any operations that are
considered out of compliance by the RSO may be paused or terminated
by the RSO to ensure that we will achieve compliance.
The Radiation Safety Office ensures that training is provided to all UNLV
personnel that use radioactive materials or radiation producing
machines (X-ray machines, lasers, particle accelerators, etc.); maintains
inventories of radioactive materials, evaluates areas where radioactive
materials and machines that produce radiation are used, collects
radioactive waste for proper disposal, provides personnel dosimetry, and
maintains records of personnel radiation exposure.
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What is the RSO’s job?
According to the Nevada Administrative Code, the Radiation Safety
Officer shall:
(a) Investigate overexposures, accidents, spills, thefts, unauthorized
receipts, uses, transfers, disposals, mis-administrations and other
deviations from approved radiation safety practices and implement
corrective actions as necessary.
(b) Establish and implement written policies and procedures for:
(1) Authorizing the procurement of radioactive material;
(2) Receiving and opening packages of radioactive material;
(3) Storing radioactive material;
(4) Keeping inventory of radioactive material;
(5) Safely using radioactive material;
(6) Taking action if radioactive material is lost;
(7) Performing surveys of radiation periodically;
(8) Performing checks of instruments for surveying;
(9) Performing checks of other safety equipment;
(10) Training personnel who work in restricted areas or are
otherwise occupationally exposed to radiation; and
(c) Brief management at least once per year on the usage of radioactive
material at the facility;
(d) Establish levels of exposure for personnel which, when exceeded, will
be investigated by the radiation safety officer to determine the cause of
the exposure and methods that can be used to prevent recurrence of the
exposure; and
(e) If the licensee has a committee on radiation safety, assist the
committee in the performance of its duties.
What are the consequences of non-compliance?
If anyone at UNLV fails to provide compliance with regulations for the
safe use of radioactive materials or radiation producing machines, we
(UNLV) could lose our authorization to use these materials or machines.
Any research that requires use of these materials or devices would be
required to stop and perhaps continue at another University.
Usually before a regulator will take an action such as this, the offending
licensee would be allowed to show reason why they should be allowed to
continue working with radiation.
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How do we prove that we have complied with regulations?
Compliance with regulations is demonstrated by maintaining records
that show that we have: properly evaluated all radiation hazards, taken
precautions to protect our personnel, taken precautions to protect the
environment, and have trained all personnel to protect themselves from
unnecessary radiation exposure.
If you are working with radioactive materials, the surveys that you do of
your work area and laboratory are very important to demonstrate that
we provide compliance with the regulations. Please ensure that these are
done and documented regularly.
All people working with radioactive materials or that provided services to
laboratories where radioactive materials are used must ensure that their
training and experience provide for the safe use of these materials. The
intent of our radioactive material licenses are to provide for the
protection of ourselves and the people that we work with, always keep
these thoughts in mind when working with radiation producing devices
or materials.
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Newsletter 15 – X-ray Producing Devices
Two new x-ray producing machines were obtained by the Radiochemistry
Program in 2007 to provide new sample analysis capability for the
nuclear group.
These machines are located in the radiation laboratories and provide for:
X-ray diffraction analysis of powders, and
X-ray crystallography analysis of single crystals.
X-Ray Diffraction (XRD) is a non-destructive technique for analyzing a
wide range of materials, including fluids, metals, minerals, polymers,
catalysts, plastics, pharmaceuticals, thin-film coatings, ceramics and
semiconductors. Throughout industry and research institutions, XRD
has become a useful method for materials investigation, characterization
and quality control. Example areas of application include qualitative and
quantitative phase analysis, crystallography, structure and relaxation
determination, texture and residual stress investigations, controlled
sample environment, micro-diffraction, nano-materials, laboratory, and
process automation, and high-throughput polymorph screening.
Figure 1 - Powder XRD
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Chemical Crystallography
Chemical Crystallography provides accurate and precise measurements
of molecular dimensions in a way that no other science can begin to
approach. Historically, single crystal X-ray diffraction was used to
determine the structure of what was thought of as "small molecules".
Twenty years ago, it was possible to solve structures with an average of
only 100 non-hydrogen atoms. However, thanks to developments in
hardware and software, the upper limit has risen to about 500 and
recently, even a 1000-atom structure was solved. Chemical
crystallographers study compounds which are both of chemical and
biological interest - new synthetic chemicals, catalysts, pharmaceuticals,
natural products, minerals... and more.

Figure 2 - Single Crystal XRD
What are the radiation hazards associated with these machines?
X-ray diffraction machines generate very large numbers of very low
energy x-rays. The x-rays interact with the material under investigation
to provide information about the structure of the material, so as you can
imagine, the primary beam dose rates are very high and represent the
most important hazard in the machine. This hazard is only within the
cabinet of the machine and the x-ray beam is “turned off” when the
cabinet is opened due to an interlock on the doors. Operators should
always ensure that the x-ray beam did turn off when the cabinet was
opened and never attempt to defeat the door interlocks.
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A survey was done when we first received the machines in order to
assess the radiation levels outside of the machines during operation. The
readings all indicated only a background response and no indication of
x-rays penetrating the cabinet walls or doors of the machines.
Are there other potential hazards associated with this room or the
XRD instruments?
Yes, some of the sample preparation equipment and some of the
operation support equipment may present a hazard to researchers or
people who enter an XRD laboratory.
During sample preparation for single crystal analysis, the preparer will
heat up a glass rod and pull it to a very fine point for mounting the
sample. The heating uses an open flame and is done on a desk inside the
XRD laboratory. The sample preparer must be careful to abide by fire
safety regulations and the glass sample holder is very sharp and
represents a potential “stick” hazard.
General Safety in the XRD Laboratories
Everyone should immediately recognize that the XRD laboratories are
very small and more than 3 people in the laboratories may present an
overcrowding situation where things may get bumped or spilled. In order
to minimize the probability of a spill with powders or crystals, you should
minimize the amount of material brought into the room and ensure that
you are working with only what you need.
Gasses are used to provide cooling to the single crystal detector (liquid
nitrogen), and provide fuel for the torch (oxygen and propane). Be sure
that any gas tank is properly secured so that it will not fall over and that
all connections are appropriate.
Radioactive Materials in XRD Samples
If the samples contain radioactive materials, then there is a concern that
a spread of contamination is possible. All areas where the samples have
been prepared or have resided, should be evaluated for the presence of
radioactive contamination after each use. Since the samples that are
being analyzed have only small amounts of activity, the contamination
will not present much of a hazard to personnel, but we do have to keep
track of all material and control is necessary for license compliance.
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Newsletter 16 – Instrument Calibration and Periodic Checks
Portable Instruments are used in all radioactive material laboratories for
control of radioactive contamination.
What is Instrument Calibration?
Calibration is simply a verification of proper operation and adjustment to
ensure that the value of a response is the same as the expected response
from the same energy emission. Calibration of our portable
contamination control instruments is done by the UNLV Radiation Safety
Office and calibration of dose measuring instruments is done at a facility
certified to provide that function.
When are Portable Instruments Required?
Instruments are required in laboratories that have emissions that are
detectable by portable instruments. For example, laboratories that use
normal form radionuclides such as 99Tc, 233U, 238U, 241Am, 239Pu, must
have an instrument in their laboratory to aid in control of radioactive
contamination.
How Often is Calibration Required?
Portable instruments are required to be calibrated annually or when
significant changes are made in the detector assembly or when repairs
are made. Calibration is not required if only the batteries are changed or
the same type GM tube is used to replace a broken GM tube.
How do I know when an instrument has been calibrated last?
Each instrument has a sticker attached to the side of the instrument
case that indicates, who calibrated it, when it was calibrated, when it is
due for calibration, and who the instrument belongs to.
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How Often are Periodic Checks Required?
Each time an instrument is used a check must be made to ensure that it
responds to radiation as it did when it was calibrated. This is a
requirement in the Nevada Administrative Code. In order to demonstrate
this requirement, a record of each check should be documented.
A radiation detection instrument is the only way to identify the presence
of radiation or measure its intensity. You should always:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Check the instrument that you are about to use for damage.
Check the battery to ensure it is OK to use.
Check the response to ensure that it responds to radiation.
Place it in a safe and ready position for the next person.

What if the Instrument is Contaminated?
If the response of the instrument is above 100 cpm, then it may be
possible that the instrument screen or detector face are contaminated.
DO NOT ATTEMPT TO CLEAN IT YOURSELF! Please contact me so
that I can clean the detector.
What kind of Documentation is Required for Instrument Checks?
Whenever an instrument is checked, that check must be documented.
Remember, if you did not write it down, you did not do it. Checks of
portable instruments are documented on form RSO-IC.
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Newsletter 17 – Background Radiation
Many of the natural elements on the earth have unstable isotopes that
emit radiation during radioactive decay. The radiation emitted may be
alpha particles, beta particles, or x-rays or gamma rays (photons).
Because we live on the earth, our bodies are always exposed to radiation.
The largest source of natural background radiation exposure to humans
is terrestrial radon, a colorless, odorless, chemically inert gas that causes
approximately 55% of our average non-occupational exposure.
There is another source of background radiation that we are exposed to,
and it originates in outer space. Cosmic radiation interacts with our
atmosphere and causes particles and rays that penetrate to the surface
of the earth.
"Everything on this planet, including every living thing, is bathed in a sea
of radiation from these sources. This is commonly referred to as 'natural
background', 'background radiation', or more simply, 'background'" NUREG 1501.
Wherever you are on the earth, on the average, thousands of photons
impinge on your body every second, and some interact and deposit
energy. In addition, we breathe, drink, and eat radioactive atoms because
of natural activity in the soil, food, water, and air. Our background
radiation exposure in the course of a year is approximately 360 millirem.
In addition to natural sources of radiation, people are exposed to
manmade sources of ionizing radiation such as x-rays in dental and
medical facilities. Manmade sources provide only a fraction of the dose
that non-radiation workers typically receive from natural sources.
Depending on your job in radiation work you may receive up to 5000
millirem in a year. Under very unusual circumstances, limits may be
even higher.
Total of all Sources - Natural + Man-made = 360 millirem
This information is from Regulatory Guide 8.29 by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission - February 1996. The NCRP reported in report
160 that medical exposure increased to the point where it causes an
average of 50% of the annual exposure of the people of the United States
(2006). From this information, the total annual dose from all sources is
720 millirem.
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What effect does background radiation have on my job?
The primary effect that background has on our ability to control
radioactive materials is the nuisance that it provides when we monitor an
area or a person. Background radiation causes a response on our
instruments that is not related to the activity we are trying to control. If
this response is minimized, we can more accurately measure any low
activity material that may be present in the radioactive materials work
area.
For example, consider that you are working in an area with
concentrations of radioactive material that are very low. The bench that
you are working on is made of a mineral that contains low levels of
natural activity and the walls and floor of the building are made of
concrete (that also contains low levels of natural activity).
When we place your dosimetry on a rack near your work area, the
dosimetry is exposed to natural emissions from radioactive material in
the floor and walls of the structure. We also place control badges that
monitor all emissions that the rack is exposed to, so that we can subtract
the background exposure from the badge you are wearing to get your
occupational exposure (the dose that the badge accumulated while on
your body). If the control is lost or not turned in with the badges that we
wear, the dose on the control badge cannot be subtracted so the
resultant dose on our badges is higher.
So you see, background emissions do affect our ability to monitor
emissions from the materials we work with. The typical control badge on
a dosimetry rack at UNLV accumulates approximately 15 to 45 millirem
during a monitoring period (2 months).
How can I minimize the response due to background when I am
surveying my work area?
The best way is to ensure that usable radioactive materials are not in the
work area when you survey. This will reduce the number of emissions
that may cause a response in your detector. Another way is to shield
your detector from the work area. Let’s say you are using the portable
instrument to count your smears. If the detector is shielded from the
work area, the response from source emissions in the area will be lower
and your ability to detect low level activity on the smears will be
enhanced.
You use the same methods to minimize background exposure to your
equipment as you use to protect yourself from external radiation
exposure; time, distance, and shielding.
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Is Background Radiation Harmful?
Background radiations, alpha, beta, gamma, x-ray, and subatomic
particles, are the same as radiations emitted from man-made radioactive
materials or radiation producing machines. Since humans have always
been exposed to radiation, it may be an important part of our existence
to be exposed to low level radiation.
To say background radiation is "harmful" would be difficult since it is an
effect associated with a phenomena that may actually sustain life or even
make biological (human) systems stronger. However, for radiation
protection purposes, we consider that any radiation exposure may be
harmful and that all exposure to radiation should be justified.
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Newsletter 18 – Liquid Scintillation Counters

Many of the radionuclides
used in research at HRC
may
require
analysis
('counting")
using
a
Liquid
Scintillation
Counter (LSC), and use of
the LSC is very common
in
surveys
and
contamination
control.
Sample preparation may
be simple or complicated,
but operation of the
instrument is usually
straightforward.
The
activity that can be
detected is very low, and
samples with very little
activity
can
yield
excellent data.
How does a liquid scintillation counter work?
A liquid scintillation counter (LSC) is a simple device that measures the
amount and the energy of light pulses given off by chemicals after
excitation by energetic particles (radiation). The sample is dissolved,
suspended, or otherwise thoroughly mixed with a solvent and a "fluor"—
from "fluoresce" (another organic compound), and other additives such
as surfactants and emulsifiers. These chemicals may or may not be
regulated as hazardous.
The radiation imparts energy to the solvent, which in turn imparts
energy to the fluor. The fluor can return to a stable state by emitting
light, and it is these tiny light emissions that are detected by
photomultiplier tubes in the counter. The amount of light emitted by the
fluor is proportional to the amount of activity in the sample, and the
energy of the light produced is proportional to the energy of the radiation.
Thus both qualitative and quantitative analyses are possible.
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The photomultiplier tubes (PM tubes) which detect the tiny light
emissions are very heavily shielded, as is the sample compartment, to
reduce the instrument's response to background radiation. The
instruments are thus very heavy. Great care should be taken in moving
these instruments.
All work at this time in the Radiochemistry Laboratories use an
environmentally friendly cocktail from Perkin Elmer called Ultima Gold.
This cocktail has a much higher flash point, is non-volatile (has a very
low vapor pressure), has low toxicity, is biodegradable, and is classified
as non-flammable. This cocktail is recommended for all future work at
the radiochemistry laboratories. If a different cocktail is desired, it must
be evaluated by the Authorized User or the UNLV Radiation Safety Office.
Where can I prepare samples for the LSC?
In the Harry Reid Center, samples containing radioactive liquids may
only be prepared in the radiochemistry laboratories where work with
normal form radioactive a material (liquids, powders, or gases) is
allowed. Samples for liquid scintillation counting should never be
prepared in the LSC laboratory as a spill may affect not only your
results but the results of others as well.
How sensitive are they?
Liquid scintillation counters have very good sensitivity to directly ionizing
radiation (alpha and beta particles). They have moderate sensitivity to
indirectly ionizing radiation such as gamma and x-ray radiation.
The background response is typically very low (less than 50 counts per
minute) and the detection efficiency very high (more than 50%). As a
result these detectors can detect as low as a few picocuries in a 10
minute count.
Are there safety hazards associated with their operation?
If operated properly, there are no safety hazards associated with LSC's.
Some instruments have an internal calibration source, usually Cs-137,
on the order of 20 to 30 μCi. These are well shielded and manipulated
mechanically. Never try to remove an LSC source, and notify the
radioactive material user or the RSO if background counts increase
suddenly. The calibration source may be leaking or another source in the
area may be causing this response.
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Sample conveyor apparatus can move suddenly, but mechanical hazards
are few. Never take the LSC apart as high voltages (~2000 volts) are
required to run the photomultiplier tubes. Samples with very high dose
rates should never be run in an LSC (not only for personal protection)
because the photomultiplier tubes would be damaged.
Chemicals used may be toxic, flammable, corrosive, or all three, and
must be handled carefully. Know your radionuclides and your chemicals,
and treat both with appropriate respect. Always use secondary
containers to contain spills, and always clean up any spills as soon as
practical. Double check the screw caps of the vials for tightness, but do
not over tighten to the point of stripping threads. Wear gloves and
appropriate personal protective equipment.
What type of vials should I use?
There are a few different options here. Glass vials or plastic vials and 20
ml or 7 ml. Since we work in an analysis laboratory (MSM-242) where
sample preparation is not allowed and every precaution should be taken
to prevent spills, plastic vials are strongly encouraged. Also, since we
would always like to minimize consumption of LSC cocktail and also
minimize the creation of radioactive waste, the smaller vials are
encouraged.
However, everyone has special needs for their research and that
consideration is the most important. The sensitivity of the LSC for your
particular needs may require the use of the larger size glass vials. It is
necessary that you evaluate your needs and consider the issues of waste
creation and accident avoidance.
Are there regulatory issues associated with LSC media?
There may be. Recall that some chemicals in the cocktails may be
regulated as hazardous materials. The solvents used in some of the
common LSC cocktails have a low flash point (are flammable) and are not
biodegradable. These become hazardous wastes. When radionuclides are
present, these materials become mixed waste. The pickup of these
wastes starts a regulatory clock. They cannot be stored indefinitely,
they cannot be treated, and they cannot be rendered non-hazardous.
Disposal of mixed waste is very expensive.
Short-lived radionuclides can be allowed to decay, but long-lived nuclides
may present a problem with the creation of mixed waste. This is not to
say that these regulated chemicals cannot be used in LSC cocktails,
268

when in the judgment of the researcher no satisfactory substitute can be
found. In such a case, provision for the disposal of mixed waste should
be made PRIOR to its generation, and sufficient funds be made available
for disposal. There is no typical provision in the Radiological Safety
Office budget for the disposal of mixed waste.
What do I do with the samples after the analysis?
WAIT!! Don't just throw your samples into a bag! Don't throw
samples into the clean waste or the radioactive waste! Please place
the samples in the box that the vials came in from the
manufacturer.
There are some important considerations here as well. One is “can
you recycle the material in the samples?” If recycling is possible, it
may save many thousands of dollars of your research funds. Even 10
mg of 239Pu is $5,000.00.
If recycling is not possible, place a waste information log on the box
indicating the radionuclide(s), the activity, and your initials. Place the
vials into their cardboard racks, and place them in the liquid waste
disposal area in MSM-163. The RSO will pick up the vials and the liquid
waste and the attendant paperwork.
There are many issues associated with the use of an LSC for sample
analysis. However, the information collected from this incredible analysis
tool can be tremendous.
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Newsletter 19 – Transportation of Radioactive Materials
Radioactive material has been shipped in the U. S. for more than 50
years with no occurrences of death or serious injury from exposure to the
contents of these shipments.
As you can see from this table, there are thousands of shipments of
hazardous material in the US each day. All radioactive shipments in the
United States are regulated by the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Since transport accidents cannot be prevented, the regulations
are primarily designed to:
•
Ensure safety in routine handling situations for minimally
hazardous material
•
Ensure package integrity under all circumstances for highly
dangerous materials.
These goals are accomplished by focusing on the packaging and its
ability to:
•
•
•

Contain the material (prevent leaks)
Prevent unusual occurrences (such as criticality)
Reduce external radiation to safe levels (provide shielding)
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How is radioactive material packaged for transport on highways?
There are many different types of packaging used for radioactive
materials, some are simple packages such as boxes or cans, more robust
packaging such as tested drums or even steel canisters are used for very
high levels of radioactive material.
Excepted Packaging is designed to
survive
normal
conditions
of
transport.
Excepted packaging is used for
transportation of materials that are
either Low Specific Activity (LSA)
or Surface Contaminated Objects
(SCO) and that are limited quantity
shipments, instruments or articles,
articles manufactured from natural
or depleted uranium or natural
thorium; empty packaging is also
excepted (49CFR 173.421-428).
Excepted packaging can be almost
any packaging that meets the basic
requirements, with any of the above contents. They are excepted from
several labeling and documentation requirements. Most of the material
that we ship to other locations are shipped in excepted packages.
Industrial Packaging (IP) is designed to survive normal conditions of
transport (IP-1) and at least the drop test and stacking test for Type A
packaging (IP-2 and IP3).
Industrial packaging (IP) is used for transportation of materials with very
small amounts of radioactivity (Low Specific Activity [LSA] or Surface
Contaminated Objects [SCO]). Industrial packaging (IP) is usually metal
boxes or drums.

Type A Packaging is designed to survive normal transportation,
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handling, and minor accidents. They are used for the transportation of
quantities of radioactive material (RAM) that would not result in
significant health effects if they were released. Type A packaging may be
cardboard boxes, wooden crates, or drums. The shipper and carrier must
have documentation of the certification of the packages being
transported.
Type B packaging must be able to survive severe accidents. They are
used for the transportation of large quantities of radioactive material. A
Type B packaging may be a metal drum or a huge, massive shielded
transport container. Type B packaging must meet severe accident
performance standards that are considerably more rigorous than those
required for Type A packages.
What about labeling?
Labeling radioactive materials is as important as packaging for the
prevention of problems. Markings on the package detail the proper
shipping name, an emergency response identification number, the
shipper’s name and address and any other relevant information.
Labels are placed on opposite sides of a package to identify the contents
and activity level. The label is determined by the type of material shipped
and radiation levels of the package’s contents. Labels also provide a
hazard index to ensure correct handling. Shippers use one of three
labels; Radioactive White, Radioactive Yellow II or Radioactive Yellow III.
Shipments with extremely low levels of radioactivity may be excluded
from labeling requirements.
In some cases, there is also a requirement for the vehicle transporting
radioactive materials to have a placard on the front, rear and sides.
How do I ship Radioactive Material?
If you are asking this question, the answer is quite simply, you can’t! Any
person who ships radioactive material must be trained to do so. Any
person who presents radioactive material for shipment or assists in the
preparation of packages for shipment must be trained in accordance with
49CFR (Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
The way that you ship radioactive material is to provide your material to
a trained shipper. The shipper will get all important information from you
and prepare the package and its labeling in accordance with 49CFR. The
shipper will then take the package to a transportation company (such as
FedEx) and put the material on the road.
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What are the Consequences of Not Shipping IAW 49CFR?
Shipping radioactive material correctly is extremely important. Proper
packaging and labeling have prevented many problems from occurring
and are responsible for the excellent safety record of radioactive material
shipping over the years. Consider the following sign from a FedEx office:
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Newsletter 20 - Emergency Equipment in the HRC Radioactive Material
Laboratory Areas
As you work in the radiochemistry laboratories, you focus on your
projects and only think of emergency equipment when you need it.
However, you should be aware of what is in the laboratories, how to use
it, and how to ensure that it is always available when you need it. During
some recent inspections of the laboratories we found emergency
equipment that was made unavailable because of actions taken by
someone that demonstrated a failure to understand the need for that
equipment.
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The emergency equipment map is placed on the entry door to the
laboratories and is located at each phone throughout the laboratories.
This should serve as a continuous reminder to be aware of the location of
all emergency equipment and ensure that you do not prevent the use of
this equipment by obstructing its location or depleting its resources. If
any of the emergency resources that we have are not available, please
contact Gary, Ken, Trevor, or me so that we can get it back.
Emergency Showers – There are six emergency showers in the
laboratory area, two in MSM-165, one in MSM-164, one in MSM-167,
and two in the hallways on either side of MSM-165. No one should ever
block access to any of the showers. These showers are fed by a dedicated
water line and are tested every week to ensure that they are available.
Eye Wash Stations – There are four permanent eye wash stations and
several smaller eye wash bottles in the laboratory area. No one should
ever block access to these stations by putting things in front of the
handle that operates the water flow or preventing immediate access to
the water.
Fire Extinguishers – There are 17 fire extinguishers placed throughout
the laboratories and hallways in the first floor laboratory area. Fire
extinguishers are checked weekly. If you use a fire extinguisher, please
make sure that it is put aside for recharging and not put back in its
“ready” position. Never change the location of a fire extinguisher.
Fire Pull Boxes – There are three (3) fire pull boxes located in the
hallways between the laboratories at the location of the emergency exits.
Fire Blankets – There are three (3) large fire blankets. Large fire
blankets, for use in laboratory and industrial situations, are often made
of wool (sometimes treated with a flame retardant fluid). These blankets
are mounted in vertical quick-release cabinets so that they can be easily
pulled out and wrapped round a person whose clothes are on fire.
Alternatively, they could be used to smother a small fire. The fire
blankets are located at the control point adjacent to the PCM, outside of
MSM-164, and in MSM-168 near the source storage room.
First Aid Kits – There are ten (10) first aid kits in the laboratory area,
nine in the laboratories and one in the hallway outside of MSM-164. The
contents of each kit are checked monthly. If you use the contents of a
kit, please let Trevor know that it needs replenishment.
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Telephones – Each laboratory has a telephone. The numbers are as
follows:
This section lists the phone number for each laboratory.
Emergency Exits
There are four (4) emergency exits from the laboratory area and one
designated emergency exit from MSM-173 – near the PCM. These exits
are for emergency exit only. They must not be used for routine access
and egress from the laboratories in order to ensure that contamination
control of the facility is maintained.
Evacuation
If there is an emergency situation in the laboratory area or in case of a
fire in the main building, put your work in a safe configuration and leave
the area. As you exit the building, warn others of the situation and the
need to leave the area. Take a contamination control detector with you.
Gather outside of the laboratories near the entrance to MSM-162 if
possible. Avoid contact with others before you check yourself for
contamination. At this location, you should survey yourself and allow
others to do the same so that you can all verify that you are free of
radioactive contamination.
Emergency Phone Numbers
Name: Here you should list the name and contact information for all
personnel crucial to the response and recovery from the accident.
Medical or Fire
Radiation Safety Officer Occupational Safety Officer Biological Safety
Officer Laboratory Safety Officer Fire and Life Safety Officer
In case of an injury in the laboratories, contact the laboratory
manager and the laboratory director immediately. In case of a
contaminated and injured person (life threatening injuries) do not
delay medical treatment for radiological contamination control. If
hospital care is required, be sure that a radiation safety trained
individual accompanies or meets the contaminated patient to the
hospital (with radiation detection equipment) and the RSO is
notified immediately.
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Newsletter 21 – Access to Laboratories Containing Radioactive Materials
Laboratories containing radioactive materials are "controlled to ensure
the security of radioactive materials and to prevent unnecessary
exposure of personnel to radiation".
While this concept is very simple, in practice, preventing unauthorized
access to rooms containing radioactive materials is sometimes difficult.
Everyone must be aware of the rules in order to ensure that the meaning
of the term unauthorized access is understood by all.
So what is unauthorized access?
If you are not a member of the radiation safety staff or you are not a
member of a professor's laboratory staff or if you are a member of one of
these groups but have not received your annual radiation safety training,
you are not authorized to enter a laboratory where radioactive material is
in use.
What about laboratory visitors?
Visitors to the radiochemistry laboratories must be escorted at all times.
The escort must be a trained member of the Radiochemistry Program
staff. An Authorized User or the Laboratory Manager must be aware of
any tours.
Visitors may become radiation workers for collaborative work with HRC
scientists. All work with radioactive materials must be done under the
authorization of a UNLV Authorized Radioactive Material User.
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What are the dose rates in the radiochemistry laboratory areas?
The dose rate in the laboratory areas are 10 to 20 times background in
areas where the largest amounts of radioactive material are used or
stored. There are no dangerous levels of external dose rate in any areas
of the laboratories. This map shows a display of the common dose rates
in the laboratory areas in units of micro-rem/hour:
You can see from this map that the dose rates in the hallways and in
many of the laboratory areas are similar to the normal background dose
rate for Las Vegas which ranges from approximately 5 micro-rem/hour to
15 micro-rem/hour.
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What are the rules regarding security of radioactive material?
A policy approved by the Radiation Safety Advisory Committee
established the requirements for security of radioactive materials at
UNLV.
It shall be the policy of the University of Nevada Las Vegas to properly
control radioactive materials in accordance with the requirements of the
UNLV Radiation Safety Manual and the Nevada Administrative Code.
The following issues are addressed in this policy:
1. Security of Radioactive Materials in Storage Areas.
2. Security of Radioactive Materials in Laboratories.
All areas where radioactive materials are used shall be posted with a
“Caution Radioactive Materials” sign. Radioactive materials shall be used
only by trained personnel. All personnel working in a laboratory where
radioactive materials are in use shall be aware of the presence of the
material in the laboratory. All radioactive materials not in use shall be in
a locked container. These four statements form the basis of security of
radioactive materials at the University.
It is most desirable to have two levels of security for all radioactive
materials at the University. However, it is recognized that this is
inefficient for some situations and may cause more radiation exposure
than if the sources were not handled as much. In this regard, at least
one level of security shall be in effect to prevent the removal of sources
from all laboratories and storage areas.
IN NO CIRCUMSTANCES IS IT ACCEPTABLE FOR UNTRAINED
PERSONNEL TO BE LEFT ALONE IN POSTED, UNCLEARED AREAS.
"TRAINING," FOR THESE PURPOSES, MEANS RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY
TRAINING PERFORMED BY, OR ACCEPTED BY, RADIATION SAFETY
PERSONNEL.
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Newsletter 22 – New Laboratories in HRC Completed
We now have two new laboratories for use of radioactive materials in
the Harry Reid Center, MSM-234 and MSM-236. These laboratories
offer three new fume hoods with HEPA filtered ventilation, a new
perchloric acid hood, and two new glove boxes as well as more than 40
linear feet of laboratory bench space, two new water purification
systems, and two sinks.
Our new laboratories will be controlled similar to the way that we control
our other laboratories where radioactive materials are used. However,
experiments with flowing water are restricted from these laboratories
because they are located above the Marjorie Barrick Museum.
Many features of these new laboratories are discussed in this newsletter.
Fume Hoods
There are two four foot and one six foot fume hood available for work
with radioactive materials. Flow into the hoods is greater than 100
ft/minute with the sash at 18 inches. Each hood has a flow rate alarm to
immediately identify when a hood is not ventilated. The vent pipes that
provide flow from each hood are stainless steel and are welded at each
seam. Each hood flows independently to its own HEPA filtered discharge.
Perchloric Acid Hood
A fourth hood in the MSM-234 laboratory is designed for work with
perchloric acid. The ventilation lines for this hood have a wash-down
system with restricted access. The wash-down system will spray the
inside of the vent pipes with water that will collect in the hood and
transfer to a five gallon tank under the hood. The volume of water used
in the wash-down must be closely monitored to prevent overflow of the
collection tank. In order to prevent accidental overflow of the tank, this
operation will be restricted to specifically trained people. The valves that
provide water to the spray lines will be locked out when the wash-down
system is not in use. The perchloric acid hood does not have a filtered
discharge.
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Air Conditioning and Heating
Temperature control is provided by two large AC systems, a 13 ton
system providing support for MSM-234 and a 10 ton system providing
support for MSM-236. Thermostats are on the front walls of the
laboratories near the exit doors. Thermostats may be adjusted to provide
a comfortable temperature in the laboratories.
Bench Tops
The bench tops are standard laboratory tops with acid and heat
resistance and similar to laboratory benches in other areas, they must be
covered with bench paper when radioactive material will be used on
them.
Chemical Storage
Cabinets have been installed for chemical storage, however, the primary
location for chemical storage will continue to be MSM-163 in the main
laboratory area on the first floor.
Water Systems
There are two Pall Cascada DI water systems in these laboratories. They
are supplied from our new 1000 gallon per day reverse osmosis system.
As a reminder, do not use water cooling systems in this room. A leak or
uncontrolled flow of water could be disastrous to the museum.
Sinks
Two sinks are provided for personal washing, and equipment cleaning.
These sinks must not be used for release of chemicals or radioactive
materials. All radioactive liquids are collected for disposal by the UNLV
Radiation Safety Office. Hazardous materials are collected by the UNLV
Hazardous Materials Technicians. Hazardous and radioactive liquids are
stored in MSM-163 prior to transfer to RMS personnel for disposal.
Glove Boxes
Two new Labconco glove boxes are in MSM-236. These boxes will be
initially under argon atmosphere and have regeneration capability. We
anticipate that these boxes will be available for use by mid-November.
Parts are on order to allow setup of the boxes.
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Electrical Supply
There is a variety of electrical supply including (2) 30 amp 208V outlets,
(2) 20 amp 110V outlets, and several 110V service outlets on each bench.
Emergency Equipment
Eye-wash stations are located at each sink, the emergency shower is on
the south wall of MSM-234. Fire extinguishers are located at the
emergency exit door in MSM-236 and inside MSM-234 at the doorway
between MSM-234 and MSM-236. First aid kits are located at each door
to the hallway.
Hand & Foot Monitor
The Thermo HFM-11 hand and foot monitor is at the exit from MSM-234
to provide a simple method to prevent radioactive contamination from
leaving the room. This monitor is a set of gas flow proportional detectors,
operated on P-10 gas with a microprocessor controlled system that
monitors system operation and provides an alarm upon detection of
activity above background. Upon identification of an alarm, check
yourself for contamination using a frisker, or if alpha contamination is
detected, use an alpha scintillation detector (Ludlum 4393 / 2360) to
identify the contaminated location and allow cleanup.
Proximity card access has been allowed for all radiochemistry program
personnel.
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Newsletter 23 – Radiological Emergency Preparedness
You are working in your laboratory with a solution containing radioactive
materials and due to some unforeseen circumstance you drop the vial
containing your entire inventory. As you drop the vial, you notice that
your laboratory partner, in an attempt to prevent the spill, falls to the
ground and is hurt. Are you prepared to respond to this situation? What
will you do?
Your response to an uncontrolled spill of radioactive material
Evaluate the scene, if someone is injured, get medical assistance on the
way before any other action – call 911 from any campus phone. Ensure
that the injured person is in a safe location and take any medical action
that you are qualified for, to help the individual. Get Help if you need to.
1. Stop the Spill
If you can stop the spill by up-righting the container or turning off flow of
liquid to a drain or preventing the flow of the liquid to a floor drain, do
so. If you are dripping, take off your laboratory coat in the area. If
possible use it to absorb the spill or stop the flow of the liquid.
2. Warn Others in the Area
Let other people in the area know that you have a problem. Loudly
indicate that you have spilled radioactive material and no one should
enter the spill area. Do this to minimize the spread of material from the
area and minimize exposure to others.
3. Isolate the Area
You don't want other people coming back into the spill area while there is
still a problem. Don't leave, prevent others from going into the area, lock
the laboratory doors, put up a sign, and rope off the area. If you don't
control the area, someone might enter the area, cause further spread of
the material, and receive unnecessary exposure.
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4. Minimize Exposure
Minimize your exposure and the exposure of others by using time,
distance, and shielding. Move away from the spill area and use physical
structures between you and the spill to lower the dose rate in your area.
Ensure others in the laboratory either leave the immediate laboratory
area or also minimize their exposure.
5. Notify the RSO
The people in the UNLV Radiation Safety Office can assist you in your
efforts to minimize exposure and get the laboratory back into normal
operation. Call X54226 for anyone in RMS, X54419 or X54941 for the
Radiation Safety Officer or Radiation Safety Technician, or 3404419 for
the RSO cell phone. Then call people on the HRC Emergency Call List
posted in any of the HRC radiation laboratories. If there is an injured
contaminated person, contact the Radiation Laboratory Director
immediately.
Your response to a controlled spill of radioactive material
Well, what's the difference? You have taken the precautions to assure
that the impact of a spill will be minimized. Consider the following:
You are working with the same liquid as above, in a hood, on a tray with
sides to catch a spill. Your actions should be similar but will not be as
extensive.
If there is an injury, medical response to injured people always takes
priority!
Use the same sequence S-W-I-M-N as needed.
The spill is Stopped by the tray, the need to Warn others is minimized to
those who may need access to the hood,
you can Isolate the hood by closing it and telling others in the laboratory.
you can Minimize your exposure and the exposure of others by moving
yourself
and others away from the hood, then Notify the RSO for help.
Preparing for an emergency involving radioactive materials is really a
way to minimize the impact of the event on yourself and others in your
laboratory.
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Some things that you can do in your laboratory to prevent or
provide easy response to spills involving radioactive material:
Always ensure that radioactive materials are used over a secondary
container that can contain twice the volume of liquid or solid
materials if your container is accidentally knocked over. Always
work over absorbent material with a plastic backing.
When you are ready to work with radioactive materials, take one
more look at your apparatus and work area to ensure that
movement of materials in the area will not cause a problem and
items that may fall or be knocked over will spill into the area that
you setup to contain the material.
Ensure that the work area is not cluttered and there is space to
move around unimpeded. Ensure others in the laboratory are
aware of what you are doing and the potential for a spill if your
area is crowded. Use radioactive materials in a hood when
possible.
If you will be transferring components and material from the work
area to another area of the laboratory or another laboratory,
ensure that the pathway is open and available before you attempt
the transfer. Put all materials in a secondary container to prevent a
spill. Call ahead to the destination to ensure that you will not
confront a locked door when you get there.
Keep a spill kit in your laboratory to assist you with rapid and
efficient containment and cleanup of a spill. Your kit, as a
minimum, should contain a box of protective gloves, absorbent
material, clean rags, rubber drain covers (if there are floor drains
in your laboratory), and a standard first aid kit.
You should know and trust everyone in the laboratory with you. If
you see something that someone is doing that may cause harm to
themselves or someone else, ask them about it, if there is a
problem with what they are doing, don’t let them do it! We all have
to peacefully coexist in our laboratories; you and I must be
comfortable that the laboratories are a safe place to be.
Finally, periodically check the location and condition of emergency
equipment. If there is anything missing let the Laboratory Manager
know about it.
Your primary goal is obviously successful completion of your
research. Your secondary goal (my primary goal) is to ensure that
you do so safely and ensure control of your radioactive material.
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Newsletter 24 – Portable Instruments – Ludlum Model 3 / 44-9
This issue will begin a series of newsletters with the primary subject
area as portable radiation detection instruments. This first issue on
that topic will describe the workhorse of our laboratories, the ratemeter and pancake GM detector.
The Model 3/44-9 is a combination rate-meter with a model 44-9 GM
detector from Ludlum Measurements Inc.
The Ludlum model 3 rate-meter is a very simple measurement device
with a minimum of controls. The controls are as follows:
1. A rotary selection switch with positions: OFF, BAT, X100, X10, X1,
X0.1.
2. An on/off switch for audio indication.
3. A switch for fast (4 second)/slow (22 second) response – from 10% to
90% of the maximum reading.
4. A reset button that takes the meter indication to zero.
The Model 3 rate meter is a tool for identification of the response rate
from a source of ionizing radiation
emissions. The range of measurement of the
Model 3 is up to a maximum count rate of
500,000 cpm. The response is linear within
±10% of the true response over the entire
response range. The speaker provides an
output of more than 60 db at 2 feet from the
instrument.
Batteries -The battery compartment
contains 2 “D” cells. The battery
compartment is accessible from the top of
the instrument. The battery configuration
is indicated on the underside of the
battery compartment cover. Alkaline
batteries should provide greater than 2000
hours of instrument operation.
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The Case – The Model 3 has a cast aluminum body with a steel handle
and speaker holes on the side. This provides for a light instrument that
is also rugged. Even so, if you drop this instrument, check it for damage
and operability – go through all of the instrument checks before you use
it for a measurement.
Temperature Operating Range – The normal calibration of this
o

o

o

instrument provides acceptable response from -4 F (-20 C) to 122 F
o

(50 C). Instrument operation outside of this range may require different
calibration.
The Ludlum Model 44-9 Pancake GM Probe – This is the standard
probe on GM instruments used in the radiochemistry laboratory and is
a very common detector used in many industries.
This probe houses a pancake type
halogen quenched GM detector
with a typical detection efficiency
of 19% for 99Tc beta emissions at
¼” from the source. The window
area is approximately 15 cm2 and
the open window area is 12 cm2.
The GM detector in this probe
operates on 900 volts, has a
typical dead time of approximately
80 microseconds.
The Detector
The GM detector in this instrument
is about 2 inches in diameter and
has a mica window with a thickness
of 2 mg/cm2. The filling gas is neon
with a halogen quenching agent
(chlorine or bromine). The window
has a diameter of 1.75 inches (44.5
mm).
The background response from
external gamma radiation will be
about 500 CPM in a field of 10
mrem/hour (0.1 mSv/hour).
In the illustration, the detector on the left is intact, while the one on
the right has the window removed and you can see the anode inside
the detector. A broken window cannot be repaired on these
detectors. A replacement detector costs approximately $100.00.
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What it Detects
Ionization in the detection gas caused by alpha, beta, or gamma
radiations will cause a pulse to be transmitted to the meter. However,
because the detector is not in a consistent geometry, alpha particles may
or may not penetrate the window to cause ionization of the gas, so a
consistent alpha detection efficiency cannot be accurately defined.
Gamma radiation has a low probability of interaction in the gas so
“measurement” of dose rate is not recommended from this type of
detector, even when the meter has a dose rate scale. Beta radiation with
energy greater than 100 keV is detectable and “measurable” with this
type of detector.
Direct Measurements
One of the more useful purposes for the pancake GM detector and ratemeter is basic contamination control of beta emitting radionuclides. In
order to have consistent detection efficiency while “scanning” a surface
for beta emitting contamination, the speed of movement of the detector
and the surface to detector distance must be controlled. The speed of
movement is important so that there is enough residence time over a
contaminated area to provide adequate response. The surface to
detector distance will cause a direct change to the detection efficiency.
If you move the detector over a surface at a speed of 2 inches per second,
and have a 10% efficiency for the radionuclide that you are interested in,
you will have a certain probability of detection as follows:
Let’s consider a stationary beta GM pancake detector, the probe area is
15 cm2, the background count rate is assumed to be 40 cpm, the
detection efficiency is assumed to be 20%. From table 6.4 in MARSSIM,
the critical level is 15 counts, the detection limit is 32 counts, and the
MDC is 1800 Bq/m2 (1080 dpm/100 cm2). This might be typical of 99Tc
on a smooth flat surface.
Scanning is quite different than simply holding a detector stationary,
there are some additional considerations, you are moving a detector over
a surface and at a specified distance from the surface to keep the
detection efficiency constant. You actually have a certain efficiency to do
that. The count time is related to how fast you move the detector over a
surface – consider that a spot being surveyed would pass under the
detector for a duration that begins as the leading edge of the detector
goes over the spot and ends as the back edge passes over the spot. So,
the count time for a 1.75 in diameter detector passing over a spot at 2
inches per second would have a count time on that spot of: t = 1.75 in/2
in/s = 0.875 seconds.
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So, you can see that the probability of detecting activity on that spot
would become lower as you move the probe faster. You should also
recognize that moving the probe at a constant speed and holding it a
constant distance from the surface are going to be difficult tasks and
your efficiency as a surveyor will continue to decrease as you get more
tired.
Taking this information a few steps further following MARSSIM, the
“scan MDC” for a pancake probe GM detector as we described is
approximately 3770 dpm/100 cm2. This value is more than 3 times the
activity that you could detect with the stationary instrument. Imagine if
you moved the probe much faster.
Preparing for Operation
1. Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No major
dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging out),
etc.
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year.
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due.
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter.
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background
response. For a pancake GM probe, the normal response should be
between 20 and 100 counts per minute in a low background area.
Precautions
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that
it continues to work. These are:
1. Never put the instrument in water – it will never work again.
2. When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that
you will contaminate the probe.
3. Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be
broken and the instrument to be nonresponsive.
4. Never use the probe as a hammer. There is a floating anode inside the
detector that can easily be shaken out of position – maybe even short
out – anyway use a hammer for hammering.
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5. Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break
the window or short out the anode.
6. If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, please
remove the detector from normal use and let me or Trevor know that
the instrument is OOS. We can usually decontaminate or repair the
instrument in less than an hour.
Surveying
Whenever you check your work area after working with radioactive
materials, you have several actions to take and decisions to make;
1. Check your instrument – is it calibrated? – are the batteries OK? – is
the background response OK? – does it respond to ionizing radiation?
2. If you are working with beta emitting radionuclides that emit beta
particles sufficiently energetic to be detected by a pancake GM
detector, then the Ludlum Model 3/44-9 may be the instrument that
you could use for your survey.
3. Turn on the audible response. This is your most sensitive indicator,
each “click” is caused by an ionizing event in the detector, if it clicked
- it detected something!
4. I recommend always using the “slow” response mode for low activity
measurements or clearance surveys. “Fast” response is OK for higher
activity measurements. You should not use “fast” response for surveys
where you are verifying that the area is free of contamination.
5. As you check the work area, pay particular attention to areas
immediately adjacent to the area where your radioactive material was
used.
6. Your 44-9 Pancake GM probe should be held at a distance of ¼” to ½”
from the surface that you are surveying – with the window facing the
area that you are surveying.
7. Move the probe over the area slowly. You can survey a large area by
moving the probe at 1” to 2” per second. Don’t expect to detect
anything if you wave the probe like a magic wand.
8. If you identify a response – continue to survey – wait until you
characterize the entire work area before you start your cleanup. This
will help you to decide on the best method to do cleanup and provide
information for the decision about what PPE to wear.
9. If you exceed the response capability of your instrument, be sure to
control the area, identify the location where the emissions causing
that response are coming from. This may be an area where material
was spilled or maybe your stock material was not removed from the
work area. If you recognize this as a potential problem, then take
action to prevent spread of the contamination.
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~ CAUTION ~
Radiation detectors allow you to detect and measure radiations
emitted by the materials that you are working with. It is important
that you take care of them so that they continue to provide their
function and allow you to protect yourself and others from ionizing
radiation.
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Newsletter 25 – Portable Instruments – Ludlum Model 2360 / 43-93
This issue will continue the series of newsletters with the primary subject
area as portable radiation detection instruments. This second issue on
that topic will describe a very important instrument for some of our
laboratories, the rate-meter / scaler and alpha-beta scintillation detector.
The Model 2360/43-93 is a combination rate-meter and scaler with a
model 43-93 Alpha-Beta scintillation detector from Ludlum
Measurements Inc.
The Ludlum model 2360 rate-meter/scaler is a simple measurement
device with a few more controls than the model 3. The controls are as
follows:
1. A rotary switch with positions: OFF, BAT, X1000, X100, X10, and X1.
2. A volume switch and volume control for audio indication.
3. A switch for selection of signals from the alpha scintillators or the
beta scintillators or both.
1.
A reset switch which
also allows reading of the
high voltage.
2.
A rotary switch that
allows selection of the count
time for the scaler, and a
start button that allows
starting the count integration
mode.
The Model 2360 rate meter
is a tool for identification of
the
response
rate
or
integrated counts over a
specified time from a source
of
ionizing
radiation
emissions. The range of
measurement of the Model 2360 is up to a maximum count rate of
500,000 cpm. The response is linear within ±10% of the true response
over the entire response range. The speaker provides an output of more
than 60 db at 2 feet from the instrument and the volume is adjustable.
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Batteries -The battery compartment contains 2 “D” cells. The battery
compartment is accessible from the top of the instrument. The battery
configuration is indicated on the underside of the battery compartment
cover. Alkaline batteries should provide greater than 2000 hours of
instrument operation.
The Case – The Model 2360 has a cast aluminum body with a steel
handle and speaker holes on the side. The start button for integrated
counts is located in the handle. This instrument is light and also rugged.
Even so, if you drop this instrument, check it for damage and operability
– go through all of the instrument checks before you use it for a
measurement, just like any other instrument. The probe contains a glass
photomultiplier tube which could be broken from shock.
Temperature Operating Range – The normal calibration of this
o

o

o

instrument provides acceptable response from -4 F (-20 C) to 122 F
o

(50 C). Instrument operation outside of this range may require different
calibration.
The Ludlum Model 43-93 Alpha Beta Scintillation Probe – This is the
probe on the Ludlum 2360 instruments used in the radiochemistry
laboratory and is a very
common detector used in many
industries that handle small
quantities of alpha and beta
emitting radionuclides.
This
probe
houses
a
photomultiplier
tube
that
observes the light output of a
dual scintillator. This detector
has a typical detection efficiency of 15% for 99Tc beta emissions at ¼”
from the source. The window area is approximately 100 cm2 and the
open window area is 89 cm2.
The detector in this probe operates on 1650 volts, has a typical response
time of approximately 2 to 10 microseconds for 90% of the maximum
response.
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The Detector
The detector in this instrument is about 3.5 inches by 5.75 inches and
2

has a mylar window with a thickness of 0.5 mg/cm . The detector is a
plastic plate with a coating of zinc sulfide. The background response
from external gamma radiation will be about 5000 CPM in a field of 10
mrem/hour (0.1 mSv/hour).
In the illustration, the detector is the solid white rectangle in the middle.
At the top middle is the mylar window, on the left is the cover plate
which holds the detector in place and on the right is a metal grid that fits
over the window to provide some protection for the window. A broken
window can be repaired on these detectors. A replacement window costs
approximately $30.00.

What it Detects
Interactions of alpha radiation in the zinc sulfide, or beta, or gamma
radiations in the plastic scintillator will cause a pulse to be transmitted
to the meter. The voltage of the pulse will depend on whether the
interaction was in the ZnS or the plastic. The 2360 ratemeter/scaler will
separate the signals to allow determination of alpha or beta response.
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Gamma radiation has a low probability of interaction in the gas so
“measurement” of gamma dose rate is not recommended from this type of
detector, even when the meter has a dose rate scale. Beta radiation with
energy greater than 100 keV is detectable and “measurable” with this
type of detector.
Direct Measurements
One of the more useful purposes for this scintillation detector and ratemeter is basic contamination control of alpha or beta emitting
radionuclides. In order to have consistent detection efficiency while
“scanning” a surface for alpha or beta emitting radionuclides in
contamination, the speed of movement of the detector and the surface to
detector distance must be controlled. The speed of movement is
important so that there is enough residence time over a contaminated
area to provide adequate response. The surface to detector distance will
cause a direct change to the detection efficiency.
If you move the detector over a surface at a speed of 2 inches per second,
and have a 15% efficiency for the alpha emitting radionuclide that you
are interested in, you will have a certain probability of detection as
follows:
Let’s consider a stationary 43-93 detector, the probe width is 100 cm2,
the background count rate is assumed to be 1 cpm, the detection
efficiency is assumed to be 15%. From table 6.4 in MARSSIM, the critical
level is 2 counts, the detection limit is 7 counts, and the MDC is 150
Bq/m2 (90 dpm/100 cm2). This might be typical of 239Pu on a smooth flat
surface.
Scanning is quite different than simply holding a detector stationary,
there are some additional considerations, you are moving a detector over
a surface and at a specified distance from the surface to keep the
detection efficiency constant. You actually have a certain efficiency to do
that. The count time is related to how fast you move the detector over a
surface – consider that a spot being surveyed would pass under the
detector for a duration that begins as the leading edge of the detector
goes over the spot and ends as the back edge passes over the spot. So,
the count time for a detector that is 7 cm wide passing over a spot at 5
cm per second would have a count time on that spot of: t = 7 cm/5 cm/s
= 1.4 seconds.
So, you can see that the probability of detecting activity on that spot
would become lower as you move the probe faster. You should also
recognize that moving the probe at a constant speed and holding it a
constant distance from the surface are going to be difficult tasks and
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your efficiency as a surveyor will continue to decrease as you get more
tired.
Taking this information a few steps further following MARSSIM, the
“scan MDC” for a scintillation detector probe for alpha contamination as
we described is approximately 85 dpm/100 cm2. This value is more than
4 times the activity that alpha emitting contamination should be
controlled to (22 dpm/100 cm2). Imagine if you moved the probe much
faster.
Preparing for Operation
1. Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No major
dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging out),
etc.
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year.
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due.
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter.
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background
response. For a 43-93 scintillation probe, the normal response should
be between 0 and 10 counts per minute for alpha and 100 to 300
counts per minute for beta in a low background area.
Precautions
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that
it continues to work. These are:
1. Never put the instrument in water – it may never work again.
2. When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that
you will contaminate the probe.
3. Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be
broken and the instrument to respond to ambient light (remember a
scintillation detector works by detection of photons from the
scintillator).
4. Never use the probe as a hammer. There is a glass photomultiplier
tube in the probe that will break if subjected to shock – anyway use a
hammer for hammering.
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5. Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break
the window or the photomultiplier tube.
6. If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, please
remove the detector from normal use and let me or Trevor know that
the instrument is OOS. We can usually decontaminate or repair the
instrument in less than an hour.
Surveying
Whenever you check your work area after working with radioactive
materials, you have several actions to take and decisions to make;
1. Check your instrument – is it calibrated? – are the batteries OK? – is
the background response OK? – does it respond to ionizing radiation?
2. If you are working with alpha emitting radionuclides that emit alpha
particles sufficiently energetic to be detected by the 43-93 detector,
then the Ludlum Model 2360/43-93 may be the instrument that you
could use for your survey.
3. Turn on the audible response. This is your most sensitive indicator,
each “click” is caused by an ionizing event in the detector, if it clicked
- it detected something! Notice that there are two different click
frequencies – one for alpha particles detected, and one for beta
particles detected.
4. As you check the work area, pay particular attention to areas
immediately adjacent to the area where your radioactive material was
used.
1. Your 43-93 probe should be held at a distance of ¼” to ½” from the
surface that you are surveying – with the window facing the area that
you are surveying.
2. Move the probe over the area slowly. You can survey a large area by
moving the probe at 1” to 2” per second. Don’t expect to detect
anything if you wave the probe like a magic wand.
3. If you identify a response – continue to survey – wait until you
characterize the entire work area before you start your cleanup. This
will help you to decide on the best method to do cleanup and provide
information for the decision about what PPE to wear.
4. If you exceed the response capability of your instrument, be sure to
control the area, identify the location where the emissions causing
that response are coming from. This may be an area where material
was spilled or maybe your stock material was not removed from the
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work area. If you recognize this as a potential problem, then take
action to prevent spread of the contamination.
~ CAUTION ~
Radiation detectors allow you to detect and measure radiations
emitted by the materials that you are working with. It is important
that you take care of them so that they continue to provide their
function and allow you to protect yourself and others from ionizing
radiation.
Newsletter 26 – Laboratory Inspection
This issue will explain what a laboratory inspection is for and provide
you with guidance that you can use to ensure that your area meets
reasonable criteria for safety.
One very important aspect of our radiation safety program is evaluation
of laboratories to ensure that we are in compliance with our radioactive
materials license, x-ray machine registrations, and State of Nevada
regulations.
We do inspections of every laboratory containing radioactive materials –
every day; the Radiation Safety Office checks our laboratories during a
monthly visit to ensure that we meet their criteria for a safe laboratory as
well. The inspection is NOT an in depth evaluation of compliance, but we
do check at least the following:
POSTINGS AND LABELING
• Proper labeling of the room for radioactive materials.
• “No Eating, Drinking or Smoking” sign still posted.
• No evidence of food or drink in the laboratory.
• Proper labeling of the storage area and work areas.
• Proper labeling of containers.
• Emergency phone numbers posted near the phone.
• Notice to Employees and NRC-1 posted.
• Laboratory map posted on the door. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY
• Radioactive materials use log.
• Source storage containers are secured at all times.
• Samples containing radioactive materials are appropriately labeled.
• Samples containing radioactive material are appropriately stored.
• Sealed and unsealed stock sources are appropriately stored.
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CONTAMINATION CONTROL
• Contamination surveys of the room maintained.
• Work areas do not present a safety hazard to other laboratory
inhabitants.
• Work areas are properly identified when contaminated.
• Researchers check their areas for contamination before leaving.
WASTE ITEMS
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Solid waste is appropriately disposed of in appropriate containers.
Liquid waste is placed in the appropriate disposal area.
Aqueous and organic waste streams are separate.
Organic waste streams are minimized.
Mixed waste is not created on a large scale.
LSC Waste is maintained in LSC vials and a waste form is attached.
There are no radioactive materials or labels in the clean trash.

BENCHTOPS
• Bench tops should be free of clutter.
• There should be adequate room for work when no experiments are
taking place.
• Equipment that generates a lot of heat should not be on flammable
bench coverings.
• Samples, equipment, and stock solutions should be toward the center
of the bench to prevent them from being knocked off.
• Radioactive stock solutions should be stored in the safe when they are
not immediately in use.
• Open containers of liquids must be in a secondary containment.
GLOVE BOXES
• Glove boxes should be maintained relatively clean inside.
• The gloveless box should be maintained clean at all times when work
is not in progress in that box.
• The port covers should always be on the gloveless box when it is not in
immediate use.
• The gloves and box should be checked for integrity every day.
Purpose
The purpose of our inspection is not to pick on anyone or slow down
research. The purpose is to ensure that we do maintain compliance with
our Radioactive Materials License and general safety requirements.
Notification
We do not send out a warning that we will be inspecting laboratories
because we must verify that compliance is the norm, not just something
that is present when we know an inspector will visit our laboratories.
299

When the State of Nevada regulators visit our facility, they will not call to
tell us when they are coming to inspect us. We must be ready for their
inspection of our laboratories at all times.
If there are experiments in progress that may be adversely affected by
persons entering the laboratory, then please send a message to the group
to identify these situations.
Inspectors
Our inspections may be done by any one of the persons on our staff.
Typically, they are done by the laboratory manager or an Authorized User
However; anyone can identify potential problems and should identify the
problems to the laboratory managers as soon as possible.
Findings
When we find a condition that is in conflict with a regulation or
requirement, the Laboratory Director or Laboratory Manager is notified
and he/she will make contact with the person responsible for the
laboratory area to provide simple means of ensuring compliance. We will
work with the researcher to achieve compliance for any violation or item
of concern with as little impact on the research in that laboratory as
possible.
Consider the inspection process as a good way to ensure that our
radiation safety program meets license conditions and State regulations.
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Newsletter 27 – Radioactive Material Inventory
As a Radioactive Material licensee in the State of Nevada, we have
limitation on the total activity of radioactive materials that we may have
at any one time. These limits are a maximum amount of activity for each
different radionuclide.
In order to establish compliance we determine the fraction of the allowed
activity for each radionuclide, then we then 'sum the fractions' and the
sum must be less than 1 for the determination of compliance.
For example, let’s say that we have 20 mCi of 241Am and 50 mCi of 137Cs.
If our license limit for 241Am is 30 mCi and our license limit for 137Cs is
150 mCi, then we have reached:
Sum of Fractions = 20/30 + 50/150 = 100% of our license limit.
User Limits
Each user has a radioactive materials allowance in order to maintain the
total possession of all users less than our license limits. The activity
assigned as a User limit is determined by the RSO. The items that are
important in determination of the User limits are:
The limits of our radioactive materials license and ensuring that other
users are not deprived of experimentation because one person restricts
our ability to maintain license compliance by having an unusual
amount of a certain radionuclide with a low license limit.
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Some radionuclides have much lower license limits than others and may
be more or less restrictive.
For example, our limit for 32P is 1 Curie and our limit for 3H is 100
Curies. If these were the only radionuclides that we had, life would be
simple.
The license limit for some radionuclides is based on the mass of the
nuclide.
For example, the license limit for 239Pu is included in our 'special nuclear
material limit of 200 grams. Whereas our limit for 238U is included in our
'source material' limit of 100 pounds.
And there are some radionuclides that have extremely low limits such as
228Th that has a limit of 0.00005 Ci (50 microcuries).
Periodic Inventory Checks
YOU SHOULD ALWAYS BE AWARE OF YOUR RADIOACTIVE
MATERIALS. IF YOU DISCOVER THAT A SOURCE IS MISSING FROM
YOUR STORAGE OR USE AREAS, PLEASE CONDUCT A SEARCH FOR
THE MATERIAL AND CONTACT ONE OF THE USERS IMMEDIATELY!
The Radiation Safety Office must be aware of the location of all
radioactive materials at UNLV. To ensure this, they conduct a complete
inventory check every 6 months. Just because a source is 'exempt', this
does not mean that it is not held under our license.
ALL RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS THAT ARE NOT NATURALLY
OCCURRING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (NORM) ARE CONTROLLED
UNDER OUR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS LICENSE.
Consider the inventory process as another good way to ensure that our
radiation safety program meets license conditions and State
regulations.
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Laboratory Control of Sources
Control of sources of radioactive material in our laboratories is of course
not just to ensure license compliance, it’s for our protection and the
protection of others in the laboratories and it is for the protection of our
radiochemistry program. We must always ensure that our radioactive
material is within the boundaries described by our license and no one
will get hurt by our material.
There are sign out sheets located at the primary source storage area in
MSM-168. If you are a user, be sure to sign out any materials that are
provided to others for work – and make sure that you retrieve the
material from them when they are done taking the amount that they
need. The amount removed should be recorded on the form.
When you get a stock solution or compound from a user, make sure that
you return the remaining material to the user so that it can be properly
stored in one of our primary storage areas. If a source or solution is
completely used, and the container is disposed, then annotate that on
the sign out form.
If you know the location of a source with an HRC-XXX label on it (where
XXX is a number), you should make sure that this source is returned to
the safe in MSM-168 as soon as practical.
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Newsletter 28 – Survey Documentation
Surveys are done to ensure compliance with Federal and State
regulations and our Radioactive Materials License conditions. When an
inspector from the State of Nevada comes to the campus to review our
program, he/she reviews documentation to ensure that we have complied
with regulations. Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) section 459.337 is
the requirement that applies to surveys.
NAC 459.337 Surveys and monitoring. (NRS 459.030)
1. Each licensee and registrant shall make, or cause to be made, surveys
that:
(a) Are necessary for the licensee or registrant to comply with NAC
459.010 to 459.950, inclusive; and
(b)
(1)
(2)
(3)

Are necessary under the circumstances to evaluate:
The magnitude and extent of radiation levels;
Concentrations or quantities of radioactive material; and
The potential radiological hazards.

2. The licensee or registrant shall ensure that instruments and
equipment used for quantitative radiation measurements are calibrated
for the radiation measured at intervals not to exceed 12 months.
One important concept to understand regarding surveys: all information
must be written and the survey must be signed by the person doing the
survey and the survey reviewer, and signatures must be dated.
The following information is necessary for that documentation:
The location surveyed (be as specific as possible).
The date of the survey.
The model and serial number of the portable instruments used for
the survey.
The model and serial number of the laboratory instruments used
for smear or sample analysis.
The date that the next calibration of this instrument is due.
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The location of any smears or dose rate readings taken in the
laboratory.
The results of smears analyzed (an attached analysis sheet is fine).
The dose rates in the area at the location of measurement.
A note about actions taken when the survey identifies an abnormal
situation (such as contamination outside the labeled work area).
How often are surveys required?
The required frequency of radiation and contamination surveys in
laboratories differs depending on the amount of activity used and the
potential for contamination spread to personnel traffic routes in the
buildings. However, every time we are in the laboratory working with
radioactive materials, we need to ensure (by survey) that we did not
spread contamination and that all radioactive materials are secure before
we leave the laboratory.
How long should it take to do and document a survey?
A basic contamination control survey of a complete laboratory should not
take more than an hour. A routine survey of a small work area should
only take minutes. This depends on the size of the laboratory and
whether or not contamination was identified that must be cleaned up.
Some laboratories may also need a periodic evaluation of the dose rate in
the laboratory; this should take no more than half an hour.
What forms should be used to document the surveys?
Forms to document surveys of the laboratories are maintained in the
main corridor of the first floor laboratory s. The laboratory managers can
help you find what you need to document your surveys. When completed,
all survey forms are kept in the binders that are maintained in the
hallways (a very good place to identify the results of past surveys and the
current radiological profile of the laboratories).
Basic Survey Information
Always wear gloves to protect your skin from radioactive or chemical
contamination that may be on surfaces.
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Smear surveys are done to
contamination from a surface.

identify

the

activity

of

removable

Smears are small 2" disks of paper or cloth that are rubbed on a surface
to evaluate the amount of radioactive material that could be removed
from a surface by normal touching of that surface.
The standard area of a smear is 100 cm2, 100 cm2 is about 4 inches by 4
inches.
Use even pressure when rubbing the smear on a surface.
Don’t press too hard or you will destroy the smear.
Wear gloves when doing a contamination survey, you are looking for
removable contamination from surfaces - you might find some.
When measuring the dose rate in an area, hold the meter at the location
of measurement for at least 30 seconds. Record each measurement when
it is taken. The typical height above the floor at which to take
measurements is approximately 1 meter.
Evaluation of Smears
All measurements that are documented for purposes of radiation
protection must be made with equipment that has calibration traceable
to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. We have several
analysis systems that meet this qualification. All Liquid Scintillation
Counters, the Tennelec Gas Proportional Counter in MSM-145, and the
Berthold Gas Proportional Counter in MSM-167 have traceable
calibration.
Special Situations
In case of spills, cleanup should be done as soon as practical and the
area affected should be controlled to prevent the spread of
contamination. Most importantly, after the spill is cleaned up, the survey
that demonstrates the area to be free of contamination must be made
with equipment that has calibration traceable to the National Institute of
Standards and Technology.
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Newsletter 29 – Fume Hoods in the HRC Radiochemistry Program
Chemical fume hoods in the radiochemistry laboratories provide us with
a great deal of protection during our work. There are currently 7 fume
hoods with HEPA filtered ventilation and 6 without filtered ventilation in
our laboratories. It is important to know the limitations of the fume
hoods that we are working in so that we do not have a release of
radioactive materials from the laboratories and so that we do not cause
damage to the systems or a contamination control problem in the hoods
or in the laboratories.
Laboratory fume hoods are the first defense to minimize chemical
exposure to research workers. They are considered the primary means of
protection from inhalation of hazardous vapors. It is, therefore,
important that all potentially harmful chemical work be conducted inside
a properly functioning fume hood. To ensure safety, all fume hoods are
evaluated for flow rate by the safety organization annually. This
newsletter is intended to help identify fume hood types and outline
exposure control practices in relation to the hood.
All fume hoods currently at the HRC are conventional hoods. This term is
used to describe a constant air volume (CAV) hood, an older, traditionally
less elaborate hood design used for general protection of the worker.
Because the amount of exhausted air is constant, the face velocity of a
CAV hood is inversely proportional to the sash height. That is, the lower
the sash, the higher the face velocity. However, not all hoods in the HRC
operate the same way. Some have an exhaust discharge point that is
high in the hood body and some exhaust air from the lower back of the
hood.
The HF hood in MSM-164 exhausts from the lower back. A drawback to
this design is associated with the flow of air around anything that is
between the exhaust point and the sash. Turbulence within the hood is
undesirable and may cause a flow of air from the apparatus that you
want to ventilate. For this hood, keep clutter inside the hood to a
minimum and do not block the lower back exhaust port.
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Using a Fume Hood
There are several types of protection that fume hoods provide us, so
let’s look at some of those.
1. A fume hood provides a sash that can be pulled down to a level where
it provides shielding from splashes of caustics, acids, or low energy
emissions such as beta particles and very low energy photons.
2. A fume hood has a ventilation system that pulls air into the hood and
away from us. This prevents vapors and airborne particulates that
may have been created by your samples from coming into your air
space preventing airborne exposure to aromatic compounds and
airborne chemicals or radioactive materials.
3. A fume hood provides some degree of splash protection for uncovered
parts of the body. This protection may also be appropriate should
there be an energetic reaction with your material that may
instantaneously over pressurize the hood.
4. A fume hood provides services that may be required for your
experiments such as electrical outlets, gas supply, water supply, etc.
5. Flammable and corrosive cabinets typically comprise the bottom
supporting structure of the fume hood. They are vented or non-vented
enclosures used primarily for storage of flammable or corrosive
materials. If vented, the flammable storage cabinet is connected to the
hood exhaust.
Fume Hoods in MSM-164
There are two fume hoods in MSM-164, as you face them; the one on the
left is a normal HEPA filtered hood that is useful for general
radiochemistry and the one on your right is a HEPA filtered hood
designed for use with Hydro-Fluoric acid. This is the only HF certified
hood that we have and if you want to use HF, you must have HF training
and you must have another HF trained person with you when you do the
work.
Fume Hoods in MSM-165
There are three unfiltered fume hoods in laboratory MSM-165 all of them
are for use of radioactive materials. Because these have unfiltered
exhaust, they can only be used with low level radioactive materials.
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As you face the three hoods, the hood on the far right is designed for use
of perchloric acid. All of these hoods are very useful for chemistry
experiments that require only small amounts of radioactive material. The
sample activity that you work with in these hoods should typically be
less than 10 micro-Curies and be in solution or in a solid mass that will
not likely become airborne.
All unfiltered hoods represent a possible release point for radioactive
materials or chemicals that are not contained. Because of the ease with
which activity could be released from these hoods, it is necessary to
ensure that radioactive materials will not be removed from your
experiment and go up the stack.
Fume Hood in MSM-167
There is one unfiltered hood in MSM-167, it is approved for use of
radioactive materials and is a smaller hood than is in MSM-165. Since
this room houses analysis equipment and the hood is unfiltered, it is
desirable to use only very low level radioactive materials in this room to
minimize the impact on any instrumentation and prevent a release to the
outside.
Fume Hood in MSM-172A
There is one unfiltered hood in MSM-172A, it is approved for use of
radioactive materials and is a smaller hood than is in MSM-165. Since
this room houses analysis equipment, it is desirable to use only very low
level radioactive materials in this room to minimize the impact on any
instrumentation.
Fume Hoods in MSM-173
The fume hoods in the technetium laboratory (MSM-173) are HEPA
filtered and the most desirable hoods to use higher levels of activity. The
ventilation from these hoods goes through a double HEPA filter train
before being released.
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Fume Hoods in MSM-234
There are two fume hoods in laboratory MSM-234, one is a perchloric
acid hood and the other is a HEPA filtered general chemistry hood. As in
any unfiltered hood, the activity in the perchloric acid hood must be
limited to prevent an uncontrolled release of activity from the laboratory.
The HEPA filtered general chemistry hood will of course support higher
levels of activity.
One more item about the perchloric acid hood in MSM-234; DO NOT
OPERATE THE WATER FAUCET – THERE IS NO DRAIN IN THIS
SYSTEM. This also applies to the wash-down system on this hood.
Without the ability to collect the water, it is necessary that a collection
system be provided when it is necessary to do a wash-down.
Fume Hoods in MSM-236
There are two fume hoods in laboratory MSM-236; both are HEPA filtered
general chemistry hoods.
TIPS FOR FUME HOOD SAFETY
1. Conduct all operations that may generate air contaminants at or above
the appropriate Threshold Limit Value TLV inside a filtered hood. The
TLV for a chemical may be found in its MSDS. Radionuclides that may
become airborne in excess of the DAC value must be used in a HEPA
filtered fume hood.
2. Keep all apparatus at least 6 inches back from the face of the hood. A
stripe on the bench surface is a good reminder.
3. Users should always keep their faces outside the plane of the hood
sash.
4. Hood sash openings should be kept to a minimum. Hoods are tested
(and should be used) with a hood sash opening of 15 inches.
5. Do not use the hood as a waste disposal mechanism except for small
quantities (< 10 ml) of volatile materials.
6. Do not store chemicals or apparatus in the hood. Store chemicals in
an approved safety storage cabinet.
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7. Keep the slots in the hood baffle free of obstruction by apparatus or
containers.
8. Minimize foot traffic past the face of the hood to prevent disruptions in
air flow.
9. Keep laboratory doors closed when working in the hood.
10. Do not place electrical receptacles or other spark sources inside the
hood when flammable liquids or gases are present. No permanent
electrical receptacles are permitted in the hood.
11. Use an appropriate barricade (e.g. a blast shield) if there is a chance
of explosion or implosion.
12. Do not remove hood sash or panels except when necessary for
apparatus set-up; replace the sash or panels before operating.
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Newsletter 30 – Risks associated with Radiation Exposure at HRC
More than one hundred years have passed since Roentgen discovered Xrays in 1895. Since then, radiation has become widely used for medical
and industrial purposes and is a byproduct of energy generation,
communication, and electronic components. We are exposed to manmade radiation through its medical uses, by radiation-emitting products,
employment in industries using radiation or radioactive materials, and
nuclear weapons.
Sources of Radiation Exposure
Most of the dose received by members of the general population comes
from natural and not man-made sources. These natural sources include
cosmic rays, terrestrial radiation, and internally deposited radionuclides.
Radon, a decay product of uranium-238, is the largest contributor to
population dose. Radon decays to several short lived daughters that are
inhaled and internally irradiate the lung. Estimates of total radiation
exposure for the United States show that radon contributes over half
(50%) of the estimated effective dose, and man-made sources contribute
less than 20%.
Health Effects Research
Research into the health effects of radiation exposure has been
conducted since the early 1900's. Radiation burns and radiation
sickness were recognized in the operators of early X-ray machines.
Radiation-caused skin cancers were also observed. By the mid 1900's,
the potential for external irradiation and internally deposited
radionuclides to cause cancer at other sites was documented. The most
famous episodes involved the radium dial painters in the United States,
and the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb blasts in
Japan.
The effects observed as a result of these high exposures indicate that
even low radiation exposures may cause damage to our bodies. Limits for
exposure to radiation set by the federal government are set at a small
fraction of the dose that effects have been observed. The occupational
limit for whole body exposure to ionizing radiation is 5000 mrem/year.
Studies of people exposed to low levels of radiation have been in progress
for many years involving hundreds of thousands of workers. Even though
there is no indication that low doses of radiation cause us harm, the
mechanisms for damage to our bodies cannot be quantitatively defined in
the presence of other mechanisms that damage our bodies. Some of the
many other damage mechanisms are smoking, drinking, intense sports,
driving, and even walking across the street.
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What happens if a human is exposed to a high dose of radiation to
the whole body all at once?
•
For less than 25,000 millirem, there are no directly observable
effects. There are changes in some human cells that can be observed
with a microscope at exposures above 10,000 mrem.
•
25,000 to 50,000 millirem, there will be no symptoms, but there
might be some changes in the chemistry of the individual's blood.
•
100,000 to 300,000 millirem, some physical changes (such as skin
reddening and temporary hair loss) are seen, particularly at the high end
of the range.
•
300,000 to 1,000,000 millirem, vomiting is the first symptom, and
the human loses his/her ability to produce blood. At the upper end of
this range, bone marrow transplants are generally needed and, if medical
care is not available, the condition can be fatal within one month of
exposure.
•
1,000,000 to 5,000,000 millirem, there will be vomiting, loss of
blood production, and failure of the gastrointestinal system. In general,
an acute dose of this magnitude is fatal within two weeks.
•
Greater than 5,000,000 millirem, central nervous system failure is
likely, and death will occur within a period of days.
How much dose is received by occupational radiation workers
and other people working at HRC?
Monitoring of people on campus has shown that in all areas of research
and at locations where radiation producing machines are used, the
average annual dose to anyone (including members of the RSO staff) is
less than 5 millirem/yr.
The highest dose received by any individual, monitored for occupational
exposure at the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies during
2008 was 25 mrem.
Risks From Low Doses
Generally speaking, no observable risks or effects are seen from either
acute or chronic doses of less than 25,000 millirem. Statistical methods
are used to predict the likelihood of long-term effects, such as cancer, for
large populations exposed to low doses. Unfortunately, there are
complications, such as natural incidence of cancer and cancer caused by
other agents such as smoking, that make these evaluations difficult.
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The radiation protection industry, for a number of years, has
conservatively assumed that there is some risk associated with any
radiation dose, no matter how small. We talk about this in training as
ALARA, we maintain our dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable. The
risk is assumed to increase linearly with dose, meaning the higher the
dose, the greater the risk. Based upon these very conservative
assumptions, the risk of dying from cancer as a result of a 1,000
millirem radiation dose is 5 in 10,000 or 0.0005.
Is a risk of 0.0005 a large risk?
When compared to the types of risks people incur every day of their lives,
that risk is actually quite small. For example, the U. S. Department of
Labor gives the following lifetime probabilities of death:
•

Cancer - 0.35 Highway vehicles - 0.25

•

Heart attacks - 0.11 Falls - 0.11

•

Electrocutions - 0.10 Explosions - 0.04

•

Airline Crash - 0.03 Fires - 0.01

Most of us face more significant risks associated with our normal life
style, like driving to and from UNLV, than we do on our job working with
radioactive materials or radiation producing machines. However, one of
the fundamental principles of radiation protection is that no radiation
dose is acceptable unless there is a corresponding benefit associated
with that dose that is at least as large as the risk.
The National Safety Council maintains a web site indicating statistics
associated with fatal injuries (both accidental and intentional). If you
have
more
interest
in
risk,
take
a
look
at
the
site:
http://www.nsc.org/lrs/statinfo/odds.htm
Like any job where there are hazards, work in a field where you are
exposed to radiation involves some degree of risk, is a personal choice. If
you feel that the risks are too high, then maybe you should not be
working with radiation. However, ensure that you properly evaluate the
risks associated with any other job. Many people who are exposed to
radiation at power plants, in hospitals, in the military, or in universities
have decided that the risks of working around radiation are acceptable.
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Newsletter 31 – Labeling Radioactive Material
Consider the following situation: (You are authorized to use
radioactive materials.)
You are in your laboratory cleaning up after an experiment and you see
a container that has eluded you for a few years, a residual package
from a previous researcher. The package has no markings on it and
appears to be intact. You pick up the package and open it. A puff of
dust permeates the room and you notice that the inner package has a
small trefoil symbol on it. You use a contamination survey meter and
identify that the area is contaminated, the room is contaminated, you
are contaminated, and you most likely have sustained an intake of
radioactive material.
How do I know what I was exposed to?
The simple answer is - you don't! The label didn't tell you that there was
radioactive material in the container, it did not tell you how much, or
what radionuclide you were exposed to, and sometimes more important;
what chemical compound were you exposed to? An evaluation will have
to be made of the material, the work area, (possibly outside the work
area), and your body (to determine the magnitude of the intake and the
associated dose that you received).
What do I do now?!
Call the RSO! This may be a serious exposure with long-term
consequences, not the least of which may be a call to State regulators. In
any case, the material will have to be checked and inventoried by the
RSO.
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How can I prevent this type of accident from happening?
A simple label on the outside of the package could have prevented
exposing you to the radioactive dust or a chemical hazard.
If you find such a container or package in your laboratory or work area,
you really have no need to open it. If after discussion with the laboratory
manager and the RSO, you decide to open it, then do so under controlled
conditions. Put on gloves! Put it in a filtered hood or other protective
enclosure! Use a frisker to check for contamination, or the presence of a
gamma or energetic beta source within the package. An operating glove
box or filtered hood should provide adequate control for opening a
package containing an unknown. Ensure that you are appropriately
protected and other persons in the area are also well protected. Note: the
RSO must be notified immediately any time that radioactive material is
found. Finally, label the package, container, and/or contents with all the
information you have regarding
it.
What should the label read?
A label for radioactive material
should
be
similar
to
the
following:
Indicate the radionuclide or
radionuclides, the activity in the
package, and the dose rate on
contact and at 1 meter, indicate
the status of the package (If you
don't want someone to open it,
write "DO NOT OPEN" in bold
letters on the package). Indicate
who you are and the date and
time you created the label.
What materials should be labeled?
Certainly, all radioactive materials should be labeled with the
information indicated above (NAC 459.355-357, inclusive). And you must
label all hazardous chemicals with the name of the chemical and the
principle hazard. Small vials should be placed in larger, labeled
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containers or racks, and all dilutions, fractions, etc. should bear a
reference number which will allow identification if YOU are not around.
This is especially important if you would not want someone else to open
the package!
Some Other Thoughts.
Whenever you leave a material unattended, it should be labeled. If you
will be away from the material for any length of time, ensure that the
material is stored properly. Provide detailed instructions of what is in the
package, how to open the package, how to handle the material, and how
to dispose of the material.
Experienced Authorized Users may open "unknowns," although the RSO
must always be notified when radioactive materials that we did not know
about are found. Assistants and students must contact the AU for the
laboratory and should not under any circumstances open an unknown
package. Human nature (and scientific curiosity) being what they are,
however, surprises will happen. What we can do therefore is ensure that
all radioactive materials that we know about are properly labeled.
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Newsletter 32 – Safety and Security in the HRC Laboratories
The radiochemistry laboratories in the Harry Reid Center for
Environmental Studies (HRC) allow work with radioactive
materials by trained personnel who are trusted to protect
themselves and others from harm.
Safety
Before you first started to do work with radioactive materials at the HRC
you receive training in basic aspects of radiation safety. Let me remind
you of some of your responsibilities for safety while you are working in
the laboratories.
1. Good housekeeping is required where radioactive materials are
used. Work areas must be clearly defined and uncluttered.
2. Work surfaces shall be covered to facilitate easy decontamination.
Bench coverings shall be changed frequently, i.e., weekly, or
whenever the covering is noticeably soiled, torn, or contaminated.
3. Locate work areas away from heavy traffic or doorways.
4. When moving radioactive solutions between approved locations,
place the material within covered secondary containers that
contain sufficient absorbing material to absorb twice the quantity
of liquid.
5. You must wear protective clothing when you or others in a
laboratory are working with chemicals or radioactive materials. As
a minimum, this is a laboratory coat, safety glasses, long pants,
and close-toed shoes.
6. Radioactive materials shall be stored so as to prevent unauthorized
access or removal from their place of storage. The storage shall not
create a "Radiation Area" and must be shielded or sealed to keep
exposures ALARA. Radionuclides shall not be left unsecured in
unoccupied laboratories.
7. Containers with radioactive materials for storage, processing, or
use, shall be individually and conspicuously labeled. The label
must specify the identity of the radionuclide, the estimated activity
(amount), the initials of the contact person for that material, and
the date. Containers of radioactive material may be placed in
properly labeled secondary containers for storage.
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8. Empty and decontaminated containers must have the label
removed or defaced.
9. You have a continuous monitoring device that you wear during all
work in the laboratories. This device is very sensitive to external
radiations and is specifically assigned to you. Do not loan your
dosimeter to anyone else, and do not wear anyone else’s dosimeter.
10. Your experiences in the laboratories may cause you to have a need
for training to use Hydrofluoric Acid (HF) or other potentially
dangerous compounds. You should always find out about the
elements and compounds that you are working with, look in the
MSDS for each compound – make absolutely sure that you protect
yourself.
11. Be sure that the gloves that you wear are appropriate for
protection from the chemicals you are using.
12. If you need to use HF, you must have HF training, you must have
a buddy (who is also trained) with you, the buddy must have a
tube of calcium gluconate ready to apply should you spill any on
you.
Security
1. There are several ways that we ensure security of our laboratories and
the radioactive materials that we use. On October 1, 2009 we will
institute more controls to protect the laboratories – the back hallway
will be locked at all times and the main entry (near the parking lot)
will be guarded against unauthorized entry. Your Marlock cards will
provide you with access. DO NOT – UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES
LOAN ANYONE ELSE YOUR MARLOCK CARD.
2. In addition to the Marlock permissions, you may have a proximity
card that provides you with access to the primary radioactive material
research laboratories. Your Marlock card is assigned to you and is
ONLY for YOUR use. DO NOT – UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES LOAN
ANYONE ELSE YOUR PROXIMITY CARD.
3. If at any time, you cannot find your Marlock or Proximity card, please
call the Radiation Laboratory Director immediately – so that your card
can be disabled. If you don’t, you are potentially jeopardizing our
laboratories and radioactive materials.
4. Our primary supply of radioactive materials is maintained under the
control of the primary Authorized Radioactive Material Users. Access
to these materials requires a key and a combination. This area must
never be left open and unattended. If you see this area open, call one
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of the primary users immediately!
Our work with radioactive materials and potentially dangerous
substances is very important. Our trust in each other is essential to the
proper protection of ourselves and those who work with us. Our
protection of the laboratories and protection of the materials that we
work with is essential to ensure that we can continue to do what we do.
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Newsletter 33 – X-ray Machines
There are many types of X-ray machines used at UNLV, Dental X-ray,
Diagnostic X-ray, X-ray Fluorescence, and Crystallography machines.
What are X-rays?
X-rays are electromagnetic radiation similar to light but with a higher
energy. They are produced in the electron energy shells of atoms when
electrons or other charged particles excite the atoms of a dense material.
How does an X-ray machine make X-rays?
X-ray machines have an evacuated glass (Xray) tube where a high voltage is put across
two electrodes, the negative cathode, and
the positive anode. The voltage ranges from
several thousand volts to several hundred
thousand volts. This diagram shows the
typical components of an x-ray tube.

What do these different machines do?
Dental x-ray machines make pictures of the internals of our teeth. They
are low energy and low dose rate machines where the distance from the
source to film is small and the resulting picture is small.
Medical diagnostic x-ray machines may be used to evaluate our internal
bone structures or other structures in our bodies. They are typically
higher in energy than dental machines because they have to penetrate a
larger depth of the body (and bigger bones) than dental x-rays.
X-ray Fluorescence machines are low energy machines that are used to
identify the elements in a sample. The source may be electronic or a
source of low energy x-ray emitting radioactive material. The x-rays may
be specialized to look for one element (such as lead) or output to a
spectrometer to identify several elements in an item. The output is
usually higher because the response depends on radiation scattered from
the item being analyzed. Fluorescence is a spectro-chemical method of
analysis where the molecules of the analyte are excited by irradiation at a
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certain wavelength and emit radiation of a different wavelength. The
emission spectrum provides information for both qualitative and
quantitative analysis.
X-ray Crystallography machines are very low energy at extremely high
intensity. These machines are designed to observe the structure of
molecules through diffraction of the x-ray beam. In order to “see”
molecules it is necessary to use a form of electromagnetic radiation with
a wavelength on the order of bond lengths, such as X-rays. X-ray
crystallography is an experimental technique that exploits the fact that
X-rays are diffracted by crystals. It is not an imaging technique.
There are variations of each type of machine in order to enhance certain
analyses or reduce equipment costs for a specific purpose. The degree of
hazard associated with each machine depends on the radiation safety
techniques used to protect the operator. Some machines use key
switches and interlocks to prevent inadvertent exposure, and on some
machines the exposure time and resulting dose at the operator’s
position are very low. Training is usually the key to ensuring a low dose
to x-ray machine operators.
What are the dose rates from various x-ray machines?
The following table lists the dose rate in Sievert/minute from the
different machine types. One Sievert is 100 rads. In this table contact
means as close to the source as you can reasonably get. The dose rate
at 1 meter is estimated as the ‘unshielded’ dose rate.
Dose Rate (Sv/minute)
Machine Type

Dental

Medical

Fluorescence

Crystallography

Contact with

0.01

0.1

10

1000

0.00001

0.0001

0.1

10

tube
At 1 meter

Also, different medical procedures deliver different doses to patients as
shown in the following table:
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Radiation Dose Comparison

Diagnostic Procedure
Chest x ray (PA film)
Skull x ray
Lumbar spine
I.V. urogram
Upper G.I. exam
Barium enema
CT head
CT abdomen

Typical
Effective
Dose
(mSv)1
0.02
0.07
1.3
2.5
3.0
7.0
2.0
10.0

Number of Chest X
rays (PA film) for
Equivalent Effective
Dose2
1
4
65
125
150
350
100
500

Time Period for
Equivalent Effective
Dose from Natural
Background Radiation3
2.4 days
8.5 days
158 days
304 days
1.0 year
2.3 years
243 days
3.3 years

What dose do machine operators receive?
If operators of X-ray machines are cautious and use time, distance, and
shielding appropriately, they will receive no measurable radiation dose
from most X-ray procedures.
The highest dose received by UNLV employees and students is from
fluoroscopic diagnostic X-ray machines and is incurred when they are
assigned off campus to clinical work in hospitals. Fluoroscopy machines
are essentially an X-ray movie where the beam is on continuously to
allow a physician to observe movement of body components or materials
in the body. Since the patient may have to be moved around on the X-ray
table during the ‘filming’, the technicians moving the patient are closer to
the X-ray beam and receive higher doses. There are ways to reduce the
exposure even with fluoroscopy, such as reducing the beam ‘on time’. For
example, if a machine puts out half the number of X-rays in the same ‘on
time’, the dose to everyone (including the patient) is cut in half.
For low energy machines such as dental X-ray, fluorescence, or
diffraction machines the dose is primarily to the skin (shallow dose). If
directly exposed to the beam from a florescence or crystallography
machine for even a small time period may cause burns.
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The information gained by the use of X-rays is extremely valuable but
care must be taken to get that information. The highest dose is received
when you must repeat a procedure many times to get the information
that you need. Try to do it right the first time, take your time, think it out
and prevent unnecessary exposure.
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Newsletter 34 – Some Good Work Practices
I was walking through the laboratories on my standard waste pickup on
Wednesday and took some photos of conditions in the laboratories that
should not happen. This led me to the topic for this month, some good
work practices.
In a discussion of good radiological work practices, highlighted
undesirable situations should help to understand what might be better.
Some pictures
This was the first area that caught my eye. This picture shows items
piled into a yellow tray with a “Radioactive Material” pad. This pad
represents a contaminated area. The items piled into that area may not
have been contaminated, but now they must be considered
contaminated.
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This picture represents a similar situation, clean items in a potentially
contaminated area, but also shows some potentially contaminated pads
flowing off of the area. This could lead to dripping of radioactive liquids
from the pads and an uncontrolled spill.

When you set up a contaminated area, keep things that are not
contaminated from getting contaminated, and keep the number of things
that could get contaminated to a minimum. Vial covers in the “disposable
centrifuge tube” box should not be inside the potentially contaminated
area.
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Tube trays and holders should be outside the contaminated area unless
they are holding tubes with contaminated liquid in them, or they are
contaminated from previous experiments. In this case, they are just
taking up room in the contaminated area.
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In this picture, radioactive solutions are in a tube holder, but there is no
absorbent in the tray and nothing to indicate that the tray is a potentially
contaminated area (no blue pad).
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Any materials brought into one of the higher activity laboratories should
be taken out of packaging in a clean area, and the packaging disposed of
as clean waste. In this case, in MSM-173, packing materials on some
items had to be disposed as radioactive waste.
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Your reference materials and notebooks should be maintained free of
contamination at all times, if possible. There is never a reason to put a
document in a contaminated area. The pen, sharpie, and tape should
also be maintained as non-contaminated.
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We have always said that blue pads represent a contaminated area and
that green represents a clean area. In this picture a green pad is used for
radioactive liquids and the tray to the right with radioactive solutions,
has no liner.
There seems to be a lot of confusion about what to use as a tray
liner, so here is the desired plan.
1. Use blue pads with the words “Radioactive Materials” to provide an
absorbent surface for radioactive liquids – should they spill.
2. Use green pads for non-radioactive liquids
3. Don’t use absorbent pads if you do not have liquids in the tray. A spill
of a powder onto the absorbent pads could make the spill worse.
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As always, be considerate to others in the laboratory, be a part of the
friendly environment that lets us complete our research with minimal
interference as a result of poor forethought on the part of someone else.
Keep your work areas clean and non-contaminated, use time distance,
and shielding to reduce your external dose, minimize your intake of
radioactive materials via inhalation and ingestion by preventing
radioactive materials from entering your breathing zone.
1. You must survey your work area each time that you do work there.
2. Always prepare your samples in a radiologically clean area.
3. You are part of your work area; always check yourself for
contamination before leaving the work area.
4. Prevent contamination from leaving the laboratory area by verifying
that you are not contaminated using the PCM.
5. Prevent contamination from leaving the laboratories by surveying all
items before you take them out of a laboratory.
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Newsletter 35 – Wearing Dosimetry
One requirement that is most important to a radiation safety program
is monitoring the radiation dose that any radiation worker receives.
From a regulatory standpoint we monitor dose to ensure that people
don’t receive dose in excess of limits and that they maintain their dose
As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). In addition, the radiation
safety office will periodically take bioassay samples to ensure that we
minimize intake of radioactive materials.
Who wears dosimetry at the HRC?
Any person working with radioactive materials or radiation producing
machines at the HRC or in the radio-chemistry laboratories at the SEB
who may receive a dose in excess of 500 millirem in a year is required to
wear dosimetry. However, we typically provide dosimetry to many more
than is required to demonstrate that doses are low in our laboratories.
How do I get dosimetry for a new radiation worker?
You can contact the Radiation Safety Office at 5-4226 or visit their web
site to download a form Form # 09 - Radiation Dosimetry Request . Just
fill out the form and return it to the RSO. They will request your new
dosimeter and if necessary provide you with a badge immediately.
How often are dosimeters exchanged?
Every two months the radiation safety office collects our old dosimetry
badge and exchanges it for a new one. The badges are sent to Landauer
(the dosimetry company that UNLV uses) for processing. The results are
typically received in 15 days or so after Landauer receives the badges.
Remember that these results are for the previous 2 month monitoring
period. It is possible to request an "emergency" reading of a dosimetry
badge, for which Landauer charges an additional $50.00. This is done
only if a very high dose is expected and has never been done at UNLV.
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What if my badge is lost?
When you lose your dosimeter, the RSO will need to provide you another
dosimeter – but in order to ensure that they have a reasonable record of
your dose (from the time that the lost badge was worn); they will need to
have a Lost Badge Report filed and evaluated by the RSO.
What if I am exposed to radiation at more than one job?
Some people are exposed to radiation at UNLV and at another place
where they work. Those people wear the UNLV dosimeter for UNLV (or
student) functions and their other dosimeter at the other work function.
Only one dosimeter is worn for each job.
How is my dose controlled if I am exposed at two locations?
The only way that dose can be controlled when you work at two locations
is an effort by YOU to ensure that the RSO at both locations knows that
you wear dosimetry at another location. Then the RSO's can
communicate information to ensure that you do not exceed dose limits. If
the locations are both on campus, then the same badge issued by the
UNLV RSO should be worn in both places unless different instruction is
received from the UNLV RSO.
What if I have declared my pregnancy?
This is one of the few times that the RSO may provide someone with two
dosimetry badges. The badge monitoring the mother is worn on the part
of the body expected to receive the highest dose to the mother and the
other is worn on the front surface of the baby's location under any
protective equipment (example: a lead apron). Any specific concerns
about exposure of an unborn child should be discussed with the RSO.
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Newsletter 36 – Surveying Your Workspace
A responsibility that we all have when working with radioactive materials
is to ensure that our radioactive materials do not affect others. We do
this by preventing the spread of radioactive contamination from our work
areas. The only way that we can accomplish this is by using some
method to identify the presence of the activity in and around our work
areas each time we use radioactive materials.
What is a survey for?
A contamination survey simply identifies the location of radioactive
material in the area surveyed.
What are the main methods of finding out where contamination is?
This depends on the radionuclide emissions that we desire to evaluate,
what form the radionuclide(s) are in, and what methods we have to
measure the emissions.
Radionuclides in our laboratories could be in solutions, in powders, or in
solids. The emissions from these materials could be electrons, photons,
or alpha particles. Also, we have a few different detectors that may or
may not be appropriate for the measurement that we may need.
What are direct measurements?
Direct measurements of contamination are made using portable
instruments that can be moved over a work surface and the rate of
detection for particles can be evaluated by a meter, or by sound. The
‘click’ that is made by the speaker on portable detectors is a direct
indication of an interaction in the detector.
Direct measurements are useful for immediate indication of high
concentrations of activity on item, bench tops, floors, or work areas.
There are two portable detectors that are currently used by our program
to locate emissions from radionuclides:
To do a direct measurement survey, check the instrument for operability
(see the next section), measure emissions from the work area, adjacent
areas, the bench in front of you, the floor under where you were
standing, and your clothing.
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To measure the emissions, hold the probe at 1 cm from the area you
want to check, move the probe slowly, 3 to 6 cm per second is a
reasonable speed. While the probe is in motion, pay attention to the
sound of the meter. If you hear an increase in the frequency of the
‘clicks’, move the probe back over that area and hold the probe there for
about 30 seconds to assess the magnitude of the increase.
If the increase is three times the background count rate, then consider
that area to be contaminated, wipe the area and throw the wipe in the
solid radioactive waste.
Ludlum Model 3
The Ludlum Model 3 rate-meter with a 44-9 Geiger probe is currently
used in our program for evaluation of emissions from alpha and/or beta
emissions from most of the radionuclides that we use. It is useful for
detection and measurement of beta radiation and detection of gamma
radiation or alpha radiation. This detector has a small sensitive area; the
window has a diameter of 4.75 cm, an overall area of 17.7 cm2.
The detection efficiency for 99Tc beta emissions for the model 3 is
approximately 10% (0.1 counts/transformation), so a measurement of a
surface activity concentration of 1000 dpm/probe area would be
approximately 100 counts per minute. With a background count rate of
100 counts per minute, this is the lowest activity that could be measured
by the Model 3 with some small degree of confidence.
This instrument is not appropriate for measurement of alpha emissions
because they are not consistently detected due to variations in the
window thickness of the detector. It is also not appropriate for
measurement of high energy photon emissions because of the small
sensitive volume of the detector.
Some more specific information about the Ludlum Model 3 Geiger
counter is provided in Newsletter HRC-24.
Ludlum Model 2360
The Ludlum Model 2360 rate-meter/scalar with a 43-93 alpha/beta
scintillation probe is useful for measurement of both alpha and beta
emissions from most of the radionuclides that we use. It is not useful for
measurement of gamma emissions although it will detect them. The 4393 detector has a 100 cm2 probe with a very thin mylar window.
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The detection efficiency for 99Tc beta emissions for the model 2360 is
approximately 15% (0.15 counts/transformation), so a measurement of a
surface activity concentration of 1000 dpm/100 cm2 would be
approximately 150 counts per minute. With a background count rate of
150 counts per minute, this is the lowest activity that could be measured
by the Model 2360 with some small degree of confidence.
This instrument is not appropriate for measurement of high energy
photon emissions because of the small sensitive volume of the detector.
Some more specific information about the Ludlum Model 2360 ratemeter with the 43-93 probe is provided in Newsletter HRC-25.
Preparing to Operate an Instrument
1. Always make sure that your instrument is in good condition. No
major dents in the case, it looks like it should work (no wires hanging
out), etc.
2. Make sure that the instrument has been calibrated in the past year.
Check the calibration sticker for the date that calibration is due.
3. Turn the instrument to the BAT position and make sure that the
meter reading is beyond the battery OK position in the meter.
4. Turn the knob to the lowest scale and check for a normal background
response. For a pancake GM probe, the normal response should be
between 20 and 100 counts per minute in a low background area. For an
alpha/beta scintillation probe, the normal background response is
between 100 to 200 counts per minute.
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Portable Instrument Precautions
Radiation detectors are delicate; they are the only way that you can tell if
there is ionizing radiation in your area, try to prevent them from damage.
As with any instrument, there are some precautions that you can take to
ensure that it provides you with the information that you need and that
it continues to work. These are:
1. Never put the instrument in water – it will never work again.
2. When surveying contaminated areas – try not to touch the probe to
the surface you are measuring – this will minimize the probability that
you will contaminate the probe.
3. Never survey sharp objects; wire, wire brushes, brooms, things that
can make a hole in things. This action will cause the window to be
broken and the instrument to be non-responsive.
4. Never use the probe as a hammer. There is a floating anode inside
the 44-9 Geiger detector that can easily be shaken out of position –
maybe even short out. There is a photomultiplier tube in a 43-93 that
can shatter – anyway use a hammer for hammering.
5. Try not to drop the meter or detector – dropping the meter could
break a circuit board inside the case – dropping the probe may break the
window or short out the anode on the 44-9 or break the photomultiplier
tube in the 43-93.
6. If there is an accident and you contaminate the detector, remove the
detector from normal use and notify the laboratory manager that the
instrument is Out Of Service. Usually the instrument can be
decontaminated or repaired in less than one hour.
Are there other than direct measurement surveys?
Yes, direct measurement surveys are appropriate to measure the total
activity on a surface. However, as you can surmise from the previous
discussion, direct measurements with our portable instruments are not
adequate to ensure that we are in compliance with the 100 dpm/100
cm2, level of concern for removable beta emitting radionuclides and the
20 dpm/100 cm2 limit for removable alpha emitting radionuclides.
Also, direct measurements are not useful for contamination control if the
background response rate is high. A smear survey is capable of providing
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a more sensitive evaluation of removable activity on a surface – even in a
high background area.
What is a smear?
The smears that we use are small disks of paper with an adhesive back.
Each smear comes on a small rectangle of paper with an area to record a
smear identification number and some information about the location,
date, time, surveyor, and to indicate the analysis method.
The smear is made of paper so if you rub it on rough surfaces like rough
concrete or metal, it will tear or shred. It should be used on smooth dry
surfaces. Making the smear wet will decrease your detection efficiency for
alpha and beta emissions. If you smear a wet area, let the smear dry
prior to analysis.

What are smear surveys?
In smear surveys, a smear is rubbed over an area of 100 cm2 to collect a
sample of the removable radioactive material on the surface. One
hundred square centimeters is used in order to provide a standard area.
The smear location is indicated on a survey map, usually by writing the
smear number on the map at the location where the smear was rubbed.
When you have your smears ready for analysis, take the time to evaluate
them with a portable instrument to make sure that they do not have too
much activity on them. If they do, they could cause contamination of the
low background detector (then it won’t be low background).
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The smear is then analyzed for activity on a detector appropriate for the
emissions from the radionuclides expected to be present. In our case, the
smear can be analyzed on a low background alpha/beta counter or a low
background alpha/beta scintillation detector.
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Newsletter 37 – Weekly Plans for Radiochemistry
In the past several weeks we have implemented a program for planning
all work with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry laboratories at
the HRC and in other areas where work is done for the radiochemistry
program. This program was implemented because an authorized
Radioactive Material User (User) must be responsible for all work
conducted under the authority of the UNLV Radioactive materials
license. In previous years we worked under a few different systems that
caused confusion among the Users and prevented a strong User
knowledge of the work. This newsletter is to more adequately define the
planning process and answer some questions that have come up.
What is a radioactive material User?
A User is a person who has been authorized by the UNLV Radiation
Safety Officer (RSO) to work independently with radioactive materials. A
Radioactive Materials User is a permanent faculty or staff member who
has submitted an application to the RSO and has been approved, based
on education, experience, and trust to work with licensed radioactive
materials at the UNLV main campus, the UNLV Shadow Lane campus, or
at a specific (approved) site remote from the main campus. A User must
be aware of work that is conducted under their authority and they must
be present on campus when that work is in progress.
Who are the Radioactive Material Users that work with the
Radiochemistry Program?
There are several radioactive material Users in the Radiochemistry
program as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.
Dr.

Ken Czerwinski,
Gary Cerefice,
Ralf Sudowe,
Thomas Hartmann, and
Vern Hodge.

What is in a plan for work with radioactive materials?
The basic form for submitting a plan is simple, the questions to answer
are:
What are the dates of your work and who are you?
What radionuclide(s) will you be working with and what do you want to
do with them?
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How much activity of those radionuclides will be used and where will you
use it?
Then check all of the things that you would like to do with the activity
and turn the form in to a User.
How is a plan evaluated?
The work plan is reviewed by an authorized User, and if the work looks
reasonable without additional controls, then the User checks the “box” at
the bottom of the form that indicates, the submission has been
“Compared to RMS guidelines and is accepted without additional
controls” and signs the form, and puts the information on the board
indicating that work may proceed.
A User signature is REQUIRED and your project must be on the board
before work may proceed. If you have submitted a plan and your project
is not listed on the board, then assume it has not been approved.
What is the planning board? And what is its purpose?
Work within the radiochemistry laboratories requires the knowledge and
presence of a radioactive materials User. The white board at the
laboratory bay entry is a simple way of identifying who could be working
in the laboratories and what they are working on.
Why do I have to submit a new plan each week?
A new plan is required each week so that each User knows that the plan
is current and the work described in the plan is accurate. We previously
had a board that rarely changed and was not a very good indicator of the
work going on in the laboratories. Documentation ensures information is
available for the UNLV Radiation Safety Office to evaluate our work.
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What if I don’t submit a plan and must do work with radioactive
materials?
A User MUST be aware of any use of radioactive materials and must
approve that use for any time that they are responsible. A User may
approve use of radioactive materials as needed.
However, if a User has not approved your plan and you are working with
radioactive materials, you are in violation of the UNLV radioactive
materials license and will be excused from the laboratories and your
reentry will be restricted until the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer, the
HRC Laboratory Director, and your supervisor approve your
authorization to continue your work.
What if my plan is not approved?
If you have submitted a plan that involves evolutions that may be
hazardous to you, others in the laboratory, or may result in release of
materials from the laboratory areas, the User evaluation may cause the
work to be held up until the work is discussed with you and reasonable
controls are put in place to ensure the safety of all. If the work involves
significant amounts of activity, a work plan may be required and
approval by the RSO may be required.
Remember, the Radiation Safety Officer at UNLV has TOTAL
authority to stop work by anyone using radioactive materials on
campus at any time. Our license is a broad scope type B license with
the State of Nevada and the RSO is the supervisor of all radioactive
material use at UNLV.
What about surveys?
If you work with radioactive materials in the radiochemistry laboratories,
you have a responsibility to yourself and others in the laboratory bay to
prevent the spread of radioactive contamination from your work area. As
such, you must do and document surveys to provide compliance with the
UNLV Radiation Safety Manual and thus the UNLV Radioactive Materials
License(s). If you did not document a survey of your work area(s), then
you did not do a survey of the work area! Documentation is required.
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How can I learn more about controls for my project?
There are many ways to become familiar with controls that may be
applicable to your work as follows:
1. Review the UNLV Radiation Safety Manual for requirements. The
UNLV Radiation safety Manual is now specifically indicated as a part of
our radioactive materials license.
2. Discuss your project with your supervisor and ensure that you have
considered all hazards associated with the materials that you will use.
3. Review the Material Safety Data Sheets for the chemicals that you use
in your research; be sure to control the chemical hazards as well as the
radiological hazards.
4. Discuss your project with the UNLV Radiation Safety Officer and/or
the HRC Radiation Laboratory Director.
A general rule that I have about work with any hazardous materials is:
“Make sure that you are comfortable with the controls before you start
your project.
Always ask yourself – am I ready?”
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Appendix C – Fraction of Surface Activity Removed by the Gel

Table 3-2. Fraction of Total Activity on the Surface Removed by the Gel

Location
Number

Decon Factor for
Removable
Activity

Fraction of
Removable
Activity

Decontamination
Factor for Total
Surface Activity

Fraction of
Fixed
Activity
Removed

1

55

0.028

126

0.992

2

259

0.053

63

0.984

3

7078

0.337

71

0.986

4

582

0.234

94394

1.000

5

4565

0.148

107622

1.000

6

1019

0.241

95

0.989

7

207

0.102

45

0.978

8

148

0.075

14

0.927

9

23

0.025

37

0.973

10

92

0.012

25

0.960

11

139

0.085

19

0.948

12

175

0.050

15

0.935

13

80

0.015

31

0.968

14

126

0.022

31

0.968

15

78

0.057

35

0.971

16

57

0.021

5

0.801

17

151

0.015

11

0.909

18

259

0.054

33

0.970

19

291

0.061

13

0.923

20

316

0.121

97

0.990

21

123

0.172

18

0.943

22

4308

0.240

19

0.946

23

1220

0.128

19

0.947

24

538

0.134

12

0.917

25

3996

0.060

32

0.969

26

368

0.035

31

0.968

27

156

0.035

13

0.923

28

352

0.018

18

0.945

29

4250

0.085

13

0.924

30

14

0.161

36756

1.000

31

12

0.055

46

0.978

32

13

0.074

6803

1.000

33

23

0.209

6331

1.000

34

43

0.175

6898

1.000

35

52

0.122

5

0.788

36

179

0.139

2

0.596

37

8

0.120

9

0.885
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Location
Number

Decon Factor for
Removable
Activity

Fraction of
Removable
Activity

Decontamination
Factor for Total
Surface Activity

Fraction of
Fixed
Activity
Removed

38

20

0.079

11433

1.000

39

38

0.253

8598

1.000

40

41

0.144

78

0.987

41

105

0.130

5

0.802

42

84

0.125

4

0.759

43

18

0.098

4

0.760

44

51

0.187

2

0.516

45

83

0.168

4

0.728

46

320

0.147

3

0.707

47

88

0.263

17

0.941

48

65

0.416

14

0.927

49

85

0.296

16913

1.000

50

27

0.128

11433

1.000

51

79

0.137

12094

1.000

52

84

0.241

13323

1.000

53

154

0.297

9

0.892

54

60

0.392

6

0.831

55

113

0.212

5

0.793

56

64

0.285

3

0.675

57

367

0.245

5

0.811

58

139

0.238

3

0.652

59

140

0.282

2

0.593

60

98

0.627

6

0.841

61

70

0.213

7

0.856

62

96

0.221

7

0.864

63

65

0.228

10

0.902

64

149

0.442

15

0.935

65

689

0.424

16252

1.000

66

18

0.271

27780

1.000

68

36

0.136

9638

1.000

69

31

0.139

30

0.967

70

59

0.128

32220

1.000

71

153

0.190

90

0.989

72

425

0.061

37

0.973

73

54

0.208

17575

1.000

74

10

0.010

22583

1.000

75

81

0.275

22772

1.000

76

89

0.013

97

0.990

77

7

0.118

259

0.996

78

106

0.143

45

0.978

79

29

0.394

13

0.920

80

27

0.358

28

0.964

81

193

0.423

74

0.987

82

279

0.558

24

0.958

83

51

0.012

33

0.970
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Location
Number

Decon Factor for
Removable
Activity

Fraction of
Removable
Activity

Decontamination
Factor for Total
Surface Activity

Fraction of
Fixed
Activity
Removed

84

327

0.208

13

0.924

85

248

0.149

14

0.930

86

321

0.074

18

0.943

87

1727

0.195

13

0.921

89

96

0.033

4

0.762

90

57

0.012

5

0.801

91

49

0.008

11

0.909

92

20

0.002

18

0.943

93

675

0.110

25

0.960

94

2266

0.098

21

0.953

95

236

0.033

19

0.946

97

47

0.042

18

0.944

98

81

0.053

14

0.928

100

283

0.071

15

0.934

101

1145

0.160

9

0.887

102

126

0.101

20

0.951

104

140

0.039

12

0.918

105

476

0.174

7

0.857

106

330

0.127

9

0.884

108

107

0.079

17

0.942

109

401

0.150

5

0.814

110

180

0.166

7

0.851

111

375

0.219

11

0.912

112

241

0.170

48094

1.000

113

694

0.077

17

0.942

114

710

0.446

12756

1.000

115

488

0.310

26740

1.000

116

56

0.031

48

0.979

117

132

0.033

63

0.984

118

1008

0.314

9

0.882

119

1090

0.258

179

0.994

120

1155

0.021

107622

1.000

121

100

0.013

94394

1.000

122

351

0.032

65102

1.000

123

446

0.002

71

0.986

124

201

0.019

126

0.992
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Appendix D - A Model Standard Procedure for Radionuclide
Recovery

INTRODUCTION
This procedure is a model to identify the specific aspects of a chemical
procedure for reuse of radioactive materials that are important to the
safety of personnel involved in the operation and those that may be in
the area of this work. Each of the measures that should be taken for
control of hazardous or radioactive chemicals are common and based on
documents cited throughout this model procedure. This is not intended
to be an extensive guide to chemical safety; all research facilities have
Health and Safety or Risk Management groups with experienced
personnel to provide guidance in experimentation with radiochemicals.
Personnel who work in radiochemistry laboratories should experience
radiation safety training, chemical hygiene training, and specific
laboratory training for the research that they will do.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this procedure is to provide guidance for safety
considerations appropriate for removal of radionuclides from chemical
compounds or mixtures. This guidance is to minimize the hazards
experienced or protect personnel from those hazards. The goal is to
recover radionuclides from so that they are in more easily stored and
used again without presenting a hazard to the laboratory.
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Radioactive materials emit radiation; the degree of hazard associated
with their emissions depends on the type of radiation emitted and the
energy of that radiation. Those radionuclides that emit gamma radiation
or high energy beta radiation may provide more of an external radiation
hazard, one in which the emissions have sufficient energy and
penetrability to cause an important degree of risk to researchers even
though the material is outside of the body. This external radiation risk is
controlled by minimizing the time of exposure to high dose rates,
maximizing the distance from the source to minimize the dose rate, and
using shielding to minimize the dose rate.
Some other materials may have emissions that are not important as an
external radiation hazard, but are important if inside of the body. For
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example, radionuclides that emit alpha or low energy beta radiation
might be important if inhaled, absorbed through the skin or a wound, or
ingested. There may also be radionuclides that emit both penetrating and
non-penetrating radiation, for example gamma and alpha or alpha
emitters in a compound with a light element that may emit neutrons
when hit with an alpha particle.
The emissions and their energy are well documented for radionuclides
[148]. The appropriate measures to be taken will vary by radionuclide
and when working with materials that contain activity in excess of 1
Annual Limit on Intake [149] for the most restrictive intake pathway,
inhalation or Ingestion, the Radiation Safety Officer or Health Physicist
should be consulted to ensure appropriate controls are used. A control
guideline was established for use in the radiochemistry laboratories at
UNLV [150].
Once established, methods of proper use will ensure:
Control of radioactive contamination to minimize inhalation or
ingestion.
Proper security to prevent theft of radioactive materials.
Exposure reduction by external exposure control methods.
CHEMICALS
Chemistry safety involves active measures to prevent contact with the
skin, inhalation, and ingestion. The specific hazards of chemicals are
identified in Material Safety Data Sheets published by the manufacturer
of the chemicals [151]. The MSDS is required by OSHA guidelines [152].
A second source of information regarding the hazards associated with
chemicals is the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards [153]. With
these sources of information a researcher should be able to identify the
potential effects of exposure to specific chemicals, the levels which have
shown to be safe to work with, and the mechanisms that are reasonable
for protection.
The most common hazards associated with chemicals are those hazards
that are considered ‘characteristic’ such as ignitable, corrosive, reactive,
or toxic. These classifications are generally applied to hazardous waste
[154], but are important for laboratory safety. The measures to protect
personnel from these hazards are well known. Training to assist people
in protection methods and accident response is common for personnel
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working in the hazardous waste industry and is required by OSHA as
HAZWOPER training [155].
BASIC SAFETY
Know the hazard
Any time chemicals and/or radioactive materials are used, the hazard
associated with their use must be known. Review the known safety
information about the materials known to be in the residue. For example;
the Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) or other manufacturer’s
information [156]. If there is no applicable MSDS, then consider the
compounds that will be created by the processes used to return the
radioactive residue to a reusable material, the compounds used in the
research to make the material, and base controls on all of those.
Throughout the work to recover the radioactive elements or return the
material to a more desirable form for reuse, a number of important safety
considerations must be made. These may involve controls associated
with:
Adding other reactive chemicals and







Heating
Cooling
Mixing
Freeze drying
Bubbling
Evaporating

Each of these methods has its own requirements for safety that may add
a degree of complexity to the determination of the total hazard associated
with the recovery. If there is a degree of concern for strong energetic
release from a mixture, then consult a senior member of the research
group or do a test with a small mass of material before using a larger
mass.
PLANNING
An evaluation of the material to be recovered should be completed to
ensure that adequate control measures have been implemented to
provide for the safety of personnel and the facility. Radiation, chemical,
and basic safety must all be considered as part of your plan to recover
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the material. The following safety levels are as defined in the UNLV Risk
Assessment and Control Guideline for Radioactive Materials.
The degree of authorization should be commensurate with the
importance of the resulting damage should something deviate from the
desired outcome. Conditions for including the authorization to proceed
might be as described in table B-1.
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Table B-27 - Controls for Recovery of Radionuclides from Residues

LEVEL I – User Authorization
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than
0.01 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 1 is less than 1.
This level is appropriate for general laboratory conditions where the risk to
all personnel is low and typical of most work in the laboratories where the
safety of personnel is trusted to the researcher.
LEVEL II – User Authorization
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than
0.1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 2 is less than 1.
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to
all personnel is low and typical of most hazardous work in the laboratories
where the safety of personnel is trusted to the Authorized User.
LEVEL III – Radiation Safety Officer Authorization
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than
1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 3 is less than 1.
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to
all personnel is elevated and not typical of work in the laboratories. In
these situations, which are rare, participation of the radiation safety staff
is important in planning the experiment and the attendance by a member
of the Radiation Safety Office may be considered necessary. In this
situation it is considered appropriate to minimize the number of personnel
working in the lab who may be affected by the operation.
LEVEL IV - Radiation Safety Committee Authorization
The dose equivalent rate at working distance from the material is less than
1 mSv/hour, and the limiting activity fraction for level 4 is less than 1.
This level would be appropriate for laboratory conditions where the risk to
all personnel is elevated and not typical of work in the laboratories. In
these situations, which not anticipated, participation of the radiation
safety committee is important in planning the experiment and attendance
by a member of the Radiation Safety Office is necessary. In this type of
situation, the laboratory is restricted to only personnel who are involved in
the experiment, and that number should be limited.
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DOSE RATE CONTROLS
For beta and gamma emitting radionuclides, there may be a
consideration for the shallow or deep dose equivalent rates. If the
consideration is primarily for beta radiation, then a plexiglass shield
between the researcher and the material will probably be adequate. This
type of shield is also appropriate for protection from splattering,
splashing, or flying debris and may protect a researcher from caustic or
thermal burns.
For gamma emitters, an important consideration is the energy of the
gamma emissions, a simple method to determine the thickness of
shielding required to lower the dose rate is the use of a chart similar to
Table B-1. If the dose rate can be minimized by the use of shielding, that
action should be taken without reducing the controls which would
minimize inhalation or ingestion intake of the material.
CONTROL LEVEL DETERMINATION
Using the guidance of the UNLV Radiation Safety Office, the limiting
activity fraction for each level would be as follows. If the Limiting ALI
Fraction is not less than 1, then elevate to the next level:
LFi(M) = Limiting ALI Fraction for radionuclide mixture M for Rad Level i*:

∑(

)

EQUATION A-1

* The limiting ALI for radionuclides of interest for each Rad Level at
UNLV is shown on Tables B-3, B-4, and B-5: Risk Assessment and
Control Guides for Radiochemistry Radionuclides.
n = the index number for each radionuclide considered.
An = the activity of radionuclide(n) that is in the residue.
ALi = the limiting activity of radionuclide(n) for Rad Level i.
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SF = A safety factor that may be based on minimizing the activity
that will undergo heating, or bubbling. This factor would be a
fraction of 1.
SAFETY FACTOR
The safety factor indicated in equation A-1 is added to the ALI fraction as
a means of establishing a more limiting set of controls. At this time, while
this concept is in its early stages, the values for safety factor (SF)
presented in Table B-2.
The establishment of a safety factor for any process that may cause the
development of a hazard as a result of the radioactive material or another
constituent of a solution or solid is simply a means to allow a stronger
control to be applied. The assignment of such a factor may be made by a
researcher, an Authorized User, or by Radiation Safety or Hazardous
Material Safety Personnel based on their knowledge and experience in
dealing with a specific material.
As can be identified from the information in Table B-2, it is recognized
that a temperature, degree of mixing or any process at which adverse
reactions in unknown solutions will occur is of course unknown. Thus
inappropriately establishing a “safety” factor based on limited knowledge
is undesirable. The researcher and their supervision should strive to
apply a safety factor to prevent situations that will be hazardous to any
person in a laboratory. They should use the information that they have
about what went into a solution and what may have been created from
environmental influences on the solution.
Table B-2 establishes a minimum safety factor based on the simple fact
that some tasks have an inherent hazard that cannot be avoided. When
items are heated, or stirred, or bubbled, the possibility of contamination
spread is higher than processes that will not cause a physical change to
the solution. One process that could be considered benign to the solution
might be storage unless other influences of heat or cold could affect the
material or its container.
Other considerations appropriate to the development of safety practices
should also consider the extreme case where explosion or a significant
release of radioactive material to the public could occur. In these cases,
every effort should be taken to more accurately characterize the degree of
hazard before processing the material. Processing a small quantity may
be an appropriate practice to evaluate how the material will behave.
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Table B-8 Considerations in the Use of a Safety Factor

Process

Hazard Discussion

Safety Factor

Heating

In heating, the concern is associated with
causing the radioactive material to become
airborne, splashing out of its container or
causing emission of hazardous gas from the
solution. Consider multiple factors for
heating depending on the fraction of an
important temperature (melting point,
boiling point) for the material heated. If the
possible outcome is simply a warming of the
solution then the factor is lower. If the
outcome could be volatilization or splashing,
then the factor is higher.

0.1 to 1.0

Mixing,
stirring,
or
shaking

In mixing, the aggressiveness of mixing can
be associated with improving the probability
of a spill of liquids. The safety factor
associated with slow mixing with a stir bar
could be 0 and the safety factor associated
with aggressive mixing in a blender or
centrifuge could cause a serious spill of
radioactive material if there is equipment
failure.

0.1 to 1.0

Freeze
Drying

Freeze drying removes water and volatile
liquids from a solution. Improper setup and
use can cause sprays and spills of process
materials or internal contamination of the
freeze drier. If a positive outcome of freeze
drying is known for a substance, then the
safety factor of 0 is appropriate. If there is
the possibility that it may not go well
consider a higher safety factor.

0.1 to 1.0
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Process

Hazard Discussion

Bubbling

In bubbling a gas through a solution to get a
reaction to occur, the bubbling will cause
droplets of the solution to splash out of the
container unless precautions are taken to
avoid this. Bubbling without protection
against splashing should not be done,
however, if it cannot be avoided consider a
higher safety factor.

Other
This list considers only some of the
processes processes that are used in the laboratory for
separation of liquids and solids from liquids.
Consider the hazard, if there is a likelihood
of creating airborne activity or causing a
spread of radioactive contamination, apply a
safety factor appropriate to abate the
hazard.

Safety Factor
0.1 to 1.0

0 to 1.0

SAMPLE RECOVERY
Consider use of 10 MBq of Am-241 and 15 MBq of Pu-239 for a recovery,
Consider a safety factor of 0.1 because the material will be heated.
A review of the Control Guidelines indicates that this material must be
done in a glove box.
Am-241 has a limiting activity at Level 4 of 29.6 MBq (Considering no
airborne activity). Am-243 has the same limiting activity.
Applying equation A-1, LFi(M) = 0.1 + 10/29.6 + 15/29.6 = 0.945
Since LFi(M) is less than 1, the material can be recovered at RAD LEVEL
IV, the dose equivalent rate at one meter from the material is:

Ḣ = 10/29.6 • 2.51x10-3 mSv/h + 15/29.6 • 1.465x10-3 mSv/h = 1.59
μSv/h
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At RAD LEVEL IV, the recovery should be reviewed by the Authorized
User with the RSO to ensure that adequate controls are established
during the recovery.
Other items that must be considered are training of personnel involved,
documentation of the recovery, disposition of the waste produced,
cleanup and contamination control surveys.
METHODS
This section provides some specific safety considerations that would
depend on the specific methods that might be considered for a recovery.
While these items are appropriate for safety associated with the selected
process, they may not be the only safety measure that should be taken.
Protective clothing for example, will only provide appropriate protection
when it is intact. The researcher must make continuous observation of
the process so that unexpected situations are readily identified and
actions can be taken to provide protection.
Analysis
In analysis of materials, it is possibly more important to provide
protection to the instrument so as to avoid damage. It is also important
to recognize that many of these instruments operate on high voltage and
may have very hot or cold surfaces. These three hazards are some of the
most important to be aware of. Knowing the presence of the hazard is
important, knowing how to protect yourself from it is more important.
Review some of the methods that are used in the laboratory and the
hazards associated with them. Consider the methods and protection in
Table B-2.
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Table B-9 – Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 1 & 2
Gamma Constant

RAD LEVEL 1

Nuclide
2

Am-241
Am-242m
Am-243
Ba-133
Cd-109
Cm-244
Cm-248
Co-57
Co-60
Cs-137
Eu-152
Eu-154
Eu-155
Hf-175
I-125
Mn-54
Na-22
Np-237
Pb-210
Po-210
Pu-236
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Ra-226
Sb-125
Sr-85
Sr-90
Tc-99
Tc-99m
Th-229
Th-230
Th-232
U-232
U-233
U-235
U-238

mSv/hr/MBq/m
8.479E-05
4.950E-05
8.456E-05
1.231E-04
4.983E-05
1.741E-05
1.227E-05
4.087E-05
3.703E-04
1.032E-04
2.012E-04
2.042E-04
1.804E-05
6.443E-05
7.432E-05
1.382E-04
3.620E-04
1.251E-04
6.801E-05
1.424E-09
2.405E-05
2.135E-05
8.145E-06
2.030E-05
NA
1.684E-05
3.274E-06
1.028E-04
2.052E-04
NA
1.242E-10
3.317E-05
1.989E-04
1.861E-05
1.848E-05
2.403E-05
7.866E-06
9.159E-05
1.763E-05

Less Than
(MBq)
4.921
4.921
4.921
0.10582
0.2775
3.7
3.7
0.21127
0.24679
0.0185
1.48
0.925
1.628
0.12321
0.02479
0.0925
0.02479
4.625
0.00185
0.185
3.7
4.773
4.921
4.921
4.921
4.218
0.12321
0.148
0.0555
0.2775
0.21127
0.0148
24.679
24.679
25.9
9.25
9.25
9.25
9.25
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Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
Rate
(mSv/hour)
4.173E-04
2.436E-04
4.161E-04
1.303E-05
1.383E-05
6.442E-05
4.540E-05
8.635E-06
9.139E-05
1.909E-06
2.978E-04
1.889E-04
2.937E-05
7.938E-06
1.842E-06
1.278E-05
8.974E-06
5.786E-04
1.258E-07
2.634E-10
8.899E-05
1.019E-04
4.008E-05
9.990E-05
7.103E-05
4.034E-07
1.521E-05
1.139E-05
2.624E-11
4.909E-07
4.909E-03
4.593E-04
4.786E-04
2.223E-04
7.276E-05
8.472E-04
1.631E-04

RAD LEVEL 2

Not Airborne
& Less Than
(MBq)
0.00037
0.00037
0.00037
25.9
1.48
0.00037
0.000074
25.9
1.11
3.7
0.74
0.74
3.33
33.3
1.48
29.6
14.8
0.000148
0.037
0.0222
0.00074
0.00037
0.00037
0.00037
0.0111
0.00037
0.0222
18.5
74
0.148
25.9
2960
0.000037
0.00037
0.000037
0.00037
0.00148
0.00148
0.00148

Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
Rate
(mSv/hour)
3.137E-08
1.832E-08
3.129E-08
3.188E-03
7.375E-05
6.442E-09
9.080E-10
1.059E-03
4.110E-04
3.818E-04
1.489E-04
1.511E-04
6.007E-05
2.146E-03
1.100E-04
4.091E-03
5.358E-03
1.851E-08
2.516E-06
3.161E-11
1.780E-08
7.900E-09
3.014E-09
7.511E-09
6.231E-09
7.268E-08
1.902E-03
1.518E-02
3.217E-09
9.818E-02
7.359E-09
6.886E-09
6.838E-10
8.891E-09
1.164E-08
1.356E-07
2.609E-08

Table B-10 - Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 3
Gamma Constant
Nuclide
2

Am-241
Am-242m
Am-243
Ba-133
Cd-109
Cm-244
Cm-248
Co-57
Co-60
Cs-137
Eu-152
Eu-154
Eu-155
Hf-175
I-125
Mn-54
Na-22
Np-237
Pb-210
Po-210
Pu-236
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Ra-226
Sb-125
Sr-85
Sr-90
Tc-99
Tc-99m
Th-229
Th-230
Th-232
U-232
U-233
U-235
U-238

mSv/hr/MBq/m
8.479E-05
4.950E-05
8.456E-05
1.231E-04
4.983E-05
1.741E-05
1.227E-05
4.087E-05
3.703E-04
1.032E-04
2.012E-04
2.042E-04
1.804E-05
6.443E-05
7.432E-05
1.382E-04
3.620E-04
1.251E-04
6.801E-05
1.424E-09
2.405E-05
2.135E-05
8.145E-06
2.030E-05
NA
1.684E-05
3.274E-06
1.028E-04
2.052E-04
NA
1.242E-10
3.317E-05
1.989E-04
1.861E-05
1.848E-05
2.403E-05
7.866E-06
9.159E-05
1.763E-05

If Not
Airborne Less
Than (MBq)
0.00000222
0.00000222
0.00000222
0.259
0.0148
0.0000037
0.00000074
0.259
0.0111
0.037
0.0074
0.0074
0.0333
0.333
0.0148
0.296
0.148
0.00000148
0.00037
0.000222
0.0000074
0.00000259
0.00000222
0.00000222
0.000111
0.00000259
0.000222
0.185
0.74
0.00148
0.259
1.85
0.000000333
0.00000222
0.00000037
0.00000296
0.0000148
0.0000148
0.0000148
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RAD LEVEL 3
Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
If Airborne
Rate
Less Than
(mSv/hour)
(MBq)
1.882E-10
0.0296
1.099E-10
0.0296
1.877E-10
0.0296
3.188E-05
74
7.375E-07
11.1
6.442E-11
0.037
9.080E-12
0.0074
1.059E-05
148
4.110E-06
7.4
3.818E-06
3.7
1.489E-06
29.6
1.511E-06
18.5
6.007E-07
148
2.146E-05
111
1.100E-06
1.48
4.091E-05
74
5.358E-05
14.8
1.851E-10
0.0185
2.516E-08
0.037
3.161E-13
0.111
1.780E-10
0.074
5.530E-11
0.0333
1.808E-11
0.0296
4.507E-11
0.0296
1.48
4.362E-11
0.0296
7.268E-10
0.074
1.902E-05
74
1.518E-04
111
1.11
3.217E-11
148
6.136E-05
185
6.623E-11
0.0222
4.131E-11
0.148
6.838E-12
0.0259
7.113E-11
0.074
1.164E-10
0.37
1.356E-09
0.37
2.609E-10
0.37

Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
Rate
(mSv/hour)
2.510E-06
1.465E-06
2.503E-06
9.109E-03
5.531E-04
6.442E-07
9.080E-08
6.049E-03
2.740E-03
3.818E-04
5.956E-03
3.778E-03
2.670E-03
7.152E-03
1.100E-04
1.023E-02
5.358E-03
2.314E-06
2.516E-06
1.581E-10
1.780E-06
7.110E-07
2.411E-07
6.009E-07
4.985E-07
2.423E-07
7.607E-03
2.278E-02
1.838E-08
6.136E-03
4.416E-06
2.754E-06
4.786E-07
1.778E-06
2.910E-06
3.389E-05
6.523E-06

Table B-11 - Risk Assessment Guide for Radiochemistry – Level 4
Gamma Constant
Nuclide
2

Am-241
Am-242m
Am-243
Ba-133
Cd-109
Cm-244
Cm-248
Co-57
Co-60
Cs-137
Eu-152
Eu-154
Eu-155
Hf-175
I-125
Mn-54
Na-22
Np-237
Pb-210
Po-210
Pu-236
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Ra-226
Sb-125
Sr-85
Sr-90
Tc-99
Tc-99m
Th-229
Th-230
Th-232
U-232
U-233
U-235
U-238

mSv/hr/MBq/m
8.479E-05
4.950E-05
8.456E-05
1.231E-04
4.983E-05
1.741E-05
1.227E-05
4.087E-05
3.703E-04
1.032E-04
2.012E-04
2.042E-04
1.804E-05
6.443E-05
7.432E-05
1.382E-04
3.620E-04
1.251E-04
6.801E-05
1.424E-09
2.405E-05
2.135E-05
8.145E-06
2.030E-05
NA
1.684E-05
3.274E-06
1.028E-04
2.052E-04
NA
1.242E-10
3.317E-05
1.989E-04
1.861E-05
1.848E-05
2.403E-05
7.866E-06
9.159E-05
1.763E-05

If Not
Airborne Less
Than (MBq)
1.48
1.48
1.48
1850
1850
1.85
0.37
1850
1850
1850
1850
1850
1850
1850
74
1850
1850
0.925
1.85
5.55
3.7
1.665
1.48
1.48
74
1.48
3.7
1850
1850
55.5
1850
1850
1.11
7.4
1.295
3.7
18.5
18.5
18.5

360

RAD LEVEL 4
Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
If Airborne
Rate
Less Than
(mSv/hour)
(MBq)
1.255E-04
0.0111
7.326E-05
0.0111
1.251E-04
0.0111
2.277E-01
1295
9.219E-02
74
3.221E-05
0.0185
4.540E-06
0.0037
7.561E-02
1295
6.851E-01
55.5
1.909E-01
185
3.722E-01
37
3.778E-01
37
3.337E-02
166.5
1.192E-01
1665
5.500E-03
74
2.557E-01
1480
6.697E-01
740
1.157E-04
0.0074
1.258E-04
1.85
7.903E-09
1.11
8.899E-05
0.037
3.555E-05
0.01295
1.205E-05
0.0111
3.004E-05
0.0111
0.555
2.492E-05
0.01295
1.211E-05
1.11
1.902E-01
925
3.796E-01
1850
7.4
2.298E-07
1295
6.136E-02
1850
2.208E-04
0.00185
1.377E-04
0.0111
2.393E-05
0.00185
8.891E-05
0.0148
1.455E-04
0.074
1.694E-03
0.074
3.262E-04
0.074

Maximum
Dose
Equivalent
Rate
(mSv/hour)
9.412E-07
5.495E-07
9.386E-07
1.594E-01
3.687E-03
3.221E-07
4.540E-08
5.293E-02
2.055E-02
1.909E-02
7.444E-03
7.555E-03
3.004E-03
1.073E-01
5.500E-03
2.045E-01
2.679E-01
9.257E-07
1.258E-04
1.581E-09
8.899E-07
2.765E-07
9.041E-08
2.253E-07
2.181E-07
3.634E-06
9.509E-02
3.796E-01
1.608E-07
6.136E-02
3.680E-07
2.066E-07
3.419E-08
3.556E-07
5.821E-07
6.778E-06
1.305E-06

Table B-12 – A Sample of Possible Equipment Hazards in Laboratories
Method
Analysis

Equipment
Atomic Emission Spectroscopy

Mass Spectroscopy

Gamma Spectroscopy

Alpha Spectroscopy
Laser Spectroscopy
UV Vis Photospectroscopy

FT/iR Photospectroscopy

Liquid Scintillation Counting

Alpha/Beta Counting

Transmission Electron Microscope

Scanning Electron Microscope

X-Ray Diffraction Spectroscopy
X-Ray Fluorescence
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Hazard
High voltage
Hot surfaces
Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar
Gasses - Toxic
Laser reflections
Sample handling - liquids
High voltage
Hot surfaces
Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar
Gasses - Toxic
Laser
Sample handling - liquids
High Vacuum
High voltage
Cold surfaces - LN
Sample handling - liquids
Gasses – Asphyxiates
Vacuum
Airborne materials*
Airborne materials*
Laser reflections*
UV Exposure*
Sample handling - liquids
Gasses – Asphyxiates
IR Exposure*
Sample handling - liquids
Gasses – Asphyxiates
Hazardous cocktails*
Sample handling - liquids
Contamination control
High Voltage
Flammable gasses – CH4
Gasses – Asphyxiates - Ar
Contamination control
High Voltage
X-ray emissions
High Vacuum
Contamination control
High Voltage
X-ray emissions
Contamination control
High Voltage
High dose rates
High Voltage
Contamination control

Method

Equipment

Hazard

Sample Preparation
Heating
Furnace

Hot Plate
Oven
Arc Furnace

Reactor

Cooling

Chilling in Dry Ice
Refrigeration and Chiller Operations
Gas Flow
Flowing Liquid Coolant

Other

Freeze Drying

Dissolution
Dilution
Filtration
Stirring
Ball Mill
Caustic Bath
Pellet Pressing
Polishing
Grinding
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High voltage
Hot surfaces
Gasses – Asphyxiates, Toxic
High voltage
Hot surfaces
High voltage
Hot surfaces
High voltage
Hot surfaces
IR Exposure*
Airborne materials*
High voltage
Hot surfaces
High Pressures
Cold Surfaces
Gasses – Asphyxiates – CO2
Cold Surfaces
Liquid under pressure
Gasses – Asphyxiates
Gas under pressure
Cold Surfaces
Liquid under pressure
Electrical hazard
Cold Surfaces
Contamination Control
Vacuum
Caustic liquids
Contamination Control
Contamination Control
Dose Rate Increase
Liquids under pressure
Contamination Control
Spill Potential
Contamination Control
Heavy moving parts
Contamination Control
Serious Spill Danger
Contamination Control
Airborne Activity Hazard
Contamination Control
Airborne Activity Hazard
Contamination Control
Airborne Activity Hazard

Appendix E - Data from Experiments for Radionuclide Recovery

This appendix provides the data for experiments done to recover
99Tc

from residue in solutions that were no longer useful to the research

for which they were created. The data for each experiment was collected
as it was determined whether the activity in each solution was
substantial enough to provide a useful recovery and as the process
continued once the decision was made that it would be valuable. The
data is primarily in a form that was devised to provide for consistent data
collection. Important information about each residue was collected in as
simple a way as possible to minimize costs. The result of this evaluation
is a mechanism that is applicable to residues from laboratory
experiments and provides a low cost method to determine desirability of
recovery for radionuclides in the solution.
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Residue Numbers 12-27-10-1 and 12-27-10-2
Residues #12-27-10-1 and #12-27-10-2 have a relatively low
technetium concentration and limit the mass of
recovery. With less than 1 mg of

99Tc

99Tc

available for

each, these samples are low volume

and can be solidified for waste. Recovery of

99Tc

from these samples is

noted as not recommended. Samples were absorbed into contamination
control pads, dried, and disposed as solid waste.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-1 & #12-27-10-2
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒)
Volume of solution: 100 + 200 mL

Solution pH: unknown

Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Mass (1) = 7.28E-1 mg; Act. (1) = 0.5 MBq

Radionuclide (2):

99Tc;

Mass (2) = 1.72E-1 mg; Act. (2) = 0.1 MBq

Chemical compound(s): 1 – TBP-TcO4
Chemical compound(s): 2 – Dark liquid/No label
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☒, No☐, N/A☐)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-3
Residue #12-27-10-3 was labeled “Organic liquids containing Pu &
U”, and the matrix was indicated as n-dodecane. The activity appeared
low from the LSC analyses, but this may be a “desirable recovery effort”
since there were no other solutions containing these radionuclides. The
residue was a light brown liquid and had no film on the inside of the 125
mL polyethylene container.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-3
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒)
Volume of solution: 30 mL
Radionuclide (1):

239Pu;

Solution pH: 5

Mass (1) = 1.49E-2 mg; Act. (1) <0.1 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Contained both Pu & U in n-dodecane
Chemical compound(s): CAS 112-40-3
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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The sample had no color on the filter. The dispersion continued to
the extent of the filter and there was no ring around the dispersion. This
indicated that the material was not very volatile, not very viscous, and
did not have many visible particles in the mixture. The portable
instrument response from this residue was similar to background and a
decision was made to solidify and dispose of this material as radioactive
waste.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-4
Residue #12-27-10-4 initially contained 800 mL of an unidentified
solution. LSC analysis indicated an estimated 2.1 grams of

99Tc.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-4
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 800 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: 3

Mass (1) = 2.15E+03 mg; Act. (1) =1350 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Organic Acid, light brown in color
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
If the material was homogeneous in this solution, then it would
have a concentration of approximately 2.7 mg/mL. This sample had
great recovery potential and could be the source used for collection of
data for several recovery techniques for

99Tc.

There was no film on the

inside of the container and a strong odor of ammonia emanated from the
container. The sample was colorless on the filter. The dispersion
continued to an ellipse of 4.5 cm by 4 cm, without a ring around the
ellipse perimeter, and it evaporated relatively quickly. This information
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indicated that the material was more volatile, not very viscous, and did
not have many visible particles in the mixture.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-5
Residue #12-27-10-5 was 300 mL of organic solvent containing an
estimated 1.75 grams of

99Tc

in solution. The solution appears to be

homogeneous, and has a concentration of approximately 5.8 mg of
99Tc/mL.

This sample had great recovery potential and could also be a

source used for collection of data for several recovery techniques. There
was no film on the inside of the container.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-5
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 300 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: 3

Mass (1) = 1.75E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 1100 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Organic, dark brown colored liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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The sample color on the filter paper was light brown. The dispersion
continued to an ellipse of 4.8 cm by 6 cm with no visible ring. This
information indicated that the material was volatile, not very viscous,
and did not have many visible particles in the mixture.

Residue Number 12-27-10-6
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Residue #12-27-10-6 was labeled as an unspecified organic acid.
Because of its small volume, 30 mL, and small black particles in the
liquid, it was decided to filter the residue to see if this separation could
be simple. The residue was filtered through a paper filter into a 250 mL
beaker, which was then washed with 100 mL of a 0.1 M potassium
chloride solution and allowed to settle for 24 hours. This was a simple
attempt to observe the effect of a salt on the solution. No other salts were
tested in this fashion.
After this treatment, several black specks were observed to be on
the bottom of the beaker with several white crystals, when counted
separately from each other, the highest response on a Geiger counter was
from the black specs, possibly a compound containing

99Tc.

A 50 mL

sample of 3% H2O2 was added to the beaker to assist oxidation of any
other

99Tc

in solution. The KCl salt dissolved and the black particles

containing the majority of the

99Tc

stayed at the bottom of the beaker,

they did not dissolve. The mixture was transferred into two centrifuge
tubes and a small volume of the mixture containing the

99Tc

residue was

removed by transfer pipette into a conical bottom 5 mL glass tube. This
recovery caused collection of approximately 10 mg of the

99Tc

compound.

With an estimated 47 mg available from LSC analysis, the recovery was
21.3% and considered successful. While this is not a drastic quantity of
99Tc,

the technique was simple, the cost was only the time required to

filter the solution and wash the filter, and the cost of chemicals was less
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than $1.00. The dispersion information indicated that the material was
not very volatile or viscous and had few visible particles in the mixture.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-6
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 25 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 4.70E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 29.5 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Organic acid, black suspended particles,
light brown liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-7
Residue #12-27-10-7 was labeled organic waste. The activity
identified by LSC analysis indicated an approximate

99Tc

mass of 1.58

grams available for recovery.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-7
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 125 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 1.58E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 992 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Organic waste, light brown liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)

The dispersion continued to a 5 cm by 5.4 cm ellipse with a
slightly darker ring around the dispersion. This experiment indicated
that the material was volatile and did not have many visible particles in
the mixture. The emissions measured from the filter by portable
instrument indicated an approximate activity of 5x107 Bq/mL or a total
activity in the container of 8x108 Bq in the container. This indicates an
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approximate mass of

99Tc

of 1.27 grams and is reasonably consistent

with the estimate by LSC analysis.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-8
Residue # 12-27-10-8, by discussion with the researcher [116],
was found to be a

99Tc2S7

compound. While the results from samples in

this study may not be similar in ease or cost, each can be concluded with
a degree of certainty that recovery may be possible with the exception of
this one.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-8
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒)
Volume of solution: 100 mL
Radionuclide(1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 1.11E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 6.9 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Black viscous solid by design
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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With regard to this particular sample, the residue was found to be
a compound mixture, which created a black viscous mass having the
property of easily drying to a solid and being available for disposal as a
solid waste. In the previously referenced discussion with the researcher,
he indicated this to be a product that is not easy to break down.
Although this product (99Tc2S7) is easily made, it presents very low
recovery potential and therefore is an undesirable step in a recovery
process. It may be a useful waste form for technetium isotopes [19]. The
recovery potential for this material was considered to be low because of
the particulate matter that was present in the waste. The compound
became a tar-like solid mass in the container. This material was disposed
as solid radioactive waste.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-9
Residue #12-27-10-9 had a mass concentration of

99Tc

similar to

#2-27-10-8, however, the matrix was noted as H2O.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-9
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒)
Volume of solution: 400 mL
Radionuclide(1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 5.12E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 32.1MBq

Chemical compound(s): H2O matrix
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
This sample also did not represent an opportunity to regain a
significant quantity of material and was therefore excluded from the
recovery experiments. The material was absorbed into a contamination
control pad, allowed to dry, and disposed of as solid radioactive waste.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-10
Residue #12-27-10-10 was labeled, “FP waste 5/5/06”. With a
mass concentration of approximately 4 mg/mL, this could be a valuable
reclamation.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-10
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 200 mL
Radionuclide(1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: 0

Mass (1) = 7.92E+2 mg; Act. (1) = 497 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Dark brown colored liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☒, N/A☐)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)

There was no film on the inside of the container. The sample color
on the filter paper was pale green. The dispersion continued to an ellipse
of 6.2 cm by 7 cm and with no ring. Figure 3-3 provides a photograph of
the dispersion experiment for this sample. Based on the filter dispersion,
the mixture was likely to contain a volatile fluid. As shown in Figure 3-3,
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the response rate from the activity on the filter indicates a rough activity
of 1.2x106 dpm (2x104 Bq). This relates to an activity concentration of
2x105 Bq/mL or for the 800 mL volume, a total activity of 16.4 MBq,
approximately 3% of the activity determined from LSC analysis. In the
determination of the activity on the filter, a detection efficiency of 30%
was assumed. This appears to be much higher than appropriate for
measurement of emissions from the filter.
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Residue Number 12-27-10-11
Residue #12-27-10-11 did not represent an opportunity to regain a
significant quantity of material, so recovery of

99Tc

from this sample is

not feasible. The residue was neutralized using NaOH to a pH of 9 and
solidified using Aquaset II a commercial solidification agent Invalid
source specified.Invalid source specified. to make an immobile
product, then disposed of as solid waste.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-11
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☐, No☒)
Volume of solution: 300 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 5.85E+0 mg; Act. (1) = 3.7 MBq

Chemical compound(s): None
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-12
Residue #12-27-10-12, an unlabeled sample, with a mass
concentration of approximately 1.4 mg/mL was potentially a good
reclamation. There was a thick orange film on the inside of the container.
On the filter paper the sample color was light green. The dispersion
continued to an ellipse of 6.2 cm by 7 cm and with no discernible
dispersion ring. The material in this residue appears similar to residue
#12-27-10-10.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-12
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 800 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: 0

Mass (1) = 1.12E+3 mg; Act. (1) = 704 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Orange colored liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-13
Residue #12-27-10-13, a labeled sample (“Tc waste organic
liquids”) with a mass concentration of approximately 1.2 mg/mL, had an
estimated recovery quantity at almost 600 mg and presented an excellent
opportunity for reclamation. There was no dispersion data for this
sample and all subsequent samples because it was felt that the data
already collected was sufficient to allow a decision for recovery. There
was no film on the inside of the container.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-13
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 500 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 5.91E+2 mg; Act. (1) = 370 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Tc waste organic liquids, dark brown
colored liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-14
Residue #12-27-10-14 was also a labeled (“Tc waste in H2O, NOx
11/15/2010 NF”) sample with a mass concentration of approximately 1.3
mg/mL, this sample was determined to be a good candidate for
reclamation. There was no film on the inside of the container.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-14
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 200 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 2.62E-2 mg; Act. (1) = 164 MBq

Chemical compound(s): Tc waste in H2O, NOx 11/15/2010 NF,
dark brown liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Number 12-27-10-15
Residue #12-27-10-15 was also a labeled (“0.5 g of

99Tc

in organic

acid”) sample with a mass concentration of approximately 4.4 mg/mL;
this sample was determined to be a good candidate for reclamation.
There was no film on the inside of the container.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: # 12-27-10-15
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 500 mL
Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Solution pH: unknown

Mass (1) = 2.18E+3 mg; Act. (1) =1370 MBq

Chemical compound(s): 0.5g of Tc in organic acid, dark brown
liquid
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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Residue Numbers 12-27-10-16 and 12-27-10-17
Residues

#12-27-10-16

and

#12-27-10-17

were

considered

reasonable for recovery based on their concentrations, 0.48 mg/ml and
0.473 mg/ml respectively. Both samples were listed on the same form as
another means of cutting down the administrative burden from this
process.

UNLV In-Process Experimental Products Form
Residue Number: #12-27-10-16 & #12-27-10-17
Date of Storage: Unknown
Has a value analysis been completed? (Yes☒, No☐)
Is recovery of radioactive material recommended? (Yes☒, No☐)
Volume of solution: 50 + 450 mL

Solution pH: unknown

Radionuclide (1):

99Tc;

Mass (1) = 2.38E+1 mg; Act. (1) = 14 MBq

Radionuclide (2):

99Tc;

Mass (2) = 2.13E+2 mg; Act. (2) = 133 MBq

Chemical compound(s): 1 – No notation
Chemical compound(s): 2 – No notation
Hazardous Component: Flammable ☐ Corrosive ☐ Oxidizer ☐
Toxic ☐ Unknown ☒
If recovery of radioactive material in this product is not desired, is
it possible to remove the hazardous component to allow disposal as
radioactive waste? (Yes☐, No☐, N/A☒)
Notify the UNLV Radiation Safety Office? (Yes☐, No☒)
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